Chock v. Government Employees Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 26 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. 23356.,23356.
• Parties: Aaron CHOCK, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, and Geico Casualty Company, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants and John Does 1-10; Jane Does 1-10; Doe Partnerships 1-10; Doe Corporations 1-10; Doe "Non-Profit" Corporations 1-10; Doe Entities 1-10; and Doe Governmental Entities 1-10, Defendants. Geico Casualty Company and Government Employees Insurance company, Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. Aaron Chock, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

81 P.3d 1178

103 Haw. 263

Aaron CHOCK, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, and Geico Casualty Company, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants and John Does 1-10; Jane Does 1-10; Doe Partnerships 1-10; Doe Corporations 1-10; Doe "Non-Profit" Corporations 1-10; Doe Entities 1-10; and Doe Governmental Entities 1-10, Defendants.

Geico Casualty Company and Government Employees Insurance company, Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. Aaron Chock, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

No. 23356.

Supreme Court of Hawai`i.

December 26, 2003.

George W. Playdon, Jr. and Kelvin H. Kaneshiro, on the briefs, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee Aaron Chock.

J. Patrick Gallagher and Michael N. Tanoue, on the briefs, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants Government Employees Insurance Company and GEICO Casualty Company.

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, and DUFFY, JJ.

Opinion of the Court by DUFFY, J.

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee Aaron Chock appeals from the final judgment entered on April 7, 2000 by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, the Honorable Marie N. Milks presiding, in favor of Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants Government Employees Insurance Company and GEICO Casualty Company [hereinafter, GEICO], denying Chock uninsured motorist (UM) benefits and awarding attorneys' fees and costs in favor of GEICO and against Chock. On appeal, Chock contends that the circuit court erred: (1) in concluding that Chock was not entitled to UM benefits under the GEICO insurance policies at issue; (2) in concluding that there was a material misrepresentation in the application for the GEICO policies at issue, thus rendering the policies void or voidable; (3) in concluding that Chock was not entitled to "stacked" UM benefits under the GEICO policies at issue; and (4) in awarding GEICO attorneys' fees pursuant to Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 607-14 (Supp.1998) and costs pursuant to Hawai`i Rule of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 54(d) (2000).

Based on the following, we vacate the award of attorneys' fees to GEICO and affirm in all other respects.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

During the evening of June 24, 1995, Chock spoke with Kent "Kimo" Stone, his best friend, over the telephone. Stone owed Chock a little less than $6,000 for marijuana; Stone told Chock that he (Stone) had some money that he wanted to pay Chock, and the two agreed to meet at a parking lot on the Honolulu side of the Wilson Tunnel. Chock drove a 1995 Chevrolet pickup truck owned by his girlfriend, Tracie Lee, to meet Stone. Chock had Lee's permission to drive the truck. Chock arrived at the parking lot and backed into a parking space, but left the motor running. After a few minutes, Wayne Hunt, Stone's roommate and an acquaintance of Chock's, arrived and pulled his car in next to Chock's with the driver's side door of each car very close to one another. Hunt also left the motor running. The two asked each other what they were doing at the parking lot, after which Chock turned away to adjust his radio. When Chock looked back, Hunt was holding a shotgun in both hands and leaning on the window ledge of his (Hunt's) car. Hunt shot Chock twice, injuring Chock in the head and left arm. Chock was able to drive to K;ane'ohe, where he received help. As a result of the shooting, Chock incurred medical bills of approximately $500,000.

Chock testified that, prior to the shooting, he had no reason to fear either Stone or Hunt. Chock also did not know that Hunt possessed a shotgun or any other weapon. When Chock spoke to Hunt, he could not see a shotgun in Hunt's car and still expected Stone to arrive.

The parties stipulated that for purposes of UM benefits, Hunt was uninsured on the day of the shooting.

Lee (Chock's girlfriend) applied for and received an insurance policy with GEICO in April 1995 for her truck at the time, a 1987 Chevrolet pickup. She indicated that she was the driver of the truck 100 percent of the time. In May 1995 she purchased a new truck (the 1995 Chevrolet pickup); she contacted GEICO to notify them of the new truck, but made no other changes to her policy. The circuit court ruled that Chock and Lee both regularly used the 1995 Chevrolet truck and that Lee's failure to notify GEICO that Chock was an additional driver constituted a misrepresentation of fact.

Chock lived on and off with his father, Glenn Chock (Glenn). Glenn applied for and received an insurance policy with GEICO in June 1994, but did not identify Chock as a driver in the household and did not list Chock in response to the inquiry on the application as to whether there were any residents age fifteen or older who were not listed as drivers. Glenn signed a renewal form in April 1995, two months before the shooting, and did not list Chock as a household resident age fifteen or older not listed as a driver. However, Lee testified that Chock was living at his father's house at the time of the shooting, and the circuit court ruled that Chock was a resident of his father's household since mid-April 1995. The circuit court also ruled that Glenn's failure to list Aaron Chock as a non-driver resident constituted a misrepresentation of fact.

Glenn, on behalf of his son, made a demand for Uninsured Motorist (UM) coverage under both his and Lee's GEICO insurance policies.

B. Procedural Background

Chock filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against GEICO on October 31, 1996, in which he asked the circuit court to rule that he was entitled to UM benefits under Glenn's and Lee's policies. The following day, GEICO filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Chock in which GEICO asked the circuit court to rule that Chock was not entitled to UM benefits under Glenn's and Lee's policies. In February 1997, the circuit court granted GEICO's motion to consolidate the two cases. After a bench trial in March 1999 the circuit court ruled in favor of GEICO, denying Chock UM benefits and awarding attorneys' fees and costs to GEICO. Chock appealed and GEICO filed a cross-appeal in which it argued that the circuit court erred in ruling that Chock's injuries were "caused by accident."

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review the circuit court's conclusions of law de novo. Troyer v. Adams, 102 Hawai`i 399, 409-410, 77 P.3d 83, 93-94 (2003)

. We review the circuit court's findings of fact under the "clearly erroneous" standard. Id. at 410, 77 P.3d at 94.

III. DISCUSSION

A. UM Benefits

Chock argues that he is contractually and statutorily entitled to UM benefits under Glenn's and Lee's policies. We disagree. The circuit court correctly ruled that Chock was not entitled to UM benefits under the GEICO policies because Chock's gunshot injuries did not arise out of the operation, maintenance, or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.

1. Whether Chock's injuries must have arisen from the operation, maintenance, or use of an uninsured motor vehicle

Chock first argues that the circuit court erred because HRS § 431:10C-301(b)(3) (1993¹) does not require his injuries to have arisen from the "ownership, operation, maintenance, or use" of an uninsured motor vehicle in order to be eligible for UM benefits. Although Glenn's and Lee's policies contained a provision requiring the injuries to have arisen from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, Chock argues that this provision is void because it conflicts with the statute.

Chock is correct that HRS § 431:10C-301(b)(3) does not use the phrase "operation, maintenance or use" of a motor vehicle. HRS § 431:10C-301(b)(3) also does not use the word "accident," which is defined in HRS § 431:10C-103(9) (1993) ("Motor vehicle accident means an accident arising out of the operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, including an object drawn or propelled by a motor vehicle."). Chock is also correct when he quotes State v. Villeza, 85 Hawai`i 258, 273, 942 P.2d 522, 537 (1997), for the proposition that "`[w]here a statute with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different legislative intent existed'" (quoting State v. Rodgers, 68 Haw. 438, 442, 718 P.2d 275, 277 (1986)). Therefore, Chock argues, the legislature's failure to include language in HRS § 431:10C-301(b)(3) referring to ownership, operation, maintenance, use, or accidents, while using that language in HRS §§ 431:10C-301(b)(1) (liability coverage for bodily injury) and (b)(2) (liability coverage for property damage), means that the legislature did not intend this to be a requirement to collect UM benefits; Chock concludes that inclusion of this provision in the insurance policy is void.

We disagree. First, the language of the statute itself contradicts Chock's argument. HRS § 431:10C-301 provides in relevant part:

(b) A motor vehicle insurance policy shall include:

....

(3) ... liability coverage provided therein or supplemental thereto ... for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom ....

HRS § 431:10C-301 (emphasis added). This language indicates that, in section 431:10C-301(b)(3), the legislature is still discussing injuries resulting from the use of motor vehicles even though not directly referring to the use of motor vehicles in this section.

Second, Chock's argument is undermined by the purpose of UM insurance. This court has previously discussed the purpose of UM statutes such as HRS § 431:10C-301(b)(3):

Their purpose is to provide a remedy where injury is caused by an uninsured motorist; or, as has been more frequently stated, to provide a remedy to the innocent victims of irresponsible motorists who may have no resources to satisfy the damages they cause. This recourse [ ] is provided, then, to cover the situation

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