Chimenti v. Cmty. Support Servs., Inc., CASE NO. 5:16-cv-2276

• Decision Date: 04 August 2017
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 5:16-cv-2276
• Parties: KIMBERLY A. CHIMENTI, PLAINTIFF, v. COMMUNITY SUPPORT SERVICES, INC., DEFENDANT.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

KIMBERLY A. CHIMENTI, PLAINTIFF, v. COMMUNITY SUPPORT SERVICES, INC., DEFENDANT.

CASE NO. 5:16-cv-2276

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

August 4, 2017

JUDGE SARA LIOI

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an employment case removed from state court. Plaintiff Kimberly Chimenti ("plaintiff" or "Chimenti") alleges that defendant Community Support Services, Inc. ("defendant" or "CSS") improperly terminated her employment. Before the Court is defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Doc. No. 7 ["MJP"].) Plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc. No. 9 ["Opp'n"]), and defendant has filed a reply (Doc. No. 10 ["Reply"]). Because the Court finds that plaintiff's state law claims are completely preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), defendant's motion is granted, and this case is dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

For over ten years and through May 16, 2016, plaintiff was employed by defendant, a non-profit organization, as a case manager. (Doc. No. 1-1 Complaint ["Compl."]) ¶¶ 2-3.) Her employment with defendant was governed by the terms a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), which was negotiated by the Service Employee's International Union ("SEIU" or "the Union"). (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.) A copy of the relevant CBA is appended to the complaint as Exhibit A. (Id. ¶ 4; Doc. No. 1-1 [CBA], beginning at 12¹.)

In early May 2016, a mentally ill client of CSS reported that plaintiff had improperly withheld a portion of the client's medication. (Compl. ¶ 6.) On May 16, 2016, plaintiff met with Douglas Wagner, a CSS human resources representative. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff attended the meeting with Wagner without an SEIU representative present on her behalf. (Id. ¶ 9.) Wagner advised plaintiff that CSS was "investigating 'whether or not [Chimenti] had committed an undocumented medication error' in violation of company policy." (Id. ¶ 10.) At the conclusion of the meeting, Wagner sent plaintiff home, and did not permit her to engage in the investigation in any "meaningful way[.]" (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.)

Plaintiff was not permitted to return to work after the meeting with Wagner. (Id. ¶ 13.) Instead, on or about May 30, 2016, plaintiff was contacted by a CSS representative and was "notified that her employment was terminated, effective immediately." (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff was not "subject to progressive disciplinary proceedings of any kind before her dismissal[,]" and was not permitted to redeem her accumulated "sick days" or "vacation time" for value. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 17-18.)

On August 10, 2016, plaintiff filed the present action in state court. Her complaint raises three breach of contract claims and a claim for wrongful discharge. On September 13, 2016, defendant removed the action to federal court. In its notice of removal, defendant maintains that plaintiff's claims "arise under the laws of the United States and, further, are preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA," giving this Court "original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331." (Doc. No. 1 (Notice of Removal ["Notice"]) ¶ 10.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendant brings its dispositive motion under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is the same as for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). E.E.O.C. v. J.H. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 851 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Grindstaff v. Green, 133 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1998)). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the pleading. Davis H. Elliot Co., Inc. v. Caribbean Util. Co., Ltd., 513 F.2d 1176, 1182 (6th Cir. 1975). All allegations of fact by the non-moving party are accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to that party. See Grindstaff, 133 F.3d at 421 (citing Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 475 (6th Cir. 1990)). The Court, however, "need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences." Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987)). Nor is the Court required to accept as true complaint allegations that are contradicted by public records and other evidentiary materials of which the Court may take judicial notice. See Moody v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 3d 869, 874-75 (W.D. Mich. 2014) ("court may disregard allegations in the complaint if contradicted by facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint[]") (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Williams v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 498 F. App'x 532, 536 (6th Cir. 2012) ("if a factual assertion in the pleadings is inconsistent with a document attached for support, the Court is to accept the facts as stated in the attached document[]") (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The sufficiency of the pleading is tested against the notice pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which provides that a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement ofthe claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Although this standard is liberal, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). If the plaintiff has not "nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (citation omitted).

In deciding a motion to dismiss and/or a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12, the Court generally may not consider matters outside of the pleadings without converting the motion into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. As the Sixth Circuit has held, however, there are a number of exceptions to this rule. Indeed, it is well settled that, in ruling on a Rule 12 dispositive motion, a district court "may consider the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant's motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained therein." Bassett v. Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335 (6th Cir. 2007) (court may consider documents that govern a party's rights and are necessarily incorporated by reference in the complaint on a motion to dismiss) (citations omitted).

Here, the CBA is appended to and referenced repeatedly in the complaint and is central to each and every one of plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the Court may take judicial notice of the CBA without converting the Rule 12(c) motion into one for summary judgment. Commercial Money Ctr., 508 F.3d at 335-36.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant maintains that all of plaintiff's state law claims are preempted by federal labor law. "Given the importance of maintaining uniform federal law, the Supreme Court 'has made clear that § 301 of the LMRA preempts any state-law claim arising from a breach of a collective bargaining agreement.'" Mattis v. Massman, 355 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326, 1329 (6th Cir. 1989) (en banc)). "Preemption under § 301 applies not only to state-law contract claims, but has been expanded to include state-law tort claims as well." Id. (citation omitted). Tort claims must be independent of the CBA to survive § 301 preemption. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1985) (analyzing state-law claim to determine if it was "independent of any right established by contract," or, instead, "whether evaluation of the tort claim [was] inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract[]").

Based upon Supreme Court preemption law, the Sixth Circuit has developed a two-step approach for determining whether § 301 preemption applies. Alongi v. Ford Motor Co., 386 F.3d 716, 724 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing DeCoe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1994)).

First, the district court must examine whether proof of the state law claim requires interpretation of collective bargaining agreement terms. Second, the court must ascertain whether the right claimed by the plaintiff is created by the collective bargaining agreement or by state law. If the right both is borne of state law and does not invoke contract interpretation, then there is no preemption. However, if neither or only one criterion is satisfied, section 301 preemption is warranted.

DeCoe, 32 F.3d at 216 (internal citation omitted). That is, a state-law claim is preempted by § 301 either (1) if "resolving the state-law claim would require interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement[]" or (2) if "the rights claimed by the plaintiff were created by the collective bargaining agreement [rather than] by state law." Mattis, 355 F.3d at 906 (citing DeCoe, 32 F.3d at 216). "[I]f a state-law claim fails either of these two requirements, it is preempted by § 301." Id. (emphasis in original).

With respect to the former inquiry, courts must ask whether a plaintiff can prove the elements of her state-law claim without contract interpretation. See DeCoe, 32 F.3d at 216. "In order to make [this] determination, the court is not bound by the 'well-pleaded complaint' rule, but rather, looks to the essence of the plaintiff's claim, in order to determine whether the plaintiff is attempting to disguise what is essentially a contract claim as a...