Chinniah v. E. Pennsboro Twp.
| Decision Date | 08 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 1:15-CV-02240 |
| Parties | GNANA M. CHINNIAH and SUGANTHINI CHINNIAH, Plaintiffs, v. EAST PENNSBORO TOWNSHIP, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is the report and recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Karoline Mehalchick recommending that Defendants' motions to dismiss be granted as to Plaintiffs' claims for defamation, civil conspiracy, and intentional interference with legal rights and relations, and denied as to Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and request for punitive damages. (Doc. 142.) For the reasons that follow, the court declines to adopt the recommendation to deny Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' punitive damages claim, but adopts the remaining portions of the recommendation as modified.
Neither party objected to the facts or procedural history stated in the report and recommendation. Because the court gives "reasoned consideration" to these uncontested portions of the report and recommendation, the court will only restate the factual background and procedural history necessary for clarity in this opinion. E.E.O.C. v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 99 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1987)). Plaintiffs, Gnana and Suganthini Chinniah ("the Chinniahs"), who are self-represented, initiated this action in November 2015 against the following individuals and entities: East Pennsboro Township, Pennsylvania; Township Building Inspector and Code Enforcement Officer Jeffrey S. Shultz; Township Health and Code Enforcement Officer Karen Dunkle; former Township Commissioner and current Cumberland County, Pennsylvania Commissioner James Herzler; Current Township commissioner John Kuntzelman; attorney Christopher Underhill and Underhill's firm, the Law Offices of Hartman Underhill & Brubaker (collectively, the "Underhill Defendants"); attorneys Joshua Autry and Jeffrey Conrad, along with their firm, the Law Offices of Clymer Musser & Conrad (collectively, the "Clymer Conrad Defendants"); the Cumberland County Tax Claim Bureau; and the Cumberland County Housing and Redevelopment Authorities.1 (Doc. 1.) This initial complaint was subject to four motions to dismiss, Docs. 22, 36, 40, 43, all ofwhich were granted on September 30, 2016 with leave for the Chinniahs to amend their complaint.2 (Docs. 71, 78.)
The Chinniahs filed an amended complaint on October 31, 2016. (Doc. 92.) This amended complaint was met with four renewed motions to dismiss. (Docs. 94, 96, 97, 99.) These motions were granted, and the Chinniahs' case was dismissed with prejudice.3 (Docs. 118, 126.) The Chinniahs appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for the court to consider the Chinniahs' state law claims. (Doc. 132.) After affording all parties the opportunity for supplemental briefing on the remaining state law claims, Judge Mehalchick issued a report and recommendation on April 13, 2020, limited to the issues presented for the court's supplemental jurisdiction.4 (Doc. 142.)
In the report and recommendation, Judge Mehalchick recommends that the Clymer Conrad Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted as to the Chinniahs' claims for defamation, civil conspiracy, and intentional interference with legalrights and relations. (Doc. 142, p. 22.)5 In contrast, Judge Mehalchick recommends that the motions be denied as to the Chinniahs' claims for breach of contract and punitive damages. (Id. at 22-23.) Judge Mehalchick further recommends that the Chinniahs be given 30 days to file a certificate of merit in support of their legal malpractice claim, and 30 days leave to file an amended complaint as to their claims for civil conspiracy and intentional interference with legal rights and relations as a single, stand-alone document without reliance on prior filings. (Id.) Finally, Judge Mehalchick recommends that the Underhill Defendants' motion to dismiss be denied for failure to brief, and therefore contest, the Chinniahs' civil conspiracy claim either in their motion to dismiss or in the supplemental briefing permitted by the court. (Id. at 3.)
On April 13, 2019, the Underhill Defendants objected to the recommendations relating to the Chinniahs' civil conspiracy claim. (Doc. 143.) On April 27, 2020, the Autry Defendants objected to the recommendations regarding the Chinniahs' breach of contract and punitive damages claims. (Doc. 144.) On the same day, the Chinniahs objected to the recommendations with respect to their civil conspiracy, interference with legal relations, and defamation claims. (Doc. 145.) The Autry Defendants and the Chinniahs timely filed briefs in opposition. (Docs. 147, 148.)
When a party objects to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the district court is required to conduct a de novo review of the contested portions of the report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1106 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989). The district court may accept, reject, or modify the magistrate judge's report and recommendation in whole or in part. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with further instructions. Id. "Although the standard is de novo, the extent of review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge, and the court may rely on the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper." Weidman v. Colvin, 164 F. Supp. 3d 650, 653 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (citing Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F. Supp. 2d 496, 499 (M.D. Pa. 2000)). For the uncontested portions of the report and recommendation, the court affords "reasoned consideration" before adopting it as the decision of this court. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d at 100 (quoting Henderson, 812 F.2d at 878).
In order "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausibleon its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Conclusory allegations of liability are insufficient" to survive a motion to dismiss. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79). To determine whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court identifies "the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief," disregards the allegations "that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth," and determines whether the remaining factual allegations "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012).
The parties do not object to the following opinions and recommendations by Judge Mehalchick. Judge Mehalchick recommends that the Clymer Conrad Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted as to the Chinniahs' claim for legal malpractice, based on her conclusion that this claim is not barred by collateral estoppel, but that the Chinniahs' failure to satisfy the certificate of merit requirement precludes this claim from moving forward in this litigation. (Doc.142, pp. 7-14.) Specifically, Judge Mehalchick found that collateral estoppel does not bar the Chinniahs' legal malpractice claim because, while the essence of this claim was litigated before in 2008, it was analyzed under a different standard of review and burden of persuasion than the present claim before the court. In other words: "there are stark differences between how the Chinniahs' claim was resolved in the 2008 case and how it would be resolved in this case vis-à-vis the procedures utilized . . . and the burdens of persuasion." (Id. at 8.) Thus, the Chinniahs' claim for legal malpractice is not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id.)
However, Judge Mehalchick found that the Chinniahs brought their claim for legal malpractice under a tort theory for professional negligence. (Id. at 12.) Therefore, under Pennsylvania law, the Chinniahs were required to submit a certificate of merit, which was conspicuously absent from any of their filings, and they had not relied upon any exceptions to the requirement. (Id. at 14.) Due to the absence of a certificate of merit, Judge Mehalchick granted the Clymer Conrad Defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice to the Chinniahs filing a certificate of merit within 30 days in support of their legal malpractice claim. (Id.)
After giving "reasoned consideration" to the uncontested portions of the report and recommendation, the court finds that Judge Mehalchick's analysis is well-reasoned and fully supported by the record and applicable law. See City ofLong Branch, 866 F.3d at 99 (quoting Henderson, 812 F.2d at 878). Thus, the court will adopt these portions of the report and recommendation in full.6
In the Clymer Conrad Defendants' motion to dismiss, they argued that the Chinniahs' defamation claim should be dismissed because Pennsylvania's one-year statute of limitations has run on this claim. (Doc. 100, p. 11.) In response, the Chinniahs merely restated their claim for defamation, noting that this claim was grounded upon Defendant Conrad's "false report to...
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