Christenson v. Madson
| Decision Date | 30 October 1914 |
| Docket Number | No. 18736[54].,18736[54]. |
| Citation | 149 N.W. 288,127 Minn. 225 |
| Parties | CHRISTENSON et al. v. MADSON. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; Charles S. Jelley, Judge.
Action by Williams M. Christenson and others against the Danish Brotherhood in America, wherein Mary Madson was substituted as defendant. A verdict was directed for defendant, and from denial of new trial plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
Where a person procures insurance upon the life of another, it is the general rule that he must prove an insurable interest in such life in order to recover upon such policy; but, where a person insures his own life and appoints another to receive the proceeds of such insurance, the appointee establishes a prima facie right to recover by proving the contract of insurance and the happening of the event upon which it is to become payable. If facts exist which preclude such recovery, they are matters of defense.
The classes of persons eligible as beneficiaries under policies issued by a fraternal association are to be determined by the rules adopted for the express purpose of governing such matters, and not by general statements made for the purpose of indicating the general object of such association, and restrictions limiting the classes who may be so designated must be expressed in positive terms cannot be inferred from general statements.
The by-laws of the association having provided that policies may be made payable to the affianced wife of the insured, a policy so payable is valid, although the object, of the association, as stated in its constitution, is to provide insurance for the surviving relatives of its members.
Under the evidence in this case, the court did not err in refusing to find that immoral relations existed between the insured and his beneficiary. Jay W. Crane, of Minneapolis, for appellants.
Grotte & Bowen, of Minneapolis, for respondent.
On June 7, 1909, James P. Christenson procured the Danish Brotherhood in America, of which he was a member, to issue to him a benefit certificate for one thousand dollars payable, upon his death, to defendant, Mary Madson, as his betrothed. He paid all the assessments upon the certificate until his death which occurred in December, 1912. In October, 1911, he delivered the certificate to Mary Madson, the beneficiary therein named, who has ever since retained it, but he was never married to her. He had been previously married and had grown-up children, but his wife had procured a divorce from him on April 5, 1909. After his death, his children brought this suit against the Brotherhood to recover the amount of the certificate. The Brotherhood admitted liability under the certificate, paid the money into court, and caused Mary Madson to be substituted as defendant.
The suit proceeded to trial between the children as plaintiffs and Mary Madson as defendant, and she will be referred to as defendant hereafter. The case was tried by the court without a jury. The court, among other things, found that defendant was the affianced wife of James P. Christenson; that both the law and the rules of the order authorized the issuance of benefit certificates payable to the affianced wife of the insured; and that the certificate in controversy was, by its terms, payable to defendant as such affianced wife. The court thereupon directed that judgment be entered to the effect that defendant was entitled to the proceeds of the certificate, and that the money paid into court be delivered to her. Plaintiffs appealed from an order denying their motion for a new trial.
[1] 1. Plaintiffs insist that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the finding that defendant was betrothed to Christenson. His death debarred her, a party in interest, from testifying as to conversations between them, and the only evidence to support the finding is the fact that the certificate, by his direction, was made payable to her as his betrothed. Plaintiffs invoke the rule, frequently stated in the books, that the beneficiary under a policy of life insurance, in order to recover thereon, must allege and prove an insurable interest in the life of the insured. This rule is based upon the theory that a policy, issued to one who has no interest in the continuation of the life of the person insured, is both a gambling contract, and a contract which creates a motive for desiring the termination of such life, and is therefore against public policy and void. The rule is applied very generally where the insurance is procured by the beneficiary and the suit is consequently founded upon a contract between the beneficiary and the insurer; but where the insured himself procures the insurance, the contract is between him and the insurer, not between the beneficiary and the insurer, and his interest in his own life sustains the policy and need not be proven. In such case he has the right to appoint the person to whom the proceeds of the policy shall go, and, if he make such appointment, the one so appointed takes by virtue of the contract between the insured and the insurer, not by virtue of a contract between the insurer and the appointee, and in order to recover thereon it is sufficient for the appointee to prove the contract and the happening of the event which entitles him to the benefit thereof. If there be facts which preclude the appointee from recovering, they should be alleged and proven as a defense. In other words, if the insured himself procured the issuance of the policy and caused the beneficiary to be named therein, the policy is prima facie evidence that the beneficiary so named is entitled to the proceeds thereof at the death of the insured; but, if the insured did not procure the issuance of the policy, the beneficiary thereunder must allege and prove the facts entitling him to receive such proceeds. In Campbell v. New England M. L. Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 381, the court say:
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