Chris Langley Timber & Mgmt. v. Caldwell, 2030196.

Citation923 So.2d 1094
Decision Date11 June 2004
Docket NumberNo. 2030196.,2030196.
PartiesCHRIS LANGLEY TIMBER & MANAGEMENT, INC. v. Jamie Reynolds CALDWELL, special administrator for the estate of Clayton M. Reynolds, deceased.
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

G. Shane Cooper, Atmore, for appellant.

Deborah Alley Smith of Christian & Small, LLP, Birmingham; and Joe Scarborough of Scarborough & Weldon, LLC, Tallassee, for appellee.

CRAWLEY, Judge.

Chris Langley Timber & Management, Inc. ("the buyer"), appeals from a judgment that set aside a Timber Purchase Agreement ("the agreement") executed by Clayton M. Reynolds ("the seller"). The seller died while the case was pending, and Jamie Reynolds Caldwell, his daughter, as special administrator, represents the seller's estate.

The trial court granted the estate's motion for a summary judgment, finding that the seller lacked mental capacity at the time he executed the agreement. This case was transferred to this court by the supreme court, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975.

Our review of a summary judgment is de novo.

"In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment, `we utilize the same standard as the trial court in determining whether the evidence before [it] made out a genuine issue of material fact,' Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988), and whether the movant was `entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' Wright v. Wright, 654 So.2d 542 (Ala.1995); Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. When the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating such an issue. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989). Evidence is `substantial' if it is of `such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.' Wright, 654 So.2d at 543 (quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)). Our review is further subject to the caveat that this Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Wilma Corp. v. Fleming Foods of Alabama, Inc., 613 So.2d 359 (Ala.1993); Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So.2d 412, 413 (Ala.1990)."

Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 690 So.2d 341, 344 (Ala.1997).

All contracts of an insane person are void. See § 8-1-170, Ala.Code 1975. To prove the seller's insanity at the time of the execution of the agreement, the estate supported its motion for a summary judgment with the deposition testimony of Dr. Warren T. Jackson III, a licensed clinical psychologist. On July 30, 2001, more than five months before the seller executed the agreement, Dr. Jackson conducted a psychological/neuropsychology evaluation of the seller. He testified that his diagnostic impression of the seller included dementia similar to that caused by Alzheimer's disease and alcohol dependence. In his testimony, Dr. Jackson stated:

"A. That's a reference to one of the tests of memory that he took. It involves reading to the patient two short paragraphs of information and telling them to listen carefully because they're going to be asked to remember the information and tell it back after we finished reading it to them, and then later upon delay we'll ask them to recall it again. So we tell them to pay attention. This is a memory test.

"And Mr. Reynolds, although he had some immediate recall of the information, although he performed at the bottom fifth percentile approximately, upon thirty-minute delay, he had no recall whatsoever of that information. And looking back at the test results in preparation for this this morning, it wasn't just this one measure that he had any recall upon delay. It was also the list-learning tasks and also the tests that involve delayed recall of complex visual information. And it's very rare in patients that I evaluate, even those with fairly substantial Alzheimer-type dementia, to have no recall like that. It's a severe impairment.

"Q. Would this type of impairment that you've told us — just told us about, Doctor, would that be — based on your education and training and experience, would that be a type of dementia or shortcoming, if it's fair to call it that, that might improve day to day, might have a good day one day, or is this something that Mr. Reynolds was going to have the rest of his life?

"A. It's expected to decline over time.

"Q. You wouldn't expect him to have a good day, then?

"A. Not a good day that would leave him any — other than still impaired. He might remember one word from the list instead of zero, but that would still be extremely impaired.

"Q. I may have done this, Doctor. But if you would, just in general terms — if I have asked you this, I apologize. But tell us what we might expect from a patient that would have this 290.0 dementia of Alzheimer's type with late onset diagnosis. What would we expect from that patient, that hypothetical patient?

"A. Generally we think in terms of once an individual has a diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease, we give them about a six- to eight-year life expectancy. Their course is one of downward decline and cognitive function and onset of a variety of physical difficulties that are related to their increasing lack of mobility. It's a grave diagnosis with a poor prognosis.

"Q. Doctor, would you have expected, based on your evaluation of Mr. Reynolds both through the testing process and the interview process, that anytime subsequent to your July the 30th, 2001, report or evaluation that he would have had the capacity to understand and recognize what his estate consisted of?

"A. No.

"Q. Do you think that he would have been able to absorb information at any given time after this July 30, 2001, date to be able to determine independently what he should — what he would like to do with that property as far as disposition?

"A. Absolutely not. He could not hold on to new information for even up to thirty minutes.

"Q. You say on page three of Plaintiff's 2 that Mr. Reynolds is no longer competent to manage his financial affairs, right at the top of the page. Do you see that, Doctor?

"A. I do.

"Q. Would your professional opinion be — based on your education, training, and experience and your evaluation of him both through diagnosis testing and interviewing, would you have an opinion whether or not he would be able to make some decision — have the capacity to make some decision in his best interest with regard to contractual matters?

"A. At the time I saw him, I didn't feel like he was able to make or communicate responsible decisions involving his affairs.

"Q. And would your testimony be the same here as it was when I asked you before? That based on those things, your education experience, your diagnostic testing, your interview with him, that he would not have improved from that date forward?

"A. That's correct. He's expected to decline. And I would emphasize to the Court that this was not a borderline case. This was considered a very substantial find, and it was not a hard call to make with his test data.

"[Plaintiff's attorney]: Give me just minute. (Recess taken.)

"Q.... Would a person who has this diagnosis, such as Mr. Reynolds, . . . be susceptible to influence from — on his day-to-day decision-making from his care taker?

". . . .

"A. In general, all patients with dementia are and become very dependent on their care givers.

"Q. And would you expect that to be the case with Mr. Reynolds?

"A. Yes, and increasingly so over time.

". . . .

"Q. Did you find that Mr. Reynolds was suffering from some type of permanent insanity?

"A. He had Alzheimer's dementia. Insanity is a term that we don't use as much in mental health these days. But in a word, yes.

"Q. And how is that?

"A. Alzheimer's dementia is expected to decline over time. Individuals lose their ability to remember or participate in the life of their family. They often have behavioral difficulties, including paranoia and agitation, wondering and aggressiveness.

". . . .

"Q. Now, clearly, you weren't present on May 2, 2002, when Mr. Reynolds executed a will?

"A. That's correct.

"Q. In all frankness, Doctor, [you] couldn't really tell us whether he was having a good day or a bad day on May 2, 2002, could you?

"A. Well, other than within the context of his Alzheimer's, which should have been worse by about eight months or so. He couldn't do that when I saw him on July 30th of '01. I don't see how he could have done it at any time after that.

"Q. On July 30, 2001, did you ask Mr. Reynolds to tell you what property he owned?

"A. I did not.

"Q. And is your testimony, then, that you don't believe Mr. Reynolds could verbalize what property he owned?

"A. That's correct. An example, it's not about property per se, but he told me that two weeks prior to our interview he had flown an ultralight airplane, which alarmed me. And then I ran by Ms. Baran [daughter] and Ms. Hayes [care taker], and they said no. It had been many months since he did it. And to me, that told me that he really doesn't know what he remembers or knows and is capable of saying or thinking anything.

". . . .

"Q. You mentioned that insanity is a word you don't use much in your occupation much anymore. What does `insanity' mean?

"A. Severe mental illness."

(Emphasis added.)

The evaluation was attached to Dr. Jackson's deposition; it stated, in part:

"Upon assessment of language functioning, there emerged no evidence of receptive or expressive aphasia. There was no clear deficit in confrontation naming and his ability to rapidly produce spoken words upon command according to a specific phonemic category was average. Immediate and delayed recall of narrative verbal information (short stories) was quite poor. Remarkable was complete lack of retention upon delayed recall. No spontaneous...

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1 cases
  • Ex Parte Chris Langley Timber & Management
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 22 Julio 2005
    ...the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's summary judgment. Chris Langley Timber & Management, Inc. v. Reynolds, 923 So.2d 1094 (Ala.Civ.App.2004). We granted Langley Timber's petition for certiorari review to consider whether in affirming the trial c......

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