Chowning v. Stanfield
| Decision Date | 23 April 1887 |
| Parties | CHOWNING, Adm'r, <I>v.</I> STANFIELD. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
J. M. & J. G. Taylor, for appellant. M. P. Stephens, for appellee.
On February 1, 1878, Nathaniel B. Chowning entered the W. ½ of the N. W. ¼ of section 17, in township 9 S., range 10 W., in the United States land-office at Little Rock, and received a patent therefor in the following year. He subsequently sold the land to Thomas M. Chowning. Thomas W. Chowning is administrator of the estate of Thomas M., and brought this action of ejectment against the appellee, Stanfield, who was in possession of the land described, setting out his intestate's title, and alleging in his complaint that the latter died seized of the land; that it was required to be administered as assets by him, and that the defendant wrongfully withheld the possession from him. Stanfield answered that on the ninth day of January, 1861, long before Chowning's entry, he had entered the same tract at the local land-office at Little Rock, and he exhibited with his answer a certified copy of his application to the register of the United States land-office to purchase the same; the register's certificate to the receiver that the lands were subject to entry, and the price thereof; and also the receiver's receipt in full payment of the purchase price of the tract,—all bearing date of January 9, 1861. He alleged that he had complied with all the requirements of the law in making his entry, and that soon thereafter he took possession of the land, and has continuously maintained it, either in person or by others holding for him, by erecting houses on it, and by clearing and cultivating the land, and paying the taxes. He further alleged that the entry made by him had never been canceled or set aside; that Chowning's entry was without authority of law; that he had actual knowledge of the prior entry at the time he purchased; and, in substance, that it was made as a speculation by Nathaniel Chowning, who, it was alleged, was a clerk in the land-office at the time. He made his answer a cross-complaint, and prayed that he be invested with the legal title. The cause was transferred to equity, and, after proof was taken, the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed, the defendant was declared the owner of the land, and his title quieted.
It was obvious that the appellee could have no relief under his cross-bill. Thomas M. Chowning was seized of the legal estate at least in the land, and upon his death it descended to his heirs. The administrator's right to the possession of lands as assets for the purpose of administration is exclusive of that of the heirs, and he can maintain ejectment to gain the possession, but he is not concerned with title except in so far as it affects his possessory right, and he is not authorized to represent the heirs, or to stand for them when the title is in question. They are indispensable parties in a controversy where relief is asked which will affect the title. Sisk v. Almon, 34 Ark. 391; Theurer v. Brogan, 41 Ark. 88.
The theory of the appellee's cross-bill was that the patentee, and those claiming through him, took the naked legal title in trust for his benefit, and its object was to perfect his title; but the parties in whom the legal title was vested were not parties to the litigation, and it was therefore improper for the court to undertake, as it did, to grant him the relief sought.
But the administrator urges, and it is the only point he has pressed, that his right to the possession is established by the record. The determination of this point draws the consideration of the title into question incidentally, but it can settle nothing more than the right of possession between the parties before the court. It cannot affect the real question of title, and it seems almost futile for parties to litigate where the litigation will be so meager of results. But the administrator may have his right to the possession determined without joining the heirs as parties, (see Theurer v. Brogan, 41 Ark. 92,) and the appellee, in neglecting to bring them in, has thereby elected simply to defend against the administrator's possessory right. The case of Sisk v. Almon, supra, is not inconsistent with the right of the administrator to proceed in his suit for possession, even where his intestate's title is disputed, when the defendant refuses to bring the proper parties in. In that case the admistrator attempted to have title vested in the heirs for the benefit of the estate, without first bringing them before the court, and all that was ruled was that no decree could be made in favor of persons not parties to the cause. An administrator is not entitled to the possession of lands unless they are needed to pay the intestate's debts. Stewart v. Smiley, 46 Ark. 373; Theurer v. Brogan, supra. As a naked legal title bears none of the substantial fruits of real estate, it could be of no benefit to the administrator in...
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