Christ v. Kuehne

• Decision Date: 18 February 1903
• Citation: 172 Mo. 118,72 S.W. 537
• Parties: CHRIST et al. v. KUEHNE et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

72 S.W. 537

172 Mo. 118

CHRIST et al. v. KUEHNE et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

February 18, 1903.

DEEDS — TESTAMENTARY CHARACTER — CONSTRUCTION—DEED BY HUSBAND TO WIFE —EQUITABLE ESTATE—REMAINDER.

1. A deed conveyed property to the grantor's wife, "to have and to hold from and after the death" of the grantor "for and during her natural life," and after her death to the grantor's heirs forever; "it being understood that this conveyance is made upon the express condition" that the grantor should "during his lifetime retain the possession and control of the premises hereinbefore described." Held to pass a present interest in the property, and not to be testamentary in character.

2. Where in the granting clause of a deed one is named as party of the second part, but she is only given a life estate, and the heirs of the grantor are designated in the habendum clause as invested with the fee, the interest of the second party is only a life estate, and the fee goes to the grantor's heirs, though they are not designated by their names.

3. Where a husband gives a deed to his wife for life, though the estate taken by her is equitable only, the husband holds the legal title as trustee for her; and, in the event of his death before her, she becomes seised of the whole estate, both legal and equitable, so that there is at all times a particular legal estate existing, sufficient to support a remainder in fee to the grantor's heirs.

Appeal from St. Louis circuit court; Jacob Klein, Judge.

Suit by Catherine Christ and others against Ernst Kuehne and others. From a decree for defendants, complainants appeal. Affirmed.

Suit in ejectment for a city lot in the city of St. Louis, brought by plaintiffs, the heirs at law of one Mary Annie Greenlaw, deceased, against the tenants of the heirs of Edwin M. Greenlaw, deceased. Edwin M. and Mary Annie Greenlaw were husband and wife at the time of the execution of the deed to the property in suit, on April 6, 1891, the construction of which deed has given rise to the present controversy. This deed of April 6th was from said Edwin M. Greenlaw to his wife, Mary Annie Greenlaw, conveying to her the property in controversy, with the following provisions contained in the habendum clause thereof. "To have and to hold the same, together with all the rights, privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging or in any wise appertaining unto her, the said party of the second part, from and after the death of said party of the first part, for and during her natural life, and after her death to have and to hold to heirs at law of the said party of the first part and their heirs and assigns forever, it being understood that this conveyance is made upon the express condition that the said Edwin M. Greenlaw shall, during his lifetime, retain the possession and control of the premises hereinbefore described." About two years after the execution, delivery, and placing of record of the above deed, Edwin M. and Mary Annie Greenlaw executed deed to the same property to one Courtney, who on the same day executed his deed by which he purported to convey this property to Edwin M. Greenlaw and his wife, Mary Annie Greenlaw, as joint tenants. In May, 1896, Edwin M. Greenlaw died, leaving, as his heirs, children by a former marriage, who have joined their tenants in this suit as defendants; and in June of the same year his widow, Mary Annie Greenlaw, died, leaving as her heirs a mother and two brothers, the plaintiffs herein. As said, this is a controversy between Mrs. Greenlaw and the heirs of her husband, Edwin M. Greenlaw. The trial of the cause in the lower court resulted in a judgment for the defendants, and the case is brought here on plaintiffs' appeal.

J. W. Collins, for appellants. Hornsby & Harris, for respondents.

ROBINSON, J. (after stating the facts).

There were no controverted facts in the case the rights of both parties depending entirely upon the construction to be given to the deed of April 6, 1891. If this deed was operative to convey to the heirs of Edwin M. Greenlaw the land in suit after the death of Mary Annie Greenlaw, then plaintiffs have no right thereto, and the judgment of the lower court was for the right party.

Appellants' first contention is that this deed of April 6, 1891, was testamentary in character, and hence revocable, and that the after conveyance by Edwin M. Greenlaw and wife of same land therein named to Courtney in February, 1893, operated as a revocation of any grant or gift intended by said first instrument; and, further, they contend that as this deed, direct from husband to wife, vested only an equitable estate in the wife, therefore, when Edwin M. Greenlaw, by this deed, conveyed the property in suit to his wife "from and after his death, for and during her natural life, and after her death to his heirs," he granted to his heirs such an estate as could be supported only by a particular estate at law, and that, as the particular estate created was an equitable life estate in the wife, it was not sufficient to support the estate in future in the heirs of said Edwin M. Greenlaw. Respondents, upon the other hand, insist that the instrument of April 6, 1891, in question, is in every sense of the term a deed, and that since section 4596, Rev. St. 1899, expressly permits the creation by deed of estate of freehold to commence in future, the common-law rule requiring a particular estate to support remainder has been abolished, and, further, that irrespective of the statute, and if it be conceded that a particular estate was necessary to support the future estate conveyed to the heirs of Edwin M. Greenlaw by the deed of April 6, 1891, that particular estate was clearly...