Christie v. Rolscreen Co., 88-1598

• Decision Date: 22 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-1598,88-1598
• Citation: 448 N.W.2d 447
• Parties: 51 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 649, 54 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,185 James D. CHRISTIE and Ben F. Peterson, Appellants, v. ROLSCREEN CO., Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 447

448 N.W.2d 447

51 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 649,

54 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,185

James D. CHRISTIE and Ben F. Peterson, Appellants, v. ROLSCREEN CO., Appellee.

No. 88-1598.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 22, 1989.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 18, 1989.

Ted Breckenfelder and W. Michael Shinkle, Davenport, for appellants.

Mark J. Wiedenfeld of Grefe & Sidney, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by SCHULTZ, P.J., and CARTER, LAVORATO, SNELL, and ANDREASEN, JJ.

LAVORATO, Justice.

In this age discrimination suit, the defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiffs' evidence on three grounds: (1) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of the cases because Illinois rather than Iowa law applied; (2) the plaintiffs had not filed their discrimination complaints with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission within the statutory period; and (3) the plaintiffs failed to prove prima facie cases of discrimination. The district court granted the motion as to the jurisdictional and statute of limitations grounds but found that the plaintiffs had established their prima facie cases.

On appeal the plaintiffs contend the district court erred in granting the motion, arguing that the district court had jurisdiction because the Iowa civil rights statute did apply and that the complaints were filed in time.

The defendant argues that the district court correctly decided both issues. However, if we find otherwise, the defendant urges us to uphold the district court's order sustaining the motion for directed verdict. In support of its request the defendant argues that, contrary to the district court's finding, the plaintiffs failed to establish their prima facie cases of discrimination.

We conclude the district court did not have authority to hear the plaintiffs' cases because the plaintiffs did not file them in the judicial district where the alleged discriminatory practice occurred. Accordingly, we affirm.

The two plaintiffs, James D. Christie and Ben F. Peterson, were employees of Pella Window, Co., Inc., (Pella) an Iowa corporation with its principal place of business in Rock Island, Illinois. Edgar A. Harrell owned the company, which distributed products manufactured by the defendant Rolscreen Co. (Rolscreen). Harrell operated the distributorship as a sole proprietorship until 1971 when the business was incorporated.

Rolscreen is an Iowa corporation with its principal place of business in Pella, Iowa. Rolscreen manufactures specialty construction products including windows, sunroofs, skylights, sliding glass doors, and folding doors. Rolscreen sells the products to its distributors under the trade name "Pella."

Christie, an Illinois resident, began working for Harrell in March 1963 as office manager and bookkeeper. As the business expanded, Christie's responsibilities grew until he became the secretary and controller of the company. Christie's responsibilities included collections, accounts payable and receivable, payroll, financial reports, tax returns, licenses, and insurance.

Peterson began working for Pella in May 1976. He is an Iowa resident who lives in Davenport. Peterson was responsible for the commercial sales of the entire Rolscreen territory serviced by Pella. This territory included eastern Iowa and western Illinois. Peterson's duties included preparing figures and estimates, shop drawings, and commercial sales contracts.

Two other individuals figured prominently in the events that triggered this lawsuit: Theresa Crowe and Terry Miller. Crowe was an assistant to Christie and Miller was an assistant to Peterson.

For several years Harrell had tried to sell Pella. Eventually he convinced Rolscreen to buy it. The purchase took place on December 27, 1985.

Rolscreen formed a subsidiary corporation, The New Pella Window Company (New Pella), to take over the assets of Pella and to operate the business as a going concern until Rolscreen could sell it. Rolscreen planned to divide the territory covered by Pella into smaller, more manageable ones.

After the events that triggered this lawsuit, Rolscreen succeeded in transferring the northwestern portion of the territory, consisting of counties in northeastern Iowa and southwestern Wisconsin, to another Rolscreen distributor operating out of Waterloo. In addition, Rolscreen transferred the southeastern portion to a Springfield, Illinois, distributor. The remaining portion, consisting of seven eastern Iowa counties and sixteen counties in west central Illinois, were transferred to New Pella. New Pella continued to operate out of Rock Island.

The purchase agreement called for Pella to terminate its operations and the employment of all its employees on December 31, 1985. The agreement contemplated that Rolscreen would then continue to operate the business as the New Pella Window Company, starting January 2, 1986.

Christie and Peterson were told on December 31, at the offices of Pella in Rock Island, that Rolscreen would not hire them. Instead, Rolscreen hired Crowe to do Christie's job and Miller to do Peterson's job. Christie and Peterson did not know this until after January 2. It was on that date that Crowe and Miller knew what their duties would be with the new company.

Both Crowe and Miller were younger than Christie and Peterson; Crowe was thirty-eight years old, Miller was twenty-four years old. Christie and Peterson were in their early fifties.

At the time that Pella terminated its operations, Crowe and Miller were making considerably less than their predecessors. Rolscreen hired Crowe and Miller at the same salaries they were receiving from Pella.

Christie and Peterson filed age discrimination complaints with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission on July 1, 1986. See Iowa Code § 601A.15(1) (1985). On December 17, 1986, Peterson received an administrative release (letter of right to sue) from the commission. See Iowa Code § 601A.16(2). And Christie received his administrative release on January 6, 1987.

On March 16, 1987, Christie and Peterson filed a combined petition against Pella and Rolscreen in Scott County district court. They alleged, among other things, employment discrimination based on age. Before trial, the two dismissed Pella with prejudice and proceeded to trial against Rolscreen only.

I. The district court treated the first ground raised in Rolscreen's motion for directed verdict as a "choice of law" issue and applied our "most significant relationship" test. Under the "most significant relationship" test,

the local law of the state having the most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties controls their rights, obligations and liabilities in tort. Considerations include: place of injury, place of conduct leading to the injury, domicile of the parties, and the place where any relationship between the parties is centered.

Zeman v. Canton State Bank, 211 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Iowa 1973). After weighing these various considerations, the district court found, as a matter of law, that Illinois had more significant contacts than Iowa. The court concluded, therefore, that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction of the two cases.

The issue here is not whether the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Rather the issue is whether the court lacked authority to hear the two cases. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to "the authority of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong, not merely the particular case then occupying the court's attention." Wederath v. Brant, 287 N.W.2d 591, 594 (Iowa 1980). Clearly, here, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction because Iowa Code section 601A.16(1) gave it such jurisdiction. Iowa Code § 601A.16(1) ("A complainant after the proper filing of a complaint with the commission, may subsequently commence an action for relief in the district court ...").

A court may have subject matter jurisdiction but for one reason or another may not be able to entertain the particular case. In such a situation we say the court lacks authority to hear that particular case. Sometimes we have referred to "lack of authority to hear the particular case" as lack of jurisdiction of the case. See, e.g., City of Des Moines v. Des Moines Police Bargaining Unit, 360 N.W.2d 729, 730 (Iowa 1985) ("The issue is technically not one of subject matter jurisdiction. A district court obviously has jurisdiction to entertain declaratory judgment actions. The issue is one of jurisdiction of the particular case. This is because a court lacks authority to entertain particular declaratory judgment suits in which its jurisdiction has not been properly invoked.").

A statute, like chapter 601A, that creates a cause of action and establishes procedures for enforcing that action provides an excellent example of how a court may have subject matter jurisdiction, yet lack the authority to hear a particular case. Such a statute gives the district court...