Chreste v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 16 June 1916
• Citation: 186 S.W. 919,171 Ky. 77
• Parties: CHRESTE v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

186 S.W. 919

171 Ky. 77

CHRESTE v. COMMONWEALTH.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 16, 1916

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Common Pleas Branch First Division.

Robert A. Chreste was disbarred from the practice of law for professional misconduct, and from the order of disbarment and an order denying a new trial, he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Thum &amp Roy, of Louisville, for appellant.

A Scott Bullitt, Elmer C. Underwood, and Hugh B. Fleece, all of Louisville, for the Commonwealth.

CARROLL J.

The appellant, Chreste, a practicing lawyer in the city of Louisville, prosecutes this appeal from an order made by Judge William H. Field, of the Jefferson circuit court disbarring him from the practice of law. A full understanding of the nature of the case and the grounds relied on for reversal make necessary an extended statement of matter that appears in the record.

Four different rules, based on different grounds, supported by information, were issued by Judge Field upon his own motion on December 1, 1914, against Chreste to show cause, if any he had, why his name should not be stricken from the roll of attorneys. These rules and each of them were made returnable on December 4, 1914, and were executed on Chreste on the day of their issual.

Rule No. 1, as we will style it, charged:

That on April 3, 1912, "there came on for trial in said court, common pleas branch, First division, the case of Mary E. App v. Louisville Ry. Co., in which it was testified that plaintiff, Mrs. Mary E. App, having been thrown from a street railway car, was assisted by an unknown person; that said trial resulted in a verdict for defendant; that upon a motion for a new trial it appeared that said unknown person had been discovered, and that his testimony would be material, whereupon a new trial was granted plaintiff, and upon the second trial said unknown person, Thomas Curley, testified on behalf of plaintiff; that shortly after the accident to Mary E. App defendant learned from said Thomas Curley that he (Curley) had seen the accident; that defendant, Chreste, was present in the courtroom during the first trial of the case, and saw that said Curley was not present as a witness; that at the conclusion of the trial defendant told counsel for Mary E. App that he knew the unknown person who was said to have assisted Mrs. App; that defendant agreed to produce said witness for a consideration, and counsel for Mary E. App promised to allow him a percentage of their contingent fee if defendant produced said witness; that on the second trial the witness Curley appeared and testified in behalf of Mrs. App, who won a verdict; that defendant, Chreste, knew of testimony material to a litigant and suppressed and withheld the same and divulged it only upon the condition of his being employed in the case and receiving a fee."

This rule was supported by a transcript of the evidence in the case of Mary E. App. v. Louisville Ry. Co.

Rule No. 2 charged:

That "in January, 1913, Chreste employed L. C. Sherrick to secure his employment as an attorney, agreeing to pay said Sherrick as compensation therefor the sum of $25 per month, his car fare expended, and 25 per cent. of the fee of defendant in each case secured for him by said Sherrick; that said Sherrick worked for Chreste for some three months under said contract of employment."

And this rule was supported by the evidence of L. C. Sherrick.

Rule No. 3 charged:

That "on or about November 30, 1913, he employed one Clarence Saunders to solicit the employment of said Chreste by persons who had been injured, said Chreste agreeing to pay and paying him $8 per week to give and giving him an unlimited expense account; that Saunders remained in Chreste's service until on or about November 9, 1914; that during the period between the two dates mentioned Saunders solicited and secured the employment of Chreste in many cases; that Chreste instructed Saunders to say in soliciting employment from persons of the Catholic religion and from persons of Irish descent that he represented Messrs. O'Doherty & Yonts, and to say in other cases that he represented Messrs. Edwards, Ogden & Peak; that Saunders followed the directions of Chreste in these particulars."

And this rule was supported by the affidavit of Clarence Saunders.

Rule No. 4 charged:

That "on Friday, November 20, 1914, upon an affidavit of Edward Moran that Clarence Saunders had stated to him that he (Saunders) and defendant, Chreste, who was and is an attorney at law practicing at the bar of the Jefferson circuit court, had procured two witnesses to give false testimony in the case of Clara Schipper v. Louisville Ry. Co., tried in the aforementioned division, a rule returnable November 24, 1914, was issued against Clarence Saunders to show why he should not be proceeded against for contempt, if the statement attributed to him was false; that on November 23, 1914, while the rule was in the hands of the sheriff of Jefferson county for service, defendant, Robert A. Chreste, in said Chreste's office, threatened Saunders, telling him that, if he swore that the statement attributed to him in the affidavit of said Moran was true, he (Chreste) would use the money which was due him under him under his employment by Chreste to send him to the penitentiary; that he (Chreste), with the connection he had and the money he had, could put an innocent man in the penitentiary and get a guilty one out; that defendant, Chreste, told Saunders that, if he denied the statements attributed to him, he would be paid all that was due him; that Saunders was thereby led to avoid the service of the process of the court; that the rule was returned by the sheriff on November 24, 1914, indorsed 'Not found'; that upon the affidavit of J. A. Beckley, deputy sheriff, that Saunders was avoiding service, an attachment was issued for him, returnable November 30, 1914; that said attachment was returned on said date indorsed 'Not found.' "

The next order appearing in the record was made on December 4, 1914, and reads as follows:

"This day came the defendant in the above-styled four cases and filed herein his verified response, and thereupon moved the court to submit the above-styled actions for judgment, and it is thereupon ordered by the court that the defendant's said motion to submit the above-styled actions for judgment be, and the same is, sustained; and said actions were thereupon submitted for judgment upon the pleadings, exhibits, and the verified response of the defendant. And, the court being advised, it is considered and adjudged that the response of the defendant in each of the above-styled actions be, and the same is hereby, adjudged to be insufficient."

The response of Chreste mentioned in this order and filed on December 4th reads as follows:

"In response to the four rules that have been issued against me by Hon. Judge Field will say that I am not accused of ever having wronged any client, but am accused by two dissatisfied former employés who will admit that they are dissatisfied over money matters, and also with having withheld information about a valuable witness in the case of Mary E. App v. Louisville Ry. Co. until I was employed in the case by the original counsel, who had lost the case.

In rule No. 2 will say that, while I did not employ L. C. Sherrick to solicit business for me during the three months that he claims to have been working for me, he did occupy desk room in my office, but was engaged in a different business. During this time I did loan him about $150 which he never paid back, and yet he still claims that I owe him money. He claims to have worked for me three months, and yet only claims to have secured one case for me during the entire time.

In rule No. 3 I did employ Clarence Saunders upon a weekly salary and gave him an unlimited expense account to solicit business for me, but never authorized or instructed him to refer to me as judge or to represent the law firms of O'Doherty & Yonts or Edwards, Ogden & Peak, or any lawyer other than myself. I feel perfectly satisfied that every member of the law firms of Edwards, Ogden & Peak and O'Doherty & Yonts will state if they are called upon that I have dealt with each firm for a number of years, and that I have been fair and honest in all my dealings, and that they know me as a man to be above the accusations that dissatisfied former employés have made against me.

In rule No. 4, where it is claimed that I threatened Clarence Saunders with prosecution, and thereby led him to avoid the process of the court concerning the alleged statement that Clarence Saunders had made to Ed Moran, of the Louisville Railway Company, that two women witnesses in the case of Clara Schipper v. Louisville Ry. Co. had been procured to testify falsely, will say that I had no reason to keep him away from Judge Field in regard to the investigation of this matter, because the two women witnesses who had been accused, as soon as they saw the accusations against them in the newspapers, went immediately and voluntarily to Judge Field's office and denied the accusation. As far as my threats to prosecute Clarence Saunders are concerned, will say that I told him that I would prosecute him only in the case his accusations were untrue. I asked him repeatedly to go over to Judge Field and tell the truth concerning the Schipper matter.

In rule No. 1, where I am accused of withholding information concerning a valuable witness in the case of Mary E. App v Louisville Ry. Co., and refused to divulge this information until I was employed in the case after it had been lost on the first trial, will say that I never knew any of the App family until I was employed in the case after it had been lost on the first...