Chrisco v. Shafran

• Decision Date: 11 February 1981
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 79-522.
• Citation: 507 F. Supp. 1312
• Parties: Willie CHRISCO, Plaintiff, v. Milton P. SHAFRAN and Carl Williams, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

507 F. Supp. 1312

Willie CHRISCO, Plaintiff, v. Milton P. SHAFRAN and Carl Williams, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 79-522.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

February 11, 1981.

John J. O'Brien, and John C. Laager, Wilson & Whittington, P. A., Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff.

Paul P. Welsh, and Donald F. Parsons, Jr., Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, Del., for defendant Shafran.

Samuel Russell, Biggs & Battaglia, Wilmington, Del., for defendant Williams.

OPINION

MURRAY M. SCHWARTZ, District Judge.

Willie Chrisco, a former officer of the Wilmington Police Department, has brought a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against Carl Williams, a Delaware State Police Officer, and Milton Shafran, a former Delaware Deputy Attorney General. Chrisco seeks damages for alleged violations of his 4th, 5th, 6th and 14th amendment rights by Williams and Shafran during the course of an investigation of corruption in the sale of goods by the Diamond Chemical Company to the Wilmington School Board.

Shafran and Williams were part of a State of Delaware Department of Justice force that in April 1977 began investigating allegations by informants that Wilmington School Board employees were stealing Diamond Chemical products from the School Board warehouse and then returning the products to Diamond Chemical for eventual resale to the School Board. By May 1977 the investigation had focused on certain employees of both the School Board and Diamond Chemical. During the course of the investigation, one of the informants told the investigators that he had attended a meeting in 1976 at which he had provided four Wilmington police officers with specific evidence of the unlawful scheme. Shafran and Williams then sought to interview the four Wilmington police officers alleged to have attended the 1976 meeting, apparently both to get further information about the Diamond Chemical scheme, and to determine whether there had been any attempt to corrupt those officers.

In October 1977 Shafran and Williams first contacted Chrisco, one of the four police officers at the 1976 meeting. According to Chrisco, Williams and Shafran interviewed him at least six times during October and November for periods of up to eight hours per meeting. Chrisco alleges that the defendants told him that he was only a witness and not a target of the investigation, that he was not given his Miranda¹ warnings, and that Shafran and Williams told him he could not discuss the interviews with anyone, including any attorney or his police department superiors.

Chrisco claims that at the last meeting Shafran and Williams told him they had discovered he had perjured himself (Chrisco was under oath at these meetings), and then said that they would arrest him and cause him to be indicted for perjury unless he agreed to plead guilty to a departmental charge of lying under oath.² Williams and Shafran promised Chrisco that he would not be fired from his job if he pleaded guilty to the departmental charge, and they summoned Harry Manelski, the Wilmington Police Chief, who "verified" the agreement. Chrisco accepted the "plea agreement" and subsequently pleaded guilty to perjury before the Wilmington Police Trial Board, at which time he was represented by an attorney. The Trial Board ordered Chrisco fired, but on appeal he was reinstated at the reduced rank of Patrolman. No criminal charges of any nature were ever filed against Chrisco.

Chrisco alleges that Williams and Shafran, acting under color of state law, deprived him of the following federal constitutional rights: (1) 5th and 14th amendment rights not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law; (2) 6th amendment right "to be informed of the true nature and cause of the accusation against him"; (3) 5th amendment right "not to be subjected to coercion intended to secure a confession or plea of guilty"; (4) 6th amendment right to be represented by an attorney; (5) 14th amendment right not to be compelled to incriminate himself; and (6) his 14th amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.

Defendants Williams and Shafran have moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Williams argues that the complaint should be dismissed because it fails to allege that the defendants acted with the intent or purpose necessary to a cause of action under sections 1983 and 1985, and because the complaint, in any event, fails to allege any conduct by the defendants which, if proven, would constitute a violation of any of Chrisco's constitutional rights. Shafran contends that the action must be dismissed because he has an absolute prosecutorial immunity, because the facts alleged fail to make out a violation of any of Chrisco's constitutional rights, and because the complaint fails to allege with sufficient specificity the acts of Shafran alleged to have violated Chrisco's civil rights.

The Court will consider the issues presented in the following order: (1) whether Chrisco has satisfied the pleading requirements of sections 1983 and 1985; (2) whether Chrisco's factual allegations amount to cognizable constitutional claims; (3) whether Shafran is entitled to an absolute prosecutorial immunity; and, (4) whether the complaint has been drafted with sufficient factual specificity.

Although no party has expressly moved for summary judgment, Chrisco and Shafran have submitted affidavits in connection with the motions to dismiss. The Court has considered the affidavits in connection with Chrisco's claim of deprivation of liberty and will therefore treat defendants' motions as motions for summary judgment to the extent they challenge the claimed deprivation of liberty. In all other respects defendants' motions have been treated as pure motions to dismiss, and the Court has looked solely to the complaint, accepting as true all well-pleaded factual allegations.

Before proceeding to the various claims raised by defendants, it will be helpful to articulate what claims Chrisco has and has not raised in his complaint. Most significantly, Chrisco does not raise any procedural due process claims against the Wilmington Police Department Trial Board or Appeal Board in connection with his firing and subsequent reinstatement at a reduced rank.³ Rather, Chrisco's complaint focuses entirely upon allegations that defendants deprived him of liberty and of procedural rights guaranteed by the constitution to suspects and defendants in the course of criminal investigations and prosecutions. Thus the issues before the Court are unrelated to whether or not Chrisco was properly discharged or reduced in rank, and are limited to whether Shafran or Williams violated any of Chrisco's constitutional rights during the interrogation sessions.

I. STATUTORY PLEADING REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTIONS 1983 AND 1985(3)

Chrisco seeks to make out a cause of action for money damages against defendants under sections 1983 and 1985(3) of Title 42, United States Code, for the alleged violation of his constitutional rights.⁴ Defendant Williams argues that Chrisco has failed to state a claim under section 1983 because the complaint does not allege that the defendants acted with the purpose of discriminating between persons or classes of persons. Williams also argues that Chrisco has failed to state a claim under section 1985(3) because he does not allege that the defendants acted with any racial or otherwise class-based invidiously discriminatory animus.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action for deprivation under color of state law of any right guaranteed by the federal constitution or a federal statute. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2504-06, 65 L.Ed. 555 (1980). Proof of class-based discrimination is not an element of a cause of action under section 1983. Therefore Chrisco need neither plead nor prove that defendants acted with any discriminatory animus in order to make out a claim for relief pursuant to section 1983. By contrast, an essential element of any cause of action under section 1985(3) is proof that the defendants were motivated by "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus...." Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971). Chrisco's complaint does not allege any class-based animus and therefore fails to state a claim under section 1985(3).

Since the claim for damages pursuant to section 1983 will not be dismissed for failure to allege discriminatory animus, the Court will proceed to examine with particularity each of the claims raised by Chrisco to determine whether he has alleged constitutional violations cognizable under that statute.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF CHRISCO'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS Unreasonable Search and Right to be Informed of Charges

Chrisco, in his complaint, asserts that the defendants violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches. As neither the complaint nor Chrisco's affidavit alleges any search by defendants, Chrisco has failed to state any claim under the fourth amendment. Chrisco also claims that the defendants violated his sixth amendment right "to be informed of the true nature and cause of the accusation against him...." This claim apparently is based upon Chrisco's allegation that Shafran and Williams told him prior to questioning that he was only a witness, when in fact they had focused upon him as a suspect. The sixth amendment does not, however, give citizens a constitutional right to be informed that they have become suspects in a criminal investigation. Rather, the sixth amendment right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation ..." guarantees that a person who has been formally charged with a crime will be given sufficient details about the offense charged so as to permit him to adequately present his defense and to plead the judgment as a...