Christensen v. Snap-On Tools Corp.

Decision Date18 September 1996
Docket NumberNo. 95-88,SNAP-ON,95-88
Citation554 N.W.2d 254
PartiesChrista K. CHRISTENSEN, Appellee, v.TOOLS CORPORATION, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Paul C. Thune and Michael S. Roling of Peddicord, Wharton, Thune & Spencer, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Mark S. Soldat, Algona, for appellee.

Considered en banc.

PER CURIAM.

This case comes to us on review of a district court proceeding reversing in part and affirming in part a decision of the industrial commissioner in a workers' compensation case. Snap-On Tools Corporation, the employer, has appealed, and Christa K. Christensen, the employee, has cross-appealed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Appellee, Christa Christensen, began working for Snap-On Tools Corporation, the appellant, on June 19, 1989. She was employed as a "strip tank operator." Her responsibilities consisted of placing metal parts in a basket, lowering the basket into a tank of hot caustic liquid where any paint would be stripped off, removing the parts from the basket, and then cleaning the parts with a pressure washer.

Shortly after beginning this job, Christensen began complaining of pain in her right arm. On August 14, 1989, she visited Dr. Moss for a hard lump on the top of her right elbow and pain extending from her elbow to her wrist. She was diagnosed with lateral epicondylitis and prescribed aspirin and a wrist splint. She was allowed to continue with her regular duties at work.

On November 16, 1989, Christensen's arm was injured when it was caught between the rinse tank and a hoist. On December 9, 1989, she returned to Dr. Moss for treatment of the resulting pain and swelling. The doctor then advised her to perform only left-handed work for one week. She has continued to experience pain in the arm and has seen numerous physicians for treatment. On October 15, 1990, Christensen was placed on lay-off status due to reduced production needs at Snap-On. In February of 1992, Christensen went to work for a different manufacturer doing assembly work.

Christensen later filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. On June 18, 1993, a hearing was held before a deputy industrial commissioner. The deputy commissioner filed a decision finding Christensen suffered a ten percent impairment to her right arm, refusing to award penalty benefits for unpaid permanent partial disability, and awarding Christensen interest and costs. This decision, with slight modification, was affirmed by the industrial commissioner. Christensen then sought judicial review in the district court upon which the court reversed and remanded to the agency with respect to the impairment rating and penalty benefits, and reapportioned the assessment of costs. On appeal, Snap-On claims district court error in overturning the industrial commissioner's determination that Christensen's total impairment is ten percent to the right arm and in remanding to determine possible penalty benefits. On cross-appeal, Christensen claims district court error on issues of delayed payments, interest and penalty assessments, failing to specify compensation due and credit dates, and assessment of costs.

II. Scope of Review

A district court decision rendered in an appellate capacity is examined for correction of errors at law. Houlihan v. Employment Appeal Bd., 545 N.W.2d 863, 865 (Iowa 1996). In making such a determination, we apply the standards of Iowa Code section 17A.19(8) (1989), which provides an agency decision may be reversed where substantial rights of a party have been prejudiced and the action is unsupported by substantial evidence or affected by errors of law, to determine if our conclusion would be the same as that of the district court. If so, we must affirm; if not, reversal is appropriate. Houlihan, 545 N.W.2d at 865.

Factual findings of the industrial commissioner are binding on this court and are to be considered conclusive in cases where relevant evidence is in dispute and reasonable minds could differ as to the inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom. Second Injury Fund v. Shank, 516 N.W.2d 808, 812 (Iowa 1994).

III. Impairment Rating

Christensen alleges the deputy commissioner's decision declining to find a greater degree of impairment was unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. She bases this argument partly on her presentation of lay witnesses who testified in their opinion she was injured to a much greater degree than what the physicians had diagnosed. Christensen is correct in her argument the commissioner is bound to consider this additional testimony. See Terwilliger v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 529 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Iowa 1995); Miller v. Lauridsen Foods, Inc., 525 N.W.2d 417, 421 (Iowa 1994).

On appeal by Christensen to the industrial commissioner, it was determined that claimant's injury included both the crush injury to the right forearm as well as right lateral epicondylitis. As such, the commissioner held that Christensen's entitlement to medical benefits extends to both conditions. The district court agreed and noted the commissioner failed to make any specific findings with respect to loss of function of claimant's right elbow. For this reason, remand was ordered so the commissioner may either reassess the functional capacity, considering both injuries, or clarify the ruling. We affirm the district court on this issue and remand to the commissioner.

In considering the compensation due to these injuries, the commissioner on remand, must consider all evidence, both medical and nonmedical. Lay witness testimony is both relevant and material upon the cause and extent of injury. Miller, 525 N.W.2d at 421. In this regard the deputy commissioner stated

Claimant's testimony and the lay testimony presented to show that claimant's loss of use of her right arm exceeds the assessment made by Dr. DeBartolo and Dr. Donovan is rejected and the physicians' rating is accepted as more consistent with the documentary evidence presented.

The district court found the functional capacity evaluation used by the medical experts was limited in terms of factors it could not or did not attempt to measure such as endurance. The court noted lay testimony as to Christensen's level of impairment on a continuous basis, during non-work hours, and while doing non-employment-related activities. Whether these matters were factored into the deputy commissioner's decision is disputed and, at best, is unclear. In any event, on remand, they must be considered.

In Terwilliger, decided after the decisions of the commissioner and the district court, we discussed the requirement of considering both medical and nonmedical testimony. Terwilliger, 529 N.W.2d at 273. We reiterate the importance of these considerations and direct the commissioner on remand to craft the resulting decision accordingly.

IV. Penalty Benefits

An employee is entitled to penalty benefits under certain circumstances:

If a delay in commencement or termination of benefits occurs without reasonable or probable cause or excuse, the industrial commissioner shall award benefits in addition to those benefits payable under this chapter or chapter 85, 85A, or 85B, up to fifty percent of the amount of benefits that were unreasonably delayed or denied.

Iowa Code § 86.13 (1991). Here, the parties dispute the correctness of the commissioner's decision to refuse an award of penalty benefits with respect to Snap-On's failure to timely commence payment of permanent partial disability (PPD) compensation and failure to pay the full amount of PPD benefits. A short review of the factual and procedural history relating to this issue is helpful.

A. Factual and procedural background

As already noted, Christensen injured her arm on November 16, 1989. No one questioned the occurrence of the injury. Christensen saw four doctors, none of whom stated that her injury was permanent; one doctor, however, did put restrictions on the use of her arm, with the "hope" the restrictions would not be permanent. Christensen missed a few days work in November and December 1989, but returned to work on December 10, 1989. Snap-On paid some healing period benefits in 1990 at a rate less than that to which it ultimately stipulated at the hearing in 1993.

In May 1991, Christensen retained an attorney who immediately obtained an independent medical examination. The doctor performing the medical examination, Dr. DeBartolo, concluded Christensen had a permanent injury resulting in a ten percent impairment of her arm. This rating was sent to Snap-On on November 12, 1991, together with a request that PPD payments be made. On December 19, 1991, Snap-On requested its own independent medical examination. The doctor performing the second examination, Dr. Donovan, also found a permanent injury resulting in a ten percent permanent impairment. Snap-On received Dr. Donovan's report on January 17, 1992.

Thirteen days later, on January 30, 1992, Snap-On wrote to Christensen's attorney stating it would pay PPD benefits based on a ten percent impairment at a rate of $286.32. At the hearing, Snap-On's witness testified the thirteen-day delay between receipt of Dr. Donovan's report and the decision to pay benefits was caused by "some confusion over what the proper wage rate should be." Eleven days after agreeing to pay PPD benefits, Snap-On issued and mailed a check for past-due and current PPD benefits. This check, mailed on February 10, 1992, was finally received by Christensen on February 14, 1992. At the hearing, Snap-On's witness observed that the check had to be mailed from Michigan.

Upon being retained, Christensen's attorney had also requested wage information from Snap-On to verify the rate used by Snap-On for healing period benefits. The requested wage information was never produced despite five requests made over a three-year period. Not until the January 30, 1992, letter did Snap-On inform Christensen's attorney of...

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