Chrisman v. Brooks
Decision Date | 07 June 1973 |
Citation | 291 Ala. 237,279 So.2d 500 |
Parties | Betty Idell CHRISMAN v. K. V. BROOKS, etc. SC 73. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Lusk & Lusk, Guntersville, Jenkins & Wallis, Birmingham, for appellant.
T. J. Carnes, Albertville, for appellee.
This appeal is from a decree setting aside a deed from Millard Fillmore Nixon to his niece, Miss Betty I. Chrisman. The deed was executed on June 11, 1969 and Nixon died on June 30, 1969 at the age of eighty-four years. The complainant-appellee, K. V. Brooks, is his nephew and executor of Nixon's estate.
The bill of complaint, as amended, charged that at the time of the execution of the deed, the deceased did not have sufficient mental capacity to execute it, or, in the alternative, that the deed was procured by undue influence on the part of Miss Chrisman, the respondent, or again, in the alternative, that the deed was in effect a conveyance in trust or a constructive trust, and finally, that there was a failure of consideration for the deed. The prayer was that the deed be set aside. Practically all of the estate consisted of the property deeded to Miss Chrisman by Nixon.
We do not recall that any witness described Nixon as an eccentric, but we think the undisputed testimony concerning him when he was concededly mentally competent would support that terminology. Nixon had a college education and for years he had lived alone in Albertville near the main business district. For the last ten or fifteen years of his life, he had not been employed and lived off his social security and welfare payments. Even though his normal behavior was, in some respects, odd, there was no evidence of mental incompetency until after he underwent an operation in a Huntsville hospital. But according to complainant's witnesses, Nixon's physical and mental deterioration began at that time.
When he was dismissed from the hospital at Huntsville, his niece, Miss Chrisman, a registered nurse, who was fifty-nine years of age, when the trial was had in 1971, took him to her home in Birmingham for his recuperation. He was hospitalized in a Birmingham hospital for pneumonia in September, 1968, again for two weeks of tests in April, 1969, and he was operated on for hernia in May, 1969. He was discharged in May and returned to the hospital on June 16, 1969, five days after he executed the deed and died of cancer of the pancreas on June 30, 1969.
We quote a part of the trial court's opinion:
To understand the reference to the hospital records which were in evidence, we quote a few entries from them. The following are some of the entries made during his hospitalization in 1968:
'9/11 Pulled oxygen nasal prongs from nose.
'9/17 Appears in better spirits and more aware of his surroundings.
In Dr. Risman's signed history and physical examination, he referred to Nixon as 'an elderly white male acutely ill' and that 'there was obviously mild senility.'
When Nixon was admitted to the hospital on April 10, 1969, Dr. Risman described the patient as 'a warm, elderly, senile white male'; and when he was discharged on April 29, 1969, Dr. Risman referred to him as a 'senile white male' * * * 'discharged with the following diagnosis; arteriosclerotic heart disease with auricular fibrillation (2) inguinal hernia left (3) gout (4) emphysema (5) bronchiectasis (6) abdominal pain of undetermined etiology, possible carcinoma of pancreas manifested only by abnormal chemical tests.'
A few of the notations on the clinical records during this period of hospitalization are listed:
'4/12 Pt. was found trying to get up over side rails when nurse was making rounds.
'4/15 . . . he absolutely refuses to eat.
'4/22 Pt. has been confused tonight.
Many entries note the 'confused' state of the patient. Nixon left the hospital on a stretcher accompanied by Miss Chrisman.
The next day, April 30, he was back in the hospital for a hernia operation and was discharged on May 4. The surgeon wrote of Nixon's previous hospitalization, 'It was thought that abdominal pain was probably due to carcinoma of the body or tail of the pancreas.'
Nixon remained at Miss Chrisman's home until June 16. It was in this interval that the deed was executed on June 11. A few notations from his final hospitalization read:
'6/22 Continues to be confused.
'6/23 Awake, crying.'
Nixon underwent another operation on June 24 and between then and June 30, he seems to have known little except discomfort and pain.
Mr. Nixon's will, executed October 11, 1965, bequeathed any money to be divided between K. V. Brooks, Helen Schlinkert, Edna Vieth, B. I. Chrisman and Aurelia Ferris. He also provided that his real estate be divided among these same five people and James Cox and Delmer Jones, share and share alike.
The evidence as to competency and undue influence was in sharp conflict.
The burden was on the complainant to establish to the reasonable satisfaction of the trier of fact that Nixon did not have sufficient mental capacity to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and effect of his act in executing the deed. Complainant's evidence, if believe, met this burden. Blackwell v. Sewall, 280 Ala 359, 194 So.2d 519; Spence v. Spence, 239 Ala. 480, 195 So. 717.
Where evidence is heard orally before the trial court, the finding of the court has the effect of a jury's verdict and will not be disturbed on appeal, unless plainly erroneous, whether in law or equity. And we must affirm the trial court's decree, if fairly supported by credible evidence under any reasonable aspect, regardless of what might be our view of the evidence. Patterson v. Brooks, 285 Ala. 349, 232 So.2d 598. This rule has been applied in the following recent cases where the deed was set aside because of the incompetency of the grantors, or undue influence or both: Skinner v. Todd, 283 Ala. 279, 215 So.2d 721; Blackwell v. Sewall, 280 Ala. 359, 194 So.2d 519; McBrayer v. Smith, 278 Ala. 247, 177 So.2d 571; Gilbreath...
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