Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc.

Decision Date06 March 1981
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 72S-243.
Citation509 F. Supp. 442
PartiesAlta CHRAPLIWY et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNIROYAL, INC. et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Thomas R. Ewald, Washington, D. C., Thomas R. Fette, St. Joseph, Mich., R. Wyatt Mick, Jr., Mishawaka, Ind., for plaintiffs.

Harry N. Turk of Arthur, Dry & Kalish, New York City, Rody P. Biggert of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, Ill., Timothy Woods of Jones, Obenchain, Johnson, Ford, Pankow & Lewis, South Bend, Ind., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

GRANT, District Judge.

Introduction

The award of attorney fees in this case represents the final question in a suit that has continued for seven years. This litigation resulted in a settlement between the parties providing that defendant Uniroyal, Inc., (Uniroyal), pay 526 women in the plaintiff class $4,758,000 in cash, and approximately an equal amount in future pension benefits on account of unlawful sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In addition to this monetary relief, Uniroyal must also reinstate 296 class members to active employment with full seniority, and improve the position of women workers generally through changes in the employment system at the defendant's Mishawaka plant.

As a further part of the settlement, Uniroyal agreed to pay plaintiffs' attorneys' fees in the "amount awarded" by the court, subject, of course, to any later appeal, as provided in Section 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) which states:

In any action or proceeding under this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs....

Petitioners are, of course, the prevailing parties within the meaning of Section 2000e-5(k). See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2575, 65 L.Ed. 2d 653 (1980).

It now becomes the duty of this Court to determine what is a "reasonable fee" within the meaning of Section 2000e-5(k). The reasonable fee must reflect the long history of this litigation, as well as a consideration of the congressional policies underlying Title VII.

I. Factual Background

After passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 making sex discrimination unlawful, Uniroyal continued to maintain a segregated hiring and seniority system at its Mishawaka plant where women were heavily employed in the footwear production division, while other lines had predominately male employees. From 1968-1970, Uniroyal shut down its footwear production, while continuing its other production divisions, throwing a disproportionate number of women out of work. Despite the considerable plant seniority of many women employees, they were not given a chance to "bump" less senior male workers from other production lines.

In November and December of 1969, Uniroyal mailed a form letter to 260 laid-off female employees notifying them that inasmuch as the prospects of their being recalled were "remote", the company was declaring their layoffs permanent and, as a result, was cutting off their supplemental unemployment benefits.

In January, 1970, Alta Chrapliwy and other female workers at the Mishawaka plant filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, (EEOC). The EEOC investigation found reasonable cause to believe discrimination had taken place, and after conciliation failed, the EEOC issued a right to sue letter.

1972-1974

On November 28, 1972, a complaint was filed by the 26 named plaintiffs as a class action on behalf of all female workers employed at Uniroyal's Mishawaka plant. Included as defendants were Uniroyal, Local 65 of the United Rubber Workers (Union), and the United Rubber Workers International. Uniroyal sought dismissal of this complaint, which was denied, and the plaintiffs began discovery proceedings with interrogatories and request for production of documents.

Although Uniroyal delayed its response, the Union complied with the discovery requests. Based upon this information, plaintiffs then drafted requests for admissions from Uniroyal. When Uniroyal failed to respond, plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions and partial summary judgment on liability issues. The then active Judge of this Court, Judge George N. Beamer, deemed the requests for admissions to be admitted due to Uniroyal's continued failure to respond. It was this decision, in July, 1974, that established the company's general liability for sex discrimination. Uniroyal's motion to vacate this partial summary judgment was denied.

Following this, other requests for admissions detailing the discriminatory employment system were admitted by Uniroyal. Class action certification had previously been granted. Another plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment was pending when, on October 21, 1974, Judge Beamer died. His death and the resultant vacancy on this Court delayed proceedings in the case. Uniroyal did not reply to the September, 1974 summary judgment motion until August, 1976. Although Uniroyal's violation of Title VII had been judicially determined, Uniroyal did nothing in the interim to provide relief for members of the plaintiffs' class.

1975-1976

In early 1975, plaintiffs began investigating Uniroyal's compliance status with Executive Order No. 11246. That Executive Order provides that federal contractors shall not discriminate against employees on the basis of their sex, race or other impermissible basis. In the event of noncompliance, the government contractor could be declared "ineligible" for any further contracts. The Secretary of Labor was given the power to enforce that Order and to order debarment, as well as the authority to implement such Order with appropriate federal regulations.

Uniroyal is one of the federal government's largest contractors, with approximately half a billion dollar's worth of Defense Department contracts during the 1969-1974 period. Each time it entered a federal contract, Uniroyal signed the required assurances of its compliance with the Executive Order.

Using the then recently enacted Freedom of Information Act, the plaintiffs discovered that the Interior Department had already conducted an on-site compliance review of defendant's Mishawaka plant in September, 1972, and found that Uniroyal was operating a segregated, discriminatory system of employment in violation of the Executive Order. The Interior Department had issued a deficiency letter, but Uniroyal had refused to change its practices, contending that since this Title VII suit was underway, the company was already defending itself against those same charges. The Interior Department then assured the company that it could take no further action while this litigation was still pending.

The plaintiffs then wrote the Secretaries of Labor, Defense and Interior in September of 1975 demanding that administrative action be taken against Uniroyal. The agencies responded by defending their "deferral" of any action. On October 16, 1975, the plaintiffs' attorneys filed suit in the United States District Court in Washington, D. C. for the Chrapliwy class members against the Secretaries of Labor, Defense and Interior. That complaint alleged that these officials were awarding contracts to Uniroyal in violation of their agencies' own regulations and sought enforcement of Executive Order 11246. Chrapliwy v. Dunlop. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction. With court approval, the parties entered into a stipulation which provided that the officials would conduct a new compliance review of Uniroyal. The officials promised to enforce E.O. 11246 if Uniroyal was not in compliance.

Uniroyal was not a party in Chrapliwy v. Dunlop until February 27, 1976 when the plaintiffs moved to amend the complaint and join the company. This joinder was short-lived inasmuch as the district court granted the company's motion to dismiss, relying on decisions holding that the Executive Order does not create a private right of action against the employer.

Based upon the results of the compliance inspection that had been agreed upon in Chrapliwy v. Dunlop, the Department of Interior concluded that Uniroyal was still in violation of Executive Order 11246 and issued a show cause order requesting reasons why administrative action should not be commenced for cancellation of Uniroyal's federal contracts. Uniroyal sought a hearing and an order by the Director of the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) that "substantial issues of law and fact" existed and had to be resolved before administrative action could be taken. The Chrapliwy plaintiffs opposed the motion, relying upon Judge Beamer's July 5, 1973 summary judgment order. On May 4, 1976, the Director of the OFCCP issued an order which determined that "substantial issues of law and fact" did in fact exist and suggested that the case be referred to the Department of Justice.

The plaintiffs opposed both OFCCP actions. The OFCCP Director reversed his decision to refer the case to the Department of Justice and thereupon issued a notice of intent to debar Uniroyal from government contracting, and commenced an administrative action against the company, Department of Labor, OFCCP v. Uniroyal, No. OFCCP-1977-1.

The Labor Department had no trial staff to conduct these proceedings, nor had they ever attempted to bar a major industrial corporation. In response to the needs of this case, the Solicitor of Labor hired a lawyer to assemble a trial staff to prosecute this case against Uniroyal.

Based upon these government actions, District Judge Pratt dismissed Chrapliwy v. Dunlop in September, 1974, and indicated that plaintiffs should exhaust their newly created remedies in the Labor Department's administrative proceedings. The Chrapliwy plaintiffs then intervened in the pending OFCCP v. Uniroyal case, along with defendant Rubber Workers Local Union 65.

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