Choice! Power, L.P. v. Feeley, 01-15-00821-CV
Decision Date | 04 August 2016 |
Docket Number | NO. 01-15-00821-CV,01-15-00821-CV |
Citation | 501 S.W.3d 199 |
Parties | Choice! Power, L.P., Appellant v. Michael Feeley, Appellee |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Jonathan M. Hyman, Chance K. Decker, Gray Reed & McGraw, P.C., Houston, TX, Jim Moseley, Gray Reed & McGraw, P.C., Dallas, TX, for appellant.
Andrew L. Mintz, Andrew L. Mintz, PLLC, Joseph Y. Ahmad, Ahmad, Zavitsanos, Anaipakos, Alavi & Mensing P.C., Houston, TX, for appellee.
Panel consists of Justices Higley, Bland, and Brown.
The trial court found in favor of appellee, Michael Feeley, on his breach of contract claim against appellant, Choice! Power, L.P., and awarded $353,705.57 in damages. In three issues on appeal, Choice argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the contract and that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding of breach of contract.1 In his cross-appeal, Feeley argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment against him on his claim for attorneys' fees.
We affirm.
In June 2011, Feeley entered into an employment agreement with Choice. Feeley was employed to be a broker for Choice. The agreement provided that the term of his employment began June 1, 2011, and continued for 54 months. The agreement also provided, "This Agreement may not be terminated by either party except (i) by Employer for Cause (as defined below) or (ii) by Employee for any material breach of this Agreement by Employer ...." The termination provision lists nine categories of actions by Feeley that would constitute cause for termination. One of those categories permitted termination if Feeley "materially violate[d] any specific written instructions or policies of Employer." The agreement established that "[t]he Parties understand that this Agreement creates an employment relationship for a term and shall not be construed as creating an ‘at will’ employment relationship."
When he began working with Choice, Feeley primarily worked on brokering what are known as financially-settled contracts. A smaller portion of his work concerned what are known as physically-settled contracts. During Feeley's employment with Choice, financially-settled contracts were reclassified as futures contracts, pursuant to federal regulations. In order for a broker to work on futures contracts, the broker had to be "Series 3 registered" by a certain date. In order to be Series 3 registered, the broker had to pass the Series 3 examination. Physically-settled contracts were not affected by this change, and brokers for those contracts did not require Series 3 registration.
The evidence at trial showed that Feeley took the examination three times, but never passed the examination. As a result, Feeley could not take the examination again for six months and could not broker financially-settled contracts for that time. Choice assigned Feeley to work exclusively on physically-settled contracts after that. Specifically, they charged Feeley with developing business in emissions-related contracts. About two months later, Feeley had not succeeded in brokering any physically-settled contracts. Choice terminated Feeley, claiming it was for cause under the employment contract due to Feeley's failure to comply with Choice's instructions to pass the Series 3 examination.
Feeley brought suit against Choice, alleging breach of contract. Feeley also sought to recover his attorneys' fees from Choice. Choice filed a motion for summary judgment on Feeley's claim for attorneys' fees. Choice argued that the plain text of the statute upon which Feeley was relying did not allow recovery of attorneys' fees from Choice because it was a limited partnership. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment against Feeley on his claim for attorneys' fees.
The parties proceeded to a bench trial on Feeley's breach of contract claim. Following trial, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court's findings included the following:
In its first issue, Choice argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the contract.
A court should construe an unambiguous contract as a matter of law, and, on appeal, the court's ruling is subject to de novo review. See J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster , 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex.2003) ; MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Albemarle Corp. , 241...
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