Christensen v. Lawrence F. Quigley Memorial Hosp.

• Decision Date: 01 November 1985
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 84-3388-W.
• Citation: 656 F. Supp. 14
• Parties: Charles CHRISTENSEN, Plaintiff, v. LAWRENCE F. QUIGLEY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

656 F. Supp. 14

Charles CHRISTENSEN, Plaintiff, v. LAWRENCE F. QUIGLEY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 84-3388-W.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

November 1, 1985.

Thomas Homans, Homans, Hamilton, Hahmen & Marshall, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.

Lisa Levy, Dept. of the Attorney General, Government Bureau, Boston, Mass., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WOLF, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Charles Christensen, brings this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He seeks monetary and injunctive relief against the defendant, Quigley Memorial Hospital, for alleged employment discrimination based on sex. Jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.

On March 11, 1985, Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's first complaint was granted by this court (Garrity, J.) with leave to amend within 60 days. Plaintiff amended his complaint, and defendant renewed its motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's motion to amend his amended complaint was assented to at oral argument.

For the reasons stated below, the court denies defendant's motion to dismiss.

I. Pleadings

Plaintiff's second amended complaint, in pertinent part, makes the following allegations:

1. Defendant hired plaintiff in 1977 to work as a lab technician in Quigley Memorial Hospital. Complaint, ¶ 6.

2. Defendant hired three women in 1981 who allegedly were less qualified than plaintiff. Nonetheless, from November, 1982, to July, 1983, these women allegedly received more rewarding and professionally challenging work than plaintiff. Complaint, ¶¶ 7-8.

3. From October, 1980, to July, 1983, defendant reprimanded, disciplined, and then discharged plaintiff for conduct that was tolerated in similarly situated women. This conduct included authorized and unauthorized tardiness, minor breaches of hospital rules, and the upsetting of hospital patients. Complaint, ¶ 9.

4. Defendant reprimanded, disciplined, and eventually discharged plaintiff for failing to complete work assignments that were unduly burdensome compared to workloads of three female lab technicians. Complaint, ¶ 10.

5. Each of the defendant's actions against plaintiff were taken with the intent to discriminate against him on the basis of his sex. Complaint, ¶ 15.

6. Defendant's actions were also taken to retaliate against plaintiff for bringing a complaint before the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination on June 16, 1980. Complaint, ¶ 16.

7. Plaintiff seeks various forms of injunctive and monetary relief, including reinstatement, back pay, reimbursement for lost benefits, and a restriction on the dissemination of information about his work history.

II. Discussion

Defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiff's Title VII claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It also seeks to dismiss plaintiff's action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that plaintiff's Title VII remedies are exclusive.

A. Title VII Claim

At the outset, the court stresses that it has limited discretion to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). In addition, the court must "consider only the facts and allegations set forth in the complaint and must view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Harper v. Cserr, 544 F.2d 1121, 1122 (1st Cir.1976) (reversing dismissal of § 1983 action based on alleged violation of Eighth Amendment).

In civil rights cases, the First Circuit requires a plaintiff to outline specific facts, which if proven would entitle him to relief. A plaintiff's subjective and conclusory allegations regarding a defendant's acts and motives do not alone make out a civil rights claim. Dewey v. University of New Hampshire, 694 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 944, 103 S.Ct. 2121, 77 L.Ed.2d 1301 (1983); Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 665 (1st Cir.1979); Kadar Corp. v. Milbury, 549 F.2d 230, 233 (1st Cir.1977).

At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has given specific guidance for analyzing the sufficiency of a Title VII complaint. In a Title VII action, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing by a preponderence of the evidence a prima facie case of employment discrimination. The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.¹ Plaintiff then assumes the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's articulated reasons for its actions are nothing more than a pretext for a discriminatory motive. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-806, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1823-1826, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-1095, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). In McDonald v. Santa Fe Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976), the Court set forth the pleading standard for a Title VII complaint:

An allegation that other "employees involved in acts against the employer of comparable seriousness ... were nevertheless retained ..." is adequate to plead an inferential case that the employer's reliance on his discharged employee's misconduct as grounds for terminating him was merely a pretext.

427 U.S. 273, 283 n. 13, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 2580 n. 13, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. at 1825) (emphasis in original).

The court concludes that plaintiff's Title VII claim meets the pleading standards established by Conley and McDonald and thus may not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). Although the pleadings are not replete with specific facts, the court cannot conclude, after viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, that it is "beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. at 101-102.

Furthermore, this case is too similar to McDonald to permit the court to grant defendant's motion. In McDonald, two white employees brought a Title VII action against their employer because they were dismissed for misappropriating cargo, while a fellow black employee, who also misappropriated cargo, was retained. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that the employer had the right to discharge employees for misconduct, but this criterion had to be applied equally across races. Similarly, here plaintiff concedes that he was not an ideal employee, and that he violated certain hospital rules, but he claims that similarly situated women employees who were guilty of substantially the same misconduct were not treated as harshly as he. Complaint, ¶ 9. Thus, under McDonald, plaintiff's pleadings raise "an inferential case that the employer's reliance on its discharged employee's misconduct as a grounds for terminating him was merely a pretext." 427 U.S. at 283 n. 13, 96 S.Ct. at 2580 n. 13.

The court further notes that plaintiff appears to have cured the flaws that led this court (Garrity, J.) to dismiss the original complaint. In the first complaint, plaintiff failed to give names, dates, or any other specifics about his claims. More important, he failed to plead that the alleged discrimination was based on his sex. These deficiencies have been sufficiently remedied to survive this motion to dismiss.

In addition, the court is not convinced that the pleading standards established by the First Circuit have not been met, albeit barely. In Dewey v. University of New Hampshire, the most recent case cited by defendant, the court stated that dismissal of a First Amendment claim is a "dubious practice in a close case," and that "summary judgment allows a broader basis for decision and a hearing of evidence an even broader basis." 694 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1982). The Dewey court upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff's First Amendment action because he wholly failed to identify the nature of the speech for which he claimed he was denied post-retirement age tenure. In the case at hand, plaintiff has at least set forth minimal facts describing the misconduct for which he was fired and female employees were not. He has also given dates that serve to bound the period in which the alleged discrimination occurred. In short, the court concludes that this is a "close case" in which it would be a "dubious" practice to dismiss plaintiff's complaint.²

B. § 1983 Claims

Defendant also seeks to dismiss plaintiff's action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,³ arguing that Title VII provides an exclusive remedy for employment discrimination claims brought by a state employee. Neither the Supreme Court nor the First Circuit has squarely faced this issue. The Supreme Court, however, has held that Title VII is an exclusive remedy for federal employment discrimination claims. Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) (Title VII precludes federal employment discrimination claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the statute that creates a cause of action for constitutional deprivations involving racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts). Similarly, employment discrimination claims in general may not be asserted within the remedial framework of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the statute that protects the federal rights of citizens from deprivations caused by conspiracies. Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979). These cases turn on the principle that a precisely drawn, detailed statute, like Title VII, preempts more general remedies. Brown,...