Chisholm v. Ga. Dep't of Labor
| Decision Date | 03 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. A14A0777.,A14A0777. |
| Citation | 329 Ga.App. 188,764 S.E.2d 432 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | CHISHOLM v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR et al. |
Michael Paul Pryor, for Appellant.
Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Bryan K. Webb, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Romy D. Smith, Kimberly B. Lewis, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellees.
Sheralyn R. Chisholm's employer had a policy requiring employees to report arrests within five days of their occurrence. Chisholm was discharged from employment when she reported her arrest seven days late. Following the grant of her application for interlocutory appeal, Chisholm now appeals the superior court's order affirming a decision by the Board of Review of the Department of Labor (the “Board of Review”) to disqualify her from receiving unemployment benefits because of her failure to report her arrest within the five-day deadline. Because Chisholm could not have reasonably expected that a short, immaterial delay in reporting her arrest to her employer would result in her termination, we reverse.
Judicial review of an administrative decision requires the court to determine that the findings of fact are supported by any evidence and to examine the soundness of the conclusions of law that are based upon the findings of fact. When this Court reviews a superior court's order in an administrative proceeding, our duty is not to review whether the record supports the superior court's decision but whether the record supports the final decision of the administrative agency.
(Citations, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Davane v. Thurmond, 300 Ga.App. 474, 475, 685 S.E.2d 446 (2009). Mindful of these principles, we turn to the record in the present case.
The evidence adduced at the administrative hearing showed that in November 2010, the Georgia Department of Behavioral Health & Developmental Disabilities (the “Behavioral Health Department” or the “Department”) hired Chisholm to work as a nurse educator at its regional hospital in Columbus. During her orientation, Chisholm signed a form acknowledging her responsibility to review and comply with the Department's personnel policies, including Policy Number 1201, Standards of Conduct and Ethics in Government (the “Standards of Conduct”). The Standards of Conduct totaled 11 pages and included the following section:
(Emphasis in original.)
Chisholm later transferred to the Behavioral Health Department's regional hospital in Atlanta. Subsequently, on October 24, 2012, Chisholm was arrested.1 Over the next few days, Chisholm and her husband called Chisholm's supervisor on two occasions when she had shifts scheduled at the hospital and notified the supervisor that she would be unable to work, but did not give a reason for her absence.
After returning to work, Chisholm mentioned her arrest to a co-worker, who suggested that she do some research and find out if the Behavioral Health Department had an arrest disclosure policy. The “moment” that her co-worker made this suggestion, Chisholm researched the personnel policies on the Internet, read the disclosure policy for the first time, and immediately reported her arrest to her superiors that same day, November 5, 2012. The Department does not dispute that the information that Chisholm provided to her superiors about her arrest was accurate.
Chisholm continued to work at the Atlanta hospital without incident through the end of November. However, on December 1, 2012, she emailed her superiors with complaints about understaffing and unsafe conditions at the hospital and requested that she be transferred to another hospital within the Behavioral Health Department. Two days later, Chisholm was informed that she had to either resign or be terminated due to her failure to report her arrest within five days as specified in the Standards of Conduct. She resigned under protest.
Chisholm applied for and initially was awarded unemployment benefits, but the Behavioral Health Department challenged the award. At the administrative hearing before an administrative hearing officer (“AHO”), Chisholm's immediate supervisor testified that the action taken by the Department in this case was not based on Chisholm's “work performance,” which had always “been great.” According to the supervisor, “the whole thing went to the black and white of [the] policy” requiring that an arrest be reported within five days of its occurrence, and the human resources department had made the decision that Chisholm should be terminated for violating the policy if she refused to resign. The supervisor further testified that he had been unaware that termination was even a “possibility” for failing to comply with the five-day reporting requirement.
Chisholm testified that she had been unaware of the personnel policy that arrests had to be reported to the Behavioral Health Department within five days, much less that failure to strictly comply with the time deadline could lead to termination. She conceded that during her orientation, she signed the form acknowledging that she was required to review and comply with the Department's personnel policies, but had not reviewed the policies on her own at that time. Chisholm testified that the personnel policies were not emphasized during her orientation, and that she had been given a large number of orientation materials and had signed the acknowledgment form “like most people do” without paying “any particular attention” to the individual policies, including the policy related to the disclosure of arrests.
Lastly, an employee relations specialist with the Behavioral Health Department testified at the administrative hearing. The specialist denied that Chisholm was forced to resign as a result of her complaint over work conditions or her request for a transfer, and reiterated that Chisholm was a “great employee.” According to the specialist, the “only policy” that Chisholm had violated was the policy requiring that an arrest be reported within five days of its occurrence, and the human resources department had made the decision to terminate Chisholm for violating that policy.
Following the administrative hearing, the AHO found that Chisholm had resigned only after being informed that she would be terminated, and that, as a result, she had been discharged from her position by the Behavioral Health Department. The AHO further found that Chisholm had been discharged for her failure to comply with the personnel policy that required arrests to be reported within five days, not as retaliation for her complaints about her work conditions or her request for a transfer. The AHO noted that Chisholm had signed the acknowledgment form requiring her to review and comply with the personnel policies and went on to conclude that Chisholm was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under OCGA § 34–8–194(2)(A) because of her failure “to obey orders, rules, or instructions” of her employer by not strictly complying with the five-day reporting requirement.
Chisholm appealed the AHO's decision to the Board of Review. The Board of Review adopted the findings of the AHO and affirmed the decision that Chisholm was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under OCGA § 34–8–194(2)(A). The Superior Court of DeKalb County subsequently affirmed the final decision of the Board of Review. Chisholm filed an application for discretionary appeal, which this Court granted. Chisholm now appeals, arguing that the Board of Review's final decision to disqualify her from receiving unemployment benefits was unsupported by the administrative record.
Under OCGA § 34–8–194(2)(A), an individual may be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if she is discharged by her employer “for failure to obey orders, rules, or instructions or for failure to discharge the duties for which the individual was employed as determined by the Commissioner according to the circumstances in the case.” But there is a strong public policy in favor of paying unemployment benefits to one who is discharged through no fault of her own, and, therefore, “disqualification is not appropriate unless the employer shows the discharge was caused by the deliberate, conscious fault of the claimant.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Davane, 300 Ga.App. at 476, 685 S.E.2d 446. See OCGA § 34–8–194(2)(B) ; Millen v. Caldwell, 253 Ga. 112, 113, 317 S.E.2d 818 (1984) ; Case v. Butler, 325 Ga.App. 123, 126(2), 751 S.E.2d...
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