Christianson v. Henke

• Decision Date: 31 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. A11–1319.,A11–1319.
• Citation: 831 N.W.2d 532
• Parties: Joane M. CHRISTIANSON, Respondent, v. Travis HENKE, Respondent, Claire Holewa, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

831 N.W.2d 532

Joane M. CHRISTIANSON, Respondent,

v. Travis HENKE, Respondent,Claire Holewa, Appellant.

No. A11–1319.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 31, 2013.

Syllabus by the Court

The execution of a valid Recognition of Parentage by a mother and father and the filing of that form with the appropriate state agency constitutes a “proceeding” for “parentage” for purposes of Minn.Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 2 (2012).

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction to award grandparent visitation under Minn.Stat. § 257C.08 (2012), because the mother and father of the child with whom visitation is sought executed and filed a valid Recognition of Parentage with the appropriate state agency pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 257.75 (2012).

Virginia A. Marso, Marso Law Office, Waite Park, MN, for respondent Joane M. Christianson.

Travis Henke, Foreston, MN, pro se.

Robert A. Manson, Robert A. Manson, P.A., White Bear Lake, MN, for appellant.

OPINION

ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice.

The Benton County District Court awarded grandparent visitation to Joane Christianson, the paternal grandmother of T.H., which decision was affirmed by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. T.H.'s mother, Claire Holewa, appeals the court of appeals decision to affirm the award of visitation to Christianson. Minnesota Statutes § 257C.08 (2012), the grandparent visitation statute, allows a court to award visitation as part of several different kinds of proceedings, including a “proceeding” for parentage. The district court concluded that the Recognition of Parentage executed by T.H.'s parents pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 257.75 (2012) was a proceeding for parentage under the grandparent visitation statute. Holewa asserts that there has been no proceeding under the statute and therefore the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award visitation to T.H.'s grandmother. Because we conclude that a Recognition of Parentage executed and filed with the appropriate state agency under Minn.Stat. § 257.75 is a “proceeding” for purposes of Minn.Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 2, we conclude that a “proceeding” occurred and that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to award visitation to Christianson. Therefore, we affirm.

On August 2, 2007, Claire Holewa gave birth to a son, T.H. That same day, Holewa and Travis Henke executed, and subsequently filed with the appropriate state agency, a Recognition of Parentage (ROP), which stated that Henke was T.H.'s father. SeeMinn.Stat. § 257.75 (creating ROP form and procedure). For most of the first two years of T.H.'s life, Joane Christianson, T.H.'s paternal grandmother, and Craig Christianson, T.H.'s paternal step-grandfather, played a major role in supporting T.H. and his parents. This support included helping Holewa and Henke purchase a trailer home that was located near the Christiansons' own home and frequently caring for T.H.

After Holewa and Henke separated, Benton County brought a child support action against Henke. Following the separation, the Christiansons continued to provide childcare for T.H. They did so at Henke's request. The Christiansons usually cared for T.H. on afternoons and eveningson Mondays and Wednesdays, and overnights on Friday.

On November 13, 2010, an incident occurred that adversely affected the relationship between T.H.'s parents and the Christiansons. On that day, Henke sent a text message to the Christiansons indicating that Holewa was threatening to commit suicide. Holewa had attempted suicide before T.H. was born, a fact that was known to the Christiansons. Holewa's suicide attempt had left her hospitalized for two days. On November 13, following Holewa's new threat of suicide, Henke brought T.H. to the Christiansons' home. At some point thereafter, Holewa arrived at the Christiansons' home so that she could retrieve T.H., but the Christiansons refused to release T.H. to her. The police were called and after they arrived, the Christiansons fully complied with the police's instruction that the Christiansons return T.H. to Holewa. This incident caused Holewa and Henke to state that the Christiansons “would never see [T.H.] again.”

Following the November 13, 2010 incident, the Christiansons filed a petition for grandparent visitation with T.H. The Christiansons requested visitation of four hours twice per week plus one overnight stay every weekend, time around each major holiday, and a minimum of three nonconsecutive weeks during the summer. Holewa answered the Christiansons' petition and indicated that she disagreed with the amount of visitation the Christiansons sought with T.H. The Christiansons subsequently reduced their request for visitation to “reasonable grandparent visitation.” Holewa then amended her answer to the Christiansons' petition and moved the district court to dismiss Craig Christianson as a party to the proceedings and to award Joane Christianson some visitation with T.H., provided Craig Christianson was not present. By the time the district court held a hearing on the parties' motions, Craig Christianson had withdrawn as a party to the visitation proceedings and the remaining parties—Holewa, Henke, and Joane Christianson—agreed that Joane Christianson should have at least some visitation. But the parties disagreed over how much visitation was warranted and whether Craig Christianson should be allowed to be present during the visitation.

On March 8, 2011, the district court issued an order ruling on the parties' motions. The court conducted an amount-of-contact, a best-interests-of-the-child, and an interference-with-parent/child-relationship analysis. The court then found that Joane Christianson “has had significant contact with” T.H. throughout his life and that she “cared for [T.H.] frequently.” The court found, and the parties agreed, that it was in T.H.'s best interests for T.H. to have some contact with Joane Christianson. Further, the court could not find any reason beyond the November 13, 2010 incident to mandate that Craig Christianson have no contact with T.H. The court concluded that the November 13 incident alone was “unreasonable” grounds for excluding Craig Christianson from being present during the visitation between T.H. and Joane Christianson. But the court found that the amount of time Joane Christianson had requested for visitation would interfere with the parent/child relationship and therefore granted visitation limited to 4:00–8:00 p.m. on Wednesday evenings and an overnight stay on every third Friday of each month.

Holewa responded by moving to vacate the district court's order, further amend her amended answer, and amending the district court's order. Holewa alleged that she had received faulty legal advice from her attorney and that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award Joane Christianson visitation under the grandparent visitation statute, Minn.Stat. § 257C.08. Section 257C.08, subdivision 2, only allows a court to award grandparent visitation following the “commencement” of a variety of proceedings, including a proceeding for parentage. Holewa claimed that the ROP she and Henke had executed is not such a proceeding, and thus, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award visitation to Joane Christianson.

The district court disagreed with Holewa's claims, concluding that an ROP is unambiguously a “proceeding” under section 257C.08, subdivision 2, and that legislative intent also dictates that an ROP is a proceeding. But the court did amend its visitation order, superseding the original schedule by specifying several holidays that T.H. would spend with his mother.¹ The court then denied Holewa's other motions.

Holewa appealed the district court's orders on the subject matter jurisdiction issue to the court of appeals. Christianson v. Henke, 812 N.W.2d 190, 191 (Minn.App.2012). The court of appeals affirmed the district court, holding that “under the plain language of the applicable statutes, a ROP is a ‘proceeding’ for ‘parentage’ for purposes of asserting a claim for grandparent visitation.” Id. at 194. Holewa subsequently appealed to our court and we granted review.

The parties do not dispute any relevant facts in this case. The only disputed issue before us is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Varda v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 692 N.W.2d 440, 444 (Minn.2005). When there are no disputed facts, the application of the law to the undisputed facts is a question of law and “fully reviewable” by appellate courts. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 561 N.W.2d 513, 515 (Minn.1997).

Holewa asserts that an ROP cannot count as a proceeding under section 257C.08, subdivision 2, and makes several arguments to support her assertion. First, while the district court found that section 257.75, subdivision 3, states that an ROP “has the force and effect of a judgment,” Holewa argues that the court skipped over parts of the statute that do not support the court's holding. To support her claim, Holewa cites the fact that, under certain conditions, an ROP can be challenged.² Holewa also cites a definition of “proceeding” from Black's Law Dictionary, which in part defines a “proceeding” as a component of actual litigation. Holewa next argues that the ROP statute specifically lists the actions that can be brought using an ROP, and she asserts that this list should be interpreted as exclusive under the “ expression unius est exclusio alterius ” canon of statutory construction. ³

Holewa also notes the fact that the title of the grandparent visitation subdivision in question is “Family court proceedings.” Minn.Stat. § 257C.07, subd.2. She argues that, while the titles of statutes are not typically relevant, the titles can be relevant for interpreting legislative intent when the titles were present during the legislative process that created the statute. See Minn. Express, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 333 N.W.2d 871, 873 (Minn.1983). To support this argument, Holewa...