Chiulli v. Zola

• Citation: 905 A.2d 1236,97 Conn.App. 699
• Decision Date: 26 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. 26584.,26584.
• Court: Appellate Court of Connecticut
• Parties: Stephen CHIULLI v. Nancy ZOLA, et al.

905 A.2d 1236

97 Conn.App. 699

Stephen CHIULLI v. Nancy ZOLA, et al.

No. 26584.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 21, 2006.

Decided September 26, 2006.

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Andrew B. Bowman, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Alex K. Sherman, with whom, on the brief, was David M. Cohen, Stamford, for the appellee (named defendant).

GRUENDEL, LAVINE and DUPONT, Js.

GRUENDEL, J.

The plaintiff, Stephen Chiulli, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered following the granting of the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant Nancy Zola on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.¹ The plaintiff's sole claim on appeal is that the court improperly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss because he alleged facts sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. We agree with the court that the plaintiff lacks standing to obtain the remedy of foreclosure of the mechanic's lien at issue in the name of his corporation. We also agree with the plaintiff that he has standing to pursue his remaining claims to obtain other remedies. Accordingly, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, alleged by the plaintiff and reasonably garnered from the record, are relevant to our resolution of his appeal. Prior to 1998, the plaintiff, as the sole owner of Transformations, Inc. (Transformations),² performed carpentry and home improvement work for the defendant pursuant to written contracts. In 1998, the defendant purchased the property located at 39 Tyler Drive in Stamford. Shortly thereafter, the parties, who had become romantically involved, began discussing extensive remodeling plans for the property. The plaintiff alleged that after the defendant made representations to him that the property would be their joint asset, he performed carpentry, general contracting and renovation services for her without a written contract. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that his services were performed in accordance with the promise of the defendant that she would pay for the materials, he would provide the labor and they would share in the profits from the house.

In March, 2000, the plaintiff moved into the defendant's residence, and the parties orally agreed that they would share the expenses of the household. In addition, the plaintiff alleged that the parties reaffirmed their oral agreement that the property was their common home and that if it was sold, the profit realized thereon would be divided between them equally. For the next three years, the plaintiff furnished materials and rendered services in connection with substantial renovation and construction of the property. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant orally agreed to reimburse him for his expenses to improve the property.

In 2001, after expending $100,000 worth of labor on the project, the plaintiff alleged that he asked the defendant on several occasions for a written contract to protect his investment. In response, the defendant reassured the plaintiff that he did not "need anything in writing" and that the house was part of "our retirement." The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant also told him that they would share in the appreciation of the property and that he would receive payment for the services that he was performing when the house was sold.

On March 29, 2003, the plaintiff finished the final work needed to obtain a certificate of occupancy for the property. The next day, the defendant called the police to escort the plaintiff off the property. The plaintiff commenced this action on April 3, 2003, and filed a certificate of mechanic's lien on April 8, 2003, to secure the balance of $295,805 allegedly due to him pursuant to the labor and materials portion of the oral agreement.

On August 18, 2004, the plaintiff filed his third amended complaint³ alleging (1) breach of an oral contract, (2) quantum meruit, (3) unjust enrichment and (4) fraud. The first count of the complaint sought compensatory damages for breach of contract, and also contained allegations and claims for relief related to foreclosure of the mechanic's lien. Additionally, in his claims for relief, the plaintiff sought compensatory damages for the remaining counts and punitive damages on the fraud count.

On September 1, 2004, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the third amended complaint, claiming that the plaintiff did not have standing as an individual to sue and, therefore, the court did not have jurisdiction. Specifically, the defendant claimed that, because the mechanic's lien was in the name of Transformations rather than in the name of the plaintiff individually, any alleged contract was between her and Transformations and not between her and the plaintiff. In support of her motion to dismiss, the defendant also attached evidence that all of the invoices for work performed and materials supplied in connection with the renovations were issued by Transformations, not the plaintiff. On November 29, 2004, the plaintiff filed his objection to the motion to dismiss, claiming that he was a party to the alleged contract with the defendant. The plaintiff also claimed that he was the general contractor and that Transformations acted as a subcontractor for the oral agreement that he allegedly had with the plaintiff.

On May 4, 2005, following a hearing, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff did not have standing to pursue his complaint. Specifically, the court determined that Transformations, and not the corporation's principal, the plaintiff, had entered into an agreement with the defendant to provide labor and materials in connection with renovating her house. In support of this determination, the court found that the mechanic's lien was in the name of Transformations, and, therefore, the defendant's alleged oral agreement was with the corporation. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss because he alleged facts sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that he had standing individually to bring his complaint. We agree that the plaintiff has standing as an individual to bring each count of his complaint and that the court improperly granted the motion to dismiss.⁴

The standard of review on a challenge to a court's granting of a motion to dismiss is well established. "In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.... A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.... [B]ecause [a] determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) First Union National Bank v. Hi Ho Mall Shopping Ventures, Inc., 273 Conn. 287, 291, 869 A.2d 1193 (2005).

"It is a basic principle of law that a plaintiff must have standing for the court to have jurisdiction. Standing is the right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.... [W]hen standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue and not whether the controversy is otherwise justiciable, or whether, on the merits, the [party] has a legally protected interest [that may be remedied]." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dow & Condon, Inc. v. Brookfield Development Corp., 266 Conn. 572, 579, 833 A.2d 908 (2003).

"Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring an action, in other words statutorily aggrieved, or is classically aggrieved.... The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: [F]irst, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the challenged action], as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action].... Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest ... has been adversely affected." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wesley v. Schaller Subaru, Inc., 277 Conn. 526, 538, 893 A.2d 389 (2006).

We conclude that the plaintiff has met the first prong for showing aggrievement. Specifically, we conclude that the plaintiff has alleged in his complaint facts sufficient to support a finding that he has a specific, personal and legal interest in each cause of action. More particularly, the plaintiff alleged that he had an oral agreement with the defendant to renovate the property extensively, with the plaintiff supplying the materials and the labor and the defendant supplying money for materials. In addition, the plaintiff alleged that their agreement was that he would receive not only the money for materials but also a share in the profits from the appreciation of the house. Construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the pleader, the plaintiff has alleged a specific, personal and legal interest in each claim that is distinguished from a general interest or any interest of Transformations.

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