Christopher B. Burke Eng'g, Ltd. v. Heritage Bank of Cent. Ill.

• Decision Date: 19 November 2015
• Docket Number: No. 118955.,118955.
• Citation: 43 N.E.3d 963
• Parties: CHRISTOPHER B. BURKE ENGINEERING, LTD., Appellant, v. HERITAGE BANK OF CENTRAL ILLINOIS et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

43 N.E.3d 963

CHRISTOPHER B. BURKE ENGINEERING, LTD., Appellant

v.HERITAGE BANK OF CENTRAL ILLINOIS et al., Appellees.

No. 118955.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 19, 2015.

Jeffrey E. Krumpe, of Miller, Hall & Triggs, LLC, Peoria, and Scott R. Fradin and Scott J. Smith, of Much Shelist PC, Chicago, for appellant.

Michael A. Kraft, of Quinn, Johnston, Henderson, Pretorius & Cerulo, Peoria, for appellee Heritage Bank of Central Illinois.

Kevin R. Sido, Stephen R. Swofford and Adam R. Vaught, of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Chicago, for amici curiae The American Institute of Architects–Illinois Council et al.

OPINION

Chief Justice GARMAN

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Christopher B. Burke Engineering, Ltd. (Burke Engineering) filed a complaint in civil court to foreclose on a mechanics lien on property owned by Carol and Glen Harkins. Heritage Bank of Central Illinois (Heritage Bank) has a mortgage interest in the same property. The circuit court of Peoria County invalidated the lien on grounds that the requirements for a mechanics lien set forth in section 1 of the Mechanics Lien Act were not met. 770 ILCS 60/1 (West 2008)

. Specifically, the circuit court found that the services provided by Burke Engineering did not constitute an improvement to the property and that the provision of services was not induced or encouraged by the property owner. The appellate court affirmed. 2015 IL App (3d) 140064, 389 Ill.Dec. 197, 25 N.E.3d 1223. We allowed Burke Engineering's petition for leave to appeal, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015).

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Around April 2008, Burke Engineering entered into an agreement with Glen Harkins (Harkins). Pursuant to the agreement, Burke Engineering was to survey a tract of land that Harkins was interested in purchasing and to draft and record a plat of subdivision for the property. At the time the agreement was entered into, the property was owned by Carol Schenck. Glen and Carol Harkins (the Harkinses) bought the property from Schenck after approximately six to twelve months of discussion. They closed on the property in August 2008. Though the exact schedule of the engineering work is unclear, both parties agree that Burke Engineering began some work for Harkins before the closing and continued the work afterward.

¶ 4 In February 2009, after one house was built on a lot on the property and after Burke Engineering had recorded the final plat, conducted a wetlands survey, and provided services for planning roads, utilities, and sewers, Harkins stopped all work on the property. At that time, Burke Engineering had invoiced Harkins $109,549.69, but received no payment. Burke Engineering recorded a mechanics lien on the property and filed suit to foreclose on the lien against the Harkinses, Heritage Bank, which provided the Harkinses with the financing to purchase the property in exchange for a mortgage interest, and the Allisons, the family that purchased the one completed house. Burke Engineering settled with the Allisons and the Harkinses filed for bankruptcy. After discovery, Heritage Bank filed a motion for summary judgment based on allegations that the lien did not meet the requirements of section 1 of the Mechanics Lien Act and was thus invalid. 770 ILCS 60/1 (West 2008)

.

¶ 5 In her deposition, Carol Schenck—the owner of the property at the time Burke Engineering and Harkins entered into the contract at issue—stated that Harkins had mentioned that he was working with Burke Engineering, but that she had no knowledge regarding the substance of the agreement. She further stated that she had given no one authority to act on her behalf. Through documents, she attested that the property had been free of any improvements or contracts for improvements for at least six months prior to the sale.

¶ 6 Harkins testified that he had never intended to work with Schenck on developing the property and that he was not authorized to act on Schenck's behalf. However, he testified that Schenck knew he had entered into a contract with an engineer to develop the property and that she had not objected to the contract.

¶ 7 The circuit court found that the services provided by Burke Engineering did not constitute an improvement as defined in section 1 of the Mechanics Lien Act and that the property owner had not induced or encouraged the work. Id. Therefore, the circuit court held that the lien was invalid and granted summary judgment in favor of Heritage Bank. The appellate court affirmed.

¶ 8 ANALYSIS

¶ 9 Before this court, Burke Engineering argues that the circuit court erred in granting Heritage Bank's motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2–1005(c)

(West 2014). This court reviews summary judgment rulings de novo.

Lake County Grading Co. v. Village of Antioch, 2014 IL 115805, ¶ 18, 385 Ill.Dec. 683, 19 N.E.3d 615. Whether summary judgment was appropriate in this case turns on the court's interpretation of section 1 of the Mechanics Lien Act. This court also reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo.

LaSalle Bank National Ass'n v. Cypress Creek 1, LP, 242 Ill.2d 231, 237, 351 Ill.Dec. 281, 950 N.E.2d 1109 (2011). In relevant part, section 1 of the Mechanics Lien Act provides that:

“(a) Any person who shall by any contract or contracts, express or implied, or partly expressed or implied, with the owner of a lot or tract of land, or with one whom the owner has authorized or knowingly permitted to contract, to improve the lot or tract of land or for the purpose of improving the tract of land, or to manage a structure under construction thereon, is known under this Act as a contractor and has a lien upon the whole of such lot or tract of land * * * for the amount due to him or her for the material, fixtures, apparatus, machinery, services or labor, and interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date the same is due. * * *

(b) As used in subsection (a) of this Section, ‘improve’ means to furnish labor, services, material, fixtures, apparatus or machinery, forms or form work in the process of construction where cement, concrete or like material is used for the purpose of or in the building, altering, repairing or ornamenting any house or other building, walk or sidewalk, * * * driveway, fence or improvement or appurtenances to the lot or tract of land or connected therewith * * *; or fill, sod or excavate such lot or tract of land, or do landscape work thereon or therefor; or raise or lower any house thereon or remove any house thereto, or remove any house or other structure therefrom, or perform any services or incur any expense as an architect, structural engineer, professional engineer, land surveyor or property manager in, for or on a lot or tract of land for any such purpose; or drill any water well thereon; or furnish or perform labor or services as superintendent, time keeper, mechanic, laborer or otherwise, in the building, altering, repairing or ornamenting of the same; or furnish material, fixtures, apparatus, machinery, labor or services, forms or form work used in the process of construction where concrete, cement or like material is used, or drill any water well on the order of his agent, architect, structural engineer or superintendent having charge of the improvements, building, altering, repairing or ornamenting the same.” 770 ILCS 60/1(a)

, (b) (West 2014).

¶ 10 Whether Heritage Bank was entitled to summary judgment depends on whether the services provided by Burke Engineering constitute an improvement as defined in subsection (b) of the Mechanics Lien Act (Act) and whether Carol Schenck knowingly permitted Harkins to enter into a contract regarding the property while she owned it as set forth in subsection (a). 770 ILCS 60/1(b)

(West 2014). “In matters of statutory construction, we endeavor to ‘ascertain and give effect to legislative intent.’ ” LaSalle Bank National Ass'n, 242 Ill.2d at 237, 351 Ill.Dec. 281, 950 N.E.2d 1109 (quoting People v. Perry, 224 Ill.2d 312, 323, 309 Ill.Dec. 330, 864 N.E.2d 196 (2007) ). The plain language of the statute is the best indicator of legislative intent. Id. Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as written. Id. Only when the language is ambiguous do we turn to extrinsic aids to determine legislative intent. Id.

¶ 11 Whether Burke Engineering's Services Constitute an Improvement

¶ 12 The appellate court concluded that Burke Engineering's lien was invalid because there was no physical improvement to the property or calculable increase in the property's value. 2015 IL App (3d) 140064, ¶ 18, 389 Ill.Dec. 197, 25 N.E.3d 1223

. As Justice Lytton points out in his dissent, this conclusion ignores the fact that the statute provides a lien if a professional's services result in an improvement or if the services are completed for the purpose of improving the property. Id. ¶ 43 (Lytton, J., dissenting); 770 ILCS 60/1(a) (West 2014); Pub. Act 94–627 (eff. Jan. 1, 2006) (adding the words “or for the purpose of improving” to section 1 of the Act). Burke Engineering's services—creating a plat of subdivision, surveying the property, planning out roads and sewers—were done to enable Harkins to develop a neighborhood on the property and thus were done for the purpose of improvement. There is no convincing evidence in this case that the engineering services were done for any other purpose. Compare Mostardi–Platt Associates, Inc. v. Czerniejewski, 399 Ill.App.3d 1205, 1210, 340 Ill.Dec. 790, 929 N.E.2d 94 (2010)

(concluding that surveying services done for the purpose of helping the defendant decide whether to exercise an option to purchase property were not done for the purpose of improving property and thus were not lienable).

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