Christopher P. v. Mojave Unified School Dist.

• Decision Date: 04 October 1993
• Docket Number: No. F017647,F017647
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: CHRISTOPHER P., a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MOJAVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 353

23 Cal.Rptr.2d 353

19 Cal.App.4th 165

CHRISTOPHER P., a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MOJAVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. F017647.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Oct. 4, 1993.

Review Denied Jan. 13, 1994.

[19 Cal.App.4th 167] Chain, Younger, Lemucchi, Cohn & Stiles, Timothy Lemucchi and Marshall Scott Fontes, Bakersfield, for plaintiff and appellant.

Robinson, Palmer & Stanton and Gary Logan, Bakersfield, for defendants and respondents.

OPINION

BEST, Presiding Justice.

Christopher P., a minor, through his guardian ad litem (appellant), appeals from an order denying his petition, pursuant to Government Code section 946.6, ¹ for relief from the claim filing statutes. The issue presented is whether Mojave Unified School District (District) is estopped from relying on Christopher's noncompliance with the claims statutes because its employee's admonition to Christopher not to report an incident of sexual molestation prevented timely pursuit of his claim. We hold that such conduct is sufficient to raise an estoppel and reverse the judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

According to the evidence presented in support of the petition for relief, 11-year-old Christopher was sexually molested by a District teacher, Curtis Jacquot, during a school field trip on November 9, 1989. After the incident was over, Jacquot told Christopher "not to tell anyone because 'it was not supposed to happen.' Mr. JACQUOT said this in such a way that I felt afraid of what Mr. JACQUOT might do to me." As a result, Christopher did not report the incident until May 16, 1990, when he was questioned by sheriffs' officers who were investigating another sexual abuse complaint against Jacquot. Christopher continued to fear Jacquot might physically harm him even after he reported the molest, although there is no indication Christopher had contact with Jacquot after the molestation.

Jacquot pleaded guilty to a sexual molestation charge on February 13, 1991. Christopher's father, John, believed the court would order Jacquot to pay restitution to Christopher. After Jacquot was sentenced, John realized Christopher would not be compensated through the criminal proceedings and, on April 26, 1991, he retained legal counsel for Christopher. Counsel applied for leave to present a late claim on May 13, 1991. The District denied the application on May 17, 1991.

On November 18, 1991, appellant sought relief from the claims presentation requirements on the grounds of his minority and estoppel, relying on John R. v. Oakland Unified School District (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948. The trial court denied the petition concluding appellant's evidence was insufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

DISCUSSION

Is the District equitably estopped from asserting appellant's noncompliance with the claims-presentation statutes because its employee's conduct prevented timely pursuit of the claim?

Under the Tort Claims Act, a plaintiff may not maintain an action for damages against a public entity unless a written claim has first been presented to the defendant and rejected. (§§ 905, 945.4.) Claims based on personal injury causes of action must be presented within six months after accrual of the cause of action. (§ 911.2.) After the time limit has expired, a plaintiff may apply to the public entity for leave to present a late claim. The application must be presented within a reasonable time, not to exceed one year after accrual of the cause of action. (§ 911.4.) If the application is denied, a plaintiff may, within six months, petition the court for an order relieving him from the claims-presentation procedures. (§ 946.6.) The court must grant the petition if, inter alia, the plaintiff demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the application to present a late claim was made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year, and the injured party was a minor during the six-month claim presentation period. (§ 946.6, subd. (c)(2); Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 431, 197 Cal.Rptr. 601, 673 P.2d 271.) Furthermore, "sections 911.6 and 946.6 ensure a minor that when a late-claim application is filed within a year of the accrual of his cause of action, his claim will not be barred because of a delay within that year for which the minor himself is not responsible." (Hernandez v. County of Los Angeles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1020, 1030, 232 Cal.Rptr. 519, 728 P.2d 1154; see also Williams v. Mariposa County Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 843, 851-852, 147 Cal.Rptr. 452.)

The court may also grant relief if it finds the public entity should be equitably estopped from asserting plaintiff's noncompliance with the claims-presentation statutes. (John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 445, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948; and see California Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1992) § 6.70, pp. 731-736.)

Appellant's cause of action accrued on November 9, 1989, when he was molested. (DeRose v. Carswell (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1017, 242 Cal.Rptr. 368.) Therefore, his application on May 13, 1991, to present a late claim, more than 18 months later, was untimely under section 911.4. Appellant concedes his application was not presented within the required one-year period, but submits the court erred in denying his petition because, under John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 48 Cal.3d at page 446, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948, he presented sufficient evidence to estop the District from asserting the defense of failure to file a timely claim.

Standard of Review

The trial court exercises broad discretion in granting or denying petitions for relief under section 946.6 and its determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. (Ebersol v. Cowan, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 435, 197 Cal.Rptr. 601, 673 P.2d 271.) The rule, however, does not preclude reversal of an order denying relief where adequate cause for the relief is shown by uncontradicted evidence or affidavits of petitioner. (Williams v. Mariposa County Unified Sch. Dist., supra, 82 Cal.App.3d at p. 848, 147 Cal.Rptr. 452.) The remedial policies underlying the statute require that whenever possible cases be heard on their merits and any doubts which exist be resolved in favor of the claimant. Therefore, the appellate court examines more rigorously the denial of relief under section 946.6 than its allowance. (Ebersol v. Cowan, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 435, 197 Cal.Rptr. 601, 673 P.2d 271.)

Estoppel

A public entity may be estopped from asserting noncompliance with the claims statutes where its agents or employees have deterred the filing of a timely claim by some "affirmative act." (John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 445, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948.) Estoppel as a bar to a public entity's assertion of the defense of noncompliance arises when the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the public entity was apprised of the facts, (2) it intended its conduct to be acted upon, (3) plaintiff was ignorant of the true state of facts, and (4) relied upon the conduct to his detriment. (Johnson v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 692, 700-701, 266 Cal.Rptr. 187; DeYoung v. Del Mar Thoroughbred Club (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 858, 862, 206 Cal.Rptr. 28.)

Estoppel most commonly results from misleading statements about the need for or advisability of a claim. (Rand v. Andreatta (1964) 60 Cal.2d 846, 850, 36 Cal.Rptr. 846, 389 P.2d 382; Dettamanti v. Lompoc Union School Dist. (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 715, 721, 300 P.2d 78.) Estoppel may also be invoked where conduct on behalf of the public entity induces a reasonably prudent person to avoid seeking legal advice or commencing litigation. (Bertorelli v. City of Tulare (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 432, 440, 225 Cal.Rptr. 582.) Finally, acts of violence or intimidation on the part of the public entity that are intended to prevent the filing of a claim may create an estoppel. (John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 445, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948.)

John R. was sexually molested on one occasion in February 1981, by his ninth grade mathematics teacher. When John voiced an intent to report the acts, the teacher threatened to retaliate against him if he revealed what had taken place. As a result of the threats, and his embarrassment and shame at what had happened, John did not disclose the incidents to anyone until December 1981. John's late-claim application was not presented to the school district until May 1982, 15 months after the assault. (48 Cal.3d at pp. 442, 444, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948.)

The Court of Appeal concluded that John's late-claim application was made within section 911.4's allowable one-year period because, under the "delayed discovery" doctrine, his cause of action did not accrue until he told his parents about the incident in December 1981. (John R., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 444, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948.)

Upon review, the Supreme Court doubted that the delayed discovery theory of accrual applied on these facts, but opined the facts could demonstrate the claim was timely filed under a theory of equitable estoppel. (48 Cal.3d at p. 444, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948.) Although the teacher's alleged threats were no doubt motivated largely by self-interest, rather than to prevent John from filing a claim with the district, it was inconsistent with the equitable underpinnings of the estoppel doctrine to permit the district to escape liability because the teacher's threats succeeded in preventing his victim from disclosing the molestation until the time for filing a claim against the district had lapsed. The court concluded, that for purposes of equitable estoppel, the time for filing a claim against the district was tolled during the period that the teacher's threats...