Choate v. Grand Intern. Broth. of Locomotive Engineers

• Decision Date: 09 July 1958
• Docket Number: No. A-6669,A-6669
• Parties: Armond CHOATE et al., Petitioners, v. GRAND INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS et al., Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 795

314 S.W.2d 795

159 Tex. 1

Armond CHOATE et al., Petitioners, v. GRAND INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS et

al., Respondents.

No. A-6669.

Supreme Court of Texas.

July 9, 1958.

Rehearing Denied July 23, 1958.

Abner v. McCall, Waco, Harris & Reeves, Ft. Worth, for petitioners.

Willis & Willis, Dallas, Clarence E. Weisell, Cleveland, Ohio, for respondents.

WALKER, Justice.

This suit for equitable relief was brought by petitioners individually and as a class action on behalf of the members of Local 187, Grand International Brotherhool of Locomotive Engineers. Petitioners are employed as locomotive engineers by the Rock Island Railroad, and the purpose of their suit is to prevent union interference with the alleged right of Rock Island engineers to man engines belonging to such railroad and used for switching operations in the Dallas-Irving area. All of the petitioners except one are members of the union. The defendants in the trial court and respondents here include the Grand International Brotherhodd, the chairmen of its grievance committee for the Rock Island, Burlington-Rock Island, and Fort Worth & Denver railroads, and the chief dispatchers of the three carriers. Upon motion of the Brotherhood, the suit was dismissed on the pleadings by the trial court on the ground that its subject matter lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. 307 S.W.2d 854. In our opinion the cause of action alleged by petitioners is cognizable by a court of equity, and the case will accordingly be remanded for a trial on the merits.

The events giving rise to this controversy are related in petitioners' pleadings. In 1933 the four railroad brotherhoods entered into an agreement to regulate the manning of trains between Fort Worth and Teague. At that time the Rock Island was operating between Fort Worth and Dallas, the M. K. & T. between Dallas and Waxahachie, and the Burlington-Rock Island between Waxahachie and Teague. In so far as it relates to this suit, the only track then in operation was that running from Fort Worth to Teague. The agreement provides that the first five freight crews operating in the territory between those two points shall be prorated between Rock Island, Burlington-Rock Island and Fort Worth & Denver engine and train service employees in accordance with a tabulation and certain examples set out in Article 1. As the situation stood in 1933, the distance operated over Burlington-Rock Island track from Teague to Waxahachie was 67 miles, and the distance operated over Rock Island rails from Fort Worth to Dallas was 34 miles. It was accordingly provided that all regular and extra freight crews above five in the territory covered by the contract would be apportioned on a mileage basis as follows: Burlington-Rock Island 66 2/3% and Rock Island 33 1/3%. Petitioners, allege that the sole purpose of this agreement was to enable trains to run from Fort Worth to Teague without the necessity of changing crews.

While the 1933 contract was not executed by the three carriers, Rock Island's response to requests for admissions submitted by petitioners indicates that the agreement was accepted by it as regulating the proportion of work between employees of the different companies in the territory mentioned. We shall assume that the agreement was also accepted by the other railroads and became an effective contract between the brotherhoods and the interested carriers.

There was no industrial switching between Fort Worth and Teague when the 1933 contract was executed. Since that time, however, the Rock Island has constructed approximately 50 miles of switch track leading to industrial sites in and around the Dallas-Irving area. This switch track is owned exclusively by Rock Island and only that railroad operates trains on it. These are not through trains, and no business other than that of Rock Island is handled thereby. In 1948 the local union of Rock Island engineers, a subsidiary of respondent Brotherhood entered into an agreement with Rock Island by the terms of which engineers employed by that railroad would handle all trains on the switcher tracks in the Dallas-Irving area.

The Burlington-Rock Island has ceased operations in the territory covered by the 1933 contract and leased its track and equipment to the Rock Island and the Fort Worth & Denver. Its former employees are now working for other railroads, primarily the Fort Worth & Denver. These former Burlington employees or others affected by the 1933 contract evidently objected to the 1948 agreement, because the Grand Chief Engineer of respondent Brotherhood entered an order cancelling the latter and directing that all work done in the area be prorated according to the earlier agreement. This order was upheld by the Tri-Annual Convention of the Brotherhood, and petitioners have exhausted their right of appeal within the union.

In addition to the facts already mentioned, petitioners allege that they have entered into a contract to work for the Rock Island, that work performed solely on track belonging to one railroad is normally done by the employees of that carrier, that the Rock Island is ready, able and willing to allow its employees to operate the switchers in question, and that there is no dispute between them and the railroad. The petition states that the other brotherhoods have refused to apply the 1933 contract to the Dallas-Irving switchers, and that the trainmen's union is dividing the work equally. Petitioners further allege that the action of respondent Brotherhood in placing such switchers under the terms of the agreement violates Section 38B of the Standing Rules of the Brotherhood, which is set out in the petition, and is also capricious and arbitrary in that it gives preferential treatment to one group of employees over another group of equal standing in the same area. There are also allegations of irreparable damage. The relief sought is a permanent injunction restraining the Brotherhood from interfering with petitioners' performance of the work on the Dallas-Irving switchers.

Respondent Brotherhood's position, which has been sustained by the courts below, is that exclusive jurisdiction of this controversy is vested in the Adjustment Board by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 153 First (i), which provides:

'(i) The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions * * * shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier * * *; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred * * * to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board * * *.'

It will be noted that the Act refers only to 'dispute between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers.' Controversies between railroad employees and their union are thus not included in the jurisdiction granted thereby. That the Board has exclusive jurisdiction in the first instance of a dispute between employees and a carrier involving grievances or the interpretation or application of valid working agreements is not open to question. Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 70 S.Ct. 577, 97 L.Ed. 795; Order of Ry. Conductors of America v. Southern Ry. Co., 339 U.S. 255, 70 S.Ct. 585, 94 L.Ed. 811; Spires v. Southern Ry. Co., 4 Cir., 204 F.2d 453; Brennan v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 303 N.Y. 411, 103 N.E.2d 532 (certiorari denied 343 U.S. 977, 72 S.Ct. 1073, 97 L.Ed. 1369); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 231 S.W.2d 451 (no writ)....