Christensen v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 09 May 1944
• Docket Number: 14790.
• Citation: 30 S.E.2d 471,197 Ga. 807
• Parties: CHRISTENSEN v. NEW ENGLAND MUT. LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

30 S.E.2d 471

197 Ga. 807

CHRISTENSEN v. NEW ENGLAND MUT. LIFE INS. CO.

No. 14790.

Supreme Court of Georgia

May 9, 1944

Rehearing Denied June 9, 1944.

Syllabus by the Court.

Ambiguous provisions of an insurance policy will be construed most strongly against the insurer, and in favor of the insured.

Scott Dunaway, Riley & Wiggins, and John A. Dunaway, all of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Jones Williams & Dorsey and Hugh M. Dorsey, Jr., all of Atlanta, for defendant in error.

BELL Chief Justice.

The Court of Appeals certified the following question "Where a life insurance policy provides as follows: 'Suicide. If the insured, whether sane or insane, shall die by his own hand or act within two years from the date of issue of this policy, the liability of the company under this policy shall be limited to the payment in one sum of the amount of premiums paid, less any indebtedness to the company.' Is the company liable for the face amount of the policy, where it would be liable therefor unless the above quoted provision became applicable, where the insured, within two years from the date of the issue of the policy, comes to his death by jumping from a sixth story window of a hotel and landing on the roof of another part of the hotel forty-three and one half feet below, when the insured, by reason of an hallucination, jumped to escape injury from imaginary enemies and did not realize that his act would as a natural consequence produce his death?"

It is declared in the Code, § 56-909, that death by suicide shall release the insurer from his contract; but the defense of suicide cannot be based solely upon this provision, where the act of the insured in taking his life was the result of his own insanity, for such an act would not be suicide within the meaning of this law. Merritt v. Cotton States Life Insurance Co., 55 Ga. 103 (6); Life Association of America v. Waller, 57 Ga. 533; Fraternal Relief Association v. Edwards, 9 Ga.App. 43, 70 S.E. 265. Such defense as to an insured who is sane, may, however, be waived, and the effect of the clause here was to waive it after two years. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Durden, 9 Ga.App. 797 (6, 12), 72 S.E. 295.

But the clause was not merely a waiver in favor of the insured, for instead of simply retaining the defense of suicide as to a sane insured for the first two years, it actually sought to enlarge such defense so as to include therein the act of self-destruction by an insane person, during such period. The clause in this respect was defensive in nature, and it is this phase that is here for determination. Accordingly, for present purposes, the clause must be viewed and dealt with as a defensive one. It embraced suicide, "whether sane or insane," and in the particular case, as stated in the question, the insured came to his death by jumping from a sixth story window of a hotel, when by reason of an hallucination he was endeavoring to escape from imaginary enemies and did not realize that his act would as a material consequence produce his death.

The question turns chiefly upon the meaning of the phrase, "whether sane or insane," as inserted in such a clause, for it is generally held that the words "who shall die by his own hand or act" are nothing more than a proviso against suicide or intentional self-destruction. Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Paterson, 41 Ga. 338 (4), 5 Am.Rep. 535; 29 Am.Jur. 699, § 918. Formerly, stipulations against suicide, minus the words "sane or insane," were in use, and under such stipulations the courts generally took the view that self-destruction would constitute a defense only when the insured was sane, upon the theory that self-destruction by an insane person could not properly be classed as suicide, if the insanity was of such character and degree as to free the act from all immorality and leave the actor blameless. For example, see Life Association of America v. Waller, 57 Ga. 533, supra. In other words, that such a clause, though waiving the defense of suicide after a stated period, did not during such period enlarge it in any manner as it already existed under the law. After decisions to this effect, insurance companies began to insert the phrase, "whether sane or insane," or similar words, and the question then arose as to the legal effect of such interpolation. Upon one phase of this question, a decided conflict of authority soon developed, and still exists. While it is generally agreed that the additional words served to extend the suicide clause to intentional self-destruction by an insane as well as by a sane person, regardless of the moral or criminal quality of the act, the authorities are in sharp conflict on whether intention of the insured to take his life is essential to such defense where, because of his insanity, he did not realize the physical nature and consequences of his act as one that would produce death, and therefore committed it without even an insane purpose or intention to take his life; the "numerical weight of authority" being to the effect that the element of intention is not essential to the defense in such a case. 29 Am.Jur. 700, 701,§§ 920, 921.

One of the earliest cases in which the question arose was De Gogorza v. Knickerbocker Life Insurance Co., 1875, 65 N.Y. 232, decided by the Commissioners of Appeals of New York, and not by the Court of Appeals, as is sometimes mistakenly stated; although the rank of the tribunal would be of no importance, provided the decision is sound. It was held in effect that actual intention was unnecessary to the defense where the act producing death was of such nature that it would be treated as suicide if it had been committed by a sane person, although the insured, because of insanity, did not realize the physical nature and consequences of his act, and therefore had no actual intention, sane or insane, to take his life. The commissioners were divided, however, three concurring and two dissenting. Able opinions were written, and from that time forward the same diversity of opinion has constantly appeared, a majority of the courts agreeing with the prevailing view, and others following the dissent. It may be observed further, that even in the later cases, dissenting opinions have frequently been filed, and the two lines of opinion have generally tracked pretty closely the reasoning contained in the opposing views expressed in that case. In that case, it appeared that the insured had some disease of his brain which seriously affected his mind, and on the day of his death, he was found in his room, in his own house, a pistol having been discharged, by his own hand, into his mouth. The pistol belonged to his son, and there was no evidence that he knew it was loaded, and there was no evidence of the circumstances of his death, except what appeared when he was discovered dead. The majority opinion stated that a verdict for the plaintiff having been rendered, the court would assume that the jury found that when the hand of the insured dealt the fatal shot, he was wholly bereft of reason. In holding that the clause, "die by his own hand or act, sane or insane," applied as a defense, even though the insured was so insane that his act of self-destruction was wholly involuntary, it was said; "That this language [sane or insane], in view of previous decisions, was inserted for such a purpose [to exempt from liability], cannot be doubted, and that it was agreed to by both the insured and the insurer is not questioned, and that it is a provision allowed by law, no one denies. We are to say from these words what the parties must have intended, and we cannot properly say that additional words having no meaning were inserted in the contract, and if they mean anything it is just what the words commonly import, and that is, if death ensues fom any physical movement of the hand or body of the assured proceeding from a partial or total eclipse of the mind, the insurer may go free. We are not altogether unmindful of the force of the proposition that a man does not die by his own hand who has not sufficient mind to will his own death, and it is not, perhaps, entirely easy to see in what precise words in our language the idea may be accurately and artistically expressed that a totally insane man may take his own life. But the question seems to involve more--the refinement of language--than the application of common sense, and we are of the opinion that, in the common judgment of mankind, it will be considered that, when a totally insane man blows his brains out with a pistol that he will be said to have died by his own hand within the meaning of a policy such as we have now under consideration."

In the dissenting opinion, it was said: "It is a matter of common observation that some insane persons can be influenced by motives; that they can form intentions and act upon them and that they can devise schemes and carry them out with great cunning and skill, and yet such persons may not be able to distinguish between right and wrong, may not be competent to bind them-selves by contracts, or be legally responsible for crime. There are other insane persons who cannot form intentions, are unconscious of the physical consequences of their acts, cannot control their actions, and who act from irresistible impulse; such persons can no more be said to act than an automaton. If such a person should commit self-destruction, the event...