Chilton v. St. Louis & I. M. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 06 February 1893
• Citation: 114 Mo. 88,21 S.W. 457
• Parties: CHILTON et al. v. ST. LOUIS & I. M. RY. CO.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

21 S.W. 457

114 Mo. 88

CHILTON et al. v. ST. LOUIS & I. M. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

February 6, 1893.

CIVIL RIGHTS — CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS — INSTRUCTIONS — HARMLESS ERROR.

1. It is harmless error to submit to the jury the question whether a railroad regulation is reasonable, where the jury decide the question correctly.

2. Const. U. S. Amend. 14, which provides that "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," and Const. Mo. 1865, art. 1, § 3, which provides that "no person can, on account of color, be subjected in law to any other restraints or disqualifications in regard to any personal rights than such as are laid upon others under like circumstances," are not violated by a railroad regulation that forbids negroes to travel in the same cars with

white people, where the railroad company provides equally good cars for the negroes as for the whites.

Appeal from St. Louis circuit court; G. A. Madill, Judge.

Action by Mary J. Chilton and her husband against the St. Louis & Iron Mountain Railway Company. Defendant obtained judgment. Plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

The other facts fully appear in the following statement by MACFARLANE, J.:

This is a suit by plaintiff Mary Chilton and her husband, who were of African descent, to recover damages by reason of the agents of defendant removing the said Mary from what was known as the "ladies' coach" on one of defendant's trains, on which she was a passenger, and refusing to carry her therein. Defendant by its answer, justified its action on the ground that it had adopted a regulation for the management of its business as a carrier of passengers, which was then in force, and known to plaintiffs, which prohibited persons of the race to which she belonged from occupying the ladies' coach, but that it had supplied for the use of plaintiff and others of said race another car, equally safe, comfortable, commodious, and convenient, in which plaintiff had been requested to take a seat, and which she had refused to do. The evidence tended to prove the issues. The court, of its own motion, gave the jury the following instructions: "(1) If the jury believe from the evidence in this case that at the time of the happening of the occurrence complained of in the petition it was a regulation of the defendant in the conduct of its business of carrying passengers on its cars between St. Louis and Carondelet to require colored persons (or persons of African descent) to ride in cars other than those known as `ladies' cars,' and that such regulation, under all the evidence in this case, was a reasonable one, and that defendant was ready and willing and offered to carry the plaintiff, Mary Jane Chilton, in a car other than such ladies' car, which was a reasonably safe, commodious, and comfortable car, and in which there was sufficient and suitable room for her to be carried, * * * and that the said Mary Jane had notice of such regulations, and refused to comply with them, and that in consequence of such refusal the defendant's agents expelled her from said cars, using no more force than was necessary for that purpose, then the jury are instructed to return a verdict for the defendant. (2) Although the jury may believe from the evidence that it was a regulation of the defendant, in the conduct of its business of carrying passengers on its cars between St. Louis and Carondelet, to require colored persons, or persons of African descent, to ride in cars other than ladies' cars, and that such regulation, under all the evidence in the case, was a reasonable one, and that the plaintiff, Mary Jane, had notice of such regulation, yet, if they further believe from the evidence that the defendant was not then and there ready and willing to carry the said Mary Jane in a car other than the ladies' car, which was reasonably safe, commodious, and comfortable, and in which there was sufficient and suitable room for her, then they will find for the plaintiffs, provided they further believe that the agents of defendant expelled her from said ladies' car, and that the said plaintiffs are husband and wife." The other instructions bore on the question of the measure of damages, and no point is made on it. Verdict and judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appealed.

E. W. Pattison, for appellants. Dryden & Dryden, for respondent.

MACFARLANE, J., (after stating the facts.)

1. It is insisted that the regulation of defendant in conducting its business of carrier of passengers, in this state, which excluded a woman from a car set apart for ladies merely on account of color was unreasonable, and was forbidden by the constitution and laws of the United States and of this state, and the court committed error in declaring otherwise in its instructions to the jury. Whether this regulation, the facts being undisputed, was a reasonable one, was a question of...