Chitester v. Dep't of Child Prot. Permanency

• Decision Date: 17 December 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 17-12650(FLW)
• Parties: DEBORAH JILL CHITESTER Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD PROTECTION PERMANENCY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

DEBORAH JILL CHITESTER Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD PROTECTION

PERMANENCY, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 17-12650(FLW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

December 17, 2018

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*

OPINION

WOLFSON, United States District Judge

:

Plaintiff Deborah Jill Chitester ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this suit against Defendant Department of Child Protection Permanency (the "DCPP"), alleging that the DCPP illegally removed Plaintiff's child from her care, because the agency perceived Plaintiff as disabled and discriminated against her in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the "Rehabilitation Act"). Based on the same conduct, Plaintiff claims that the DCPP violated her civil rights and caused extreme emotional harm.¹ In the instant matter, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 and state tort claim based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. With respect toPlaintiff's disability-related claims, Defendant moves for dismissal on timeliness grounds. Plaintiff opposes the motion. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED in its entirety; Plaintiff's § 1983 and tort claims against the DCPP are barred by sovereign immunity, and Plaintiff's causes of action under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are time barred. Those claims against the DCPP are dismissed with prejudice, and the DCPPP is dismissed as a defendant. However, Plaintiff is given leave to amend her Complaint within 30 days from the date of the Order accompanying this Opinion; Plaintiff may only amend her § 1983 and tort claims to the extent that asserts those claims against an individual officer of the DCPP, in that person's individual capacity only.

BACKGROUND

The following allegations are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint and are assumed as true.² Plaintiff is the divorced mother of Lillian, her 11-year-old daughter. ECF 1-3 at 1. On December 23, 2014, Lillian was removed from Plaintiff's custody and relocated to live with the father, John Chistester, following the DCPP's investigation, which allegedly revealed that the child was living in a harmful environment. Id. It appears that Plaintiffalleges that the DCPP removed her child because the agency believed that Plaintiff suffered from certain health issues and regarded Plaintiff as being disabled, which, Plaintiff claims, were based on inaccurate assumptions without clinical diagnosis. ECF 34 at 10. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the DCPP incorrectly perceived Plaintiff as a hoarder, and as a result, erroneously concluded that Plaintiff's house was not habitable for Lillian. ECF 27 at 1.

In that respect, Plaintiff alleges that the "DCPP had regarded Plaintiff as having behaviors that adversely impacted [the] child development of [the] daughter . . . [but] Plaintiff was no hoarder [and] had no clinical diagnosis . . . either." ECF 27 at 2. Plaintiff goes on to allege that "the DCPP regarded Plaintiff as disabled as per the ADA Title II and took her child for this reason with no accommodations . . ." Id. Plaintiff claims that Christine Idland³ testified that her understanding when she took over the case was that there was some type of "hoarding issue." ECF 34 at Ex. p. 3.

According to Plaintiff, as a result of the DCPP's discriminatory mischaracterization, Plaintiff was treated unlawfully under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act by being disqualified from receiving certain services and programs offeredby the DCPP that could have assisted Plaintiff in maintaining custody of her daughter. Id. In other words, Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the DCPP labeling her as having a hoarding disability, the DCPP did not offer her adequate accommodations to alleviate her clutter problems. Id. Plaintiff submits that "there were no attempts at reunification . . . [there were] no accommodations made, [and] no services offered AFTER removal." ECF 34 at 1. Plaintiff further alleges:

The Division's assistance fellas far short. DCPP offered the assistance of one cleaning agency and then failed to resolve the administrative issue arising over the number of persons needed to clean the home and the payment for the service. After this one referral failed, DCPP walked away from its responsibility to assist [Plaintiff] in cleaning the home determining that it was too difficult to find an agency to deal with this level of clutter.

Id. at Exhibit p. 1.

Plaintiff alleges that the denial of programs and services violates the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, under which Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages against the DCPP. Id. Plaintiff also brings a § 1983 claim, as well as a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED").

In the instant matter, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 and IIED claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, and Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's disability-related claims based on, inter alia, the statute of limitations.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)

Rule 12(b)(1) mandates the dismissal of a case for "lack of subject-matter jurisdiction." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). An assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity is a challenge to a district court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction.") (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984)). Typically, when jurisdiction is challenged pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the court that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991). However, because "Eleventh Amendment immunity can be expressly waived by a party, or forfeited through non-assertion, it does not implicate federal subject matter jurisdiction in the ordinary sense," and therefore, a party asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity bears the burden of proving its applicability. Christy v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm., 54 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 347 (3d Cir. 1999); Maliandiv. Montclair State Univ., No. 14-01398, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104573, 2014 WL 3778259, at *1 (D.N.J. July 31, 2014).

In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the court must determine whether the motion attacks the complaint as deficient on its face, or whether the motion attacks the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, apart from any pleadings. Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.1977). "In reviewing a facial attack, the court must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing id. at 891). However, "[i]n reviewing a factual attack, the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings." Id. at 176 (citing Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 178-79, 36 V.I. 392 (3d Cir. 1997)). Here, Defendant mounts a factual attack to subject matter jurisdiction, because the parties primarily dispute whether the DCPP qualifies for sovereign immunity as an arm of the state. See Bowers v. NCAA, 475 F.3d 524, 546 (3d Cir. 2007) (determining whether an agency is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity can be "a fact-intensive review that calls for individualized determinations."). Therefore, in reviewing this question of sovereign immunity, it is appropriate for the Court to examine evidence outside the pleadings, if necessary.

B. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, courts "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations and quotations omitted). Under such a standard, the factual allegations set forth in a complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Indeed, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "[A] complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief . . . [a] complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).

However, Rule 12(b)(6) only requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the .. . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must include "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest the required element. This does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (citations and quotations omitted); Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013) ("[A] claimant does not have to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. The pleading standard is not akin to a probability requirement; to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint merely has to state a plausible claim...