Christopher S. v. Stanislaus County Office/Educ.
| Decision Date | 08 October 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-15178.,03-15178. |
| Citation | 384 F.3d 1205 |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER S., a minor, by and through RITA S., his Guardian Ad Litem; Justin R., a minor, by and through Kathi R., his Guardian Ad Litem; Robert F., a minor, by and through Tracy F., his Guardian Ad Litem, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STANISLAUS COUNTY OFFICE OF EDUCATION; Martin G. Petersen, Superintendent of Schools and Executive Secretary to the Board, in his official capacity; Stanislaus County Board of Education; Don Viss, Alex Hedberg, Zella Gharat, James Merriam, and Richard Phillips, Members, Stanislaus County Board of Education, in their official capacities; Jim Norby, Division Administrator, Stanislaus County Office of Education, in his official capacity; Salida Union School District; Antonio Borba, Superintendent, in his official capacity; Ceres Unified School District; Walt Hanline, Superintendent, in his official capacity; Hughson Unified School District; Jim Weaver, Superintendent, in his official capacity; Stanislaus County Special Education Local Plan Area; Patricia Dimond, Director, in her official capacity, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Joyce L. Carrillo, Esq., Varma & Clancy, Sacramento, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Jeffrey R. Olson, Esq., Modesto, CA, for the defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California; Robert E. Coyle, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV 02-5631 REC.
Before: TASHIMA and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges, and LEIGHTON, District Judge.*
Opinion by Judge TASHIMA; Dissent by Judge CLIFTON.
Three autistic children (the "Students") who are part of a special education program in Stanislaus County, California, filed an action against the county and local educational authorities ("LEAs") alleging that the policy of providing a shorter school day to autistic students constitutes discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and California anti-discrimination statutes. The district court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485, because the Students had not sought a due process hearing from the State of California. On appeal, the Students argue that the district court erred in dismissing their action for lack of jurisdiction, because they sufficiently exhausted their administrative remedies by pursuing a complaint resolution procedure ("CRP") to completion. We agree, and reverse the district court's dismissal of the case.
All three Students have been diagnosed with autism. Christopher S., aged 12, lives in the Salida Union School District; Justin R., aged 10, lives in the Hughson Unified School District; and Robert F., aged 10, lives in the Ceres Unified School District. All of these school districts have delegated responsibility for educating autistic students to the Stanislaus County Office of Education ("SCOE"). The Students are in an autism program at John F. Kennedy School, classroom B-6.
Rita S., Christopher S.' mother, filed a request for complaint investigation with the Procedural Safeguards Referral Service of the Special Education Division of the California Department of Education ("CDE"). In compliance with 34 C.F.R. § 300.660, California established this CRP for alleged violations of the IDEA. In her complaint, Rita S. stated that at the beginning of the 2000-01 school year, SCOE informed parents that students in the autism class would be released at 12:00 p.m. each Tuesday because of budgetary constraints. At the beginning of the 2001-02 school year, SCOE sent parents a school schedule indicating that the class for autistic students would again end at noon every Tuesday.
The CDE conducted telephone interviews with Rita S. and also with the director of the Stanislaus Special Education Local Planning Area ("Stanislaus SELPA"), a representative of SCOE, and the director of the autism program. The CDE and Stanislaus SELPA also exchanged correspondence regarding Rita S.'s complaint. In its report on the compliance investigation, the CDE stated the positions of the parties as follows:
1. The Complainant alleges that the District failed to implement the 2000/2001 [Individualized Education Program] with regard to providing the same number of minutes in the instructional day to her son as to the student's chronological peer group in the regular education program.
2. The District states that they have provided an additional number of minutes per year for the students in the autism class compared to the students in general education in the same chronological peer group.
The report found that SCOE had included extended school year days in its calculations of instructional minutes for autistic students, and that "[t]he evidence presented supports a finding that students enrolled in the autism class receive less total minutes in their instructional day than their nondisabled peers in regular education programs."
The CDE report concluded that the school district was out of compliance with the requirement of California Code of Regulations, title 5, § 3001(q), that for special education students," `[i]nstructional day' shall be the same period of time as [the] regular school day for that chronological peer group unless otherwise specified in the individualized education program." The CDE gave the district 60 days to provide evidence that students in the autism class were receiving the same amount of instructional time per day as their regular education peers, "unless their IEP indicates otherwise."1
In response to the CDE report, SCOE increased the length of the school day for autistic students by 30 minutes. According to Patricia Dimond, director of Stanislaus SELPA, this resulted in the autistic students receiving more instructional time than their regular education counterparts. Dimond was including lunch and recess as instructional time for the autism class, however, "because of the intensive instruction provided to these students during lunch and recess." She stated that she had discussed the inclusion of lunch and recess time with the CDE investigator, who, after checking with her supervisor, confirmed that the inclusion was appropriate.2 The CDE found that the district had completed corrective action and was in compliance. The CDE has taken no further action.
Christopher S. is the only Student whose parents filed an administrative complaint under the CRP, and none of the Students' parents has ever sought a due process hearing to challenge SCOE's failure to provide a Free Appropriate Public Education ("FAPE").
The Students filed this action against SCOE, the individual school districts, and various school administrators. In their complaint, the Students stated claims under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and California education and anti-discrimination statutes. The Students sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as compensatory and statutory damages.
After filing this action, the Students received a notice of the 2002-03 school hours from SCOE. The school day for the autism class was again shorter than for regular education students in the Students' home districts. The instructional day was also shorter, unless one counted the autistic students' lunch and recess periods. Tuesdays remained minimum days.
The Students filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to stop the LEAs from providing fewer instructional minutes per day to autistic students and from providing a minimum day on Tuesdays. In their opposition to the preliminary injunction motion, the LEAs argued that the Students had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the IDEA, specifically the due process hearing procedures set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). Although the Students did not bring an IDEA claim, exhaustion of IDEA administrative remedies is a prerequisite to filing any federal claim for relief that is also available under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
The district court denied the Students' motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Students had argued that this was not a case involving substantive educational decisions; rather, the court needed only to decide the simple factual question of whether the Students were receiving fewer instructional minutes per day than their nondisabled peers and, if so, whether this violated the law. The district court concluded, however, that "it is not unlawful to include lunch and recess minutes for special education instruction if the IEP contains goals and objectives regarding those skills and if appropriate instruction is provided during that time." For this reason, the district court saw "no difference between plaintiffs' complaints that their IEPs do not allow for instruction during lunch and recess and any other challenge to the allegedly improper implementation of an IEP, notwithstanding plaintiffs' claim of discrimination." In short, the district court concluded that the Students' claims turn on a factual inquiry best addressed in a due process hearing.
Concluding that the Students had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the IDEA, the district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. If the Students did exhaust their administrative remedies, the district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a), and 1367(a). We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Whether a plaintiff has met the IDEA's exhaustion requirements is predominantly a question of law that we review de novo. Porter v. Bd. of Trustees, 307 F.3d 1064, 1069(9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1194, 123...
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