First Union National Bank v. Hi Ho Mall Shopping Ventures, Inc., (SC 17151).
Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
Writing for the Court | VERTEFEUILLE, J. |
Citation | 273 Conn. 287,869 A.2d 1193 |
Parties | FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK v. HI HO MALL SHOPPING VENTURES, INC., ET AL. |
Docket Number | (SC 17151). |
Decision Date | 12 April 2005 |
273 Conn. 287
869 A.2d 1193
v.
HI HO MALL SHOPPING VENTURES, INC., ET AL
(SC 17151).
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Argued December 6, 2004.
Officially released April 12, 2005.
Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.
Gregory T. D'Auria, associate attorney general, with whom were Jane R. Rosenberg, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Eliot D. Prescott, assistant attorney general, for the appellant (defendant state of Connecticut).
Michael J. Ajello, with whom, on the brief, was Christopher M. McKeon, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion
VERTEFEUILLE, J.
The plaintiff, First Union National Bank, brought this action to foreclose municipal tax liens recorded against a property in Bridgeport that is owned by the defendant state of Connecticut (state)1 and is used as part of the campus of Housatonic Community College. The state appeals from the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss, in which it claimed that General Statutes § 49-312 does not waive sovereign immunity so as to permit the foreclosure of the state's ownership of real property. We agree with the state's interpretation of § 49-31, and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Our resolution of this appeal is guided by the following facts. The plaintiff acquired certain municipal tax liens from the city of Bridgeport by assignment. The liens encumber two parcels of real property in Bridgeport, one located at 303 State Street and the other located at 333 State Street. In 1994, the state purchased the property located at 303 State Street and now uses that land as part of the campus of Housatonic Community College. In 1997, the plaintiff instituted a foreclosure action seeking to foreclose tax liens for taxes assessed against the 333 State Street property from 1989 to 1994. In 2003, the plaintiff amended the tax foreclosure complaint to include the 303 State Street property. The state subsequently moved to dismiss the foreclosure action, asserting that, pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Although the state maintains that all the taxes on the 303 State Street property have been paid and the tax liens should have been released, the state nevertheless claimed in its motion to dismiss that it was immune from suit. The trial court denied the state's motion to dismiss, concluding that pursuant to § 49-31, sovereign immunity is waived in a case where the state has an ownership interest in real property that is subordinate to the interest of the party seeking foreclosure. The state appealed from the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss to the Appellate Court, and we thereafter transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
The state claims on appeal that the trial court improperly denied its motion to dismiss. Specifically, the state maintains that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the present action, and any statutory waiver of sovereign immunity in § 49-31 must be construed narrowly. The state further argues that the word "interest" as used in § 49-31 is ambiguous, and must be construed narrowly so as not to encompass the state's ownership interest in any real property. The state also claims that the trial court's construction of § 49-31 would lead to serious interference with the state's oversight of an educational institution, which is a primary state function. Finally, the state maintains that the plaintiff has the option of pursuing a claim for just compensation as an alternative remedy, so the plaintiff is not without recourse in this matter if it is indeed owed real estate taxes on 303 State Street, but cannot foreclose against the property.
The plaintiff counters that § 49-31 is clear on its face, and that the plain language of the statute indicates that the state waives its sovereign immunity in a foreclosure action where it has any interest in real property, including an ownership interest. Further, the plaintiff argues that even if § 49-31 is not clear and unambiguous, its legislative history compels the result reached by the trial court, that sovereign immunity is waived in this case. Specifically, the plaintiff notes that the legislature amended the statute in 1935 to replace the narrower term "attachment or a lien of any kind" with the broader term "interest." We agree with the state, and conclude that § 49-31 does not waive sovereign immunity to the extent that the state's ownership interest in real property may be foreclosed.
As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review. "The standard of review of a motion to dismiss is . . . well established. In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader. . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction. . . . [B]ecause [a] determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brookridge District Assn. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 607, 610-11, 793 A.2d 215 (2002).
Whether the legislature has waived the state's sovereign immunity protection in the present case raises a question of statutory interpretation. General Statutes § 1-2z provides that "[t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such...
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...confined strictly to the extent the statute provides.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) First Union National Bank v. Hi Ho Mall Shopping Ventures, Inc., 273 Conn. 287, 294, 869 A.2d 1193 (2005). By its express terms, § 4–61 “grants the right to sue the state ... to contractors who have ‘......
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...claims brought against the state in state court, even after the Alden decision. See also First Union Nat. Bank v. Hi Ho Mall Shopping Ventures, Inc., 273 Conn. 287, 869 A.2d 1193, 1197-98 (2005) (holding a foreclosure claim on a municipal tax lien asserted against the state was barred by so......
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Housatonic R.R. Co. Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue Serv..
...immunity raises a question of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., First Union National Bank v. Hi Ho Mall Shopping Ventures, Inc., 273 Conn. 287, 291, 869 A.2d 1193 (2005). General Statutes § 1–2z provides: “The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the tex......
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State v. Lombardo Bros. Mason Contractors, Inc.
...confined strictly to the extent the statute provides." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) First Union National Bank v. Hi Ho Mall Shopping Ventures, Inc., 273 Conn. 287, 294, 869 A.2d 1193 (2005). By its express terms, § 4-61 "grants the right to sue the state . . . to contractors who have......