Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Assoc. v. Cal. Dep't of Educ.

• Decision Date: 29 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2:11-cv-3471-KJM-AC,2:11-cv-3471-KJM-AC
• Parties: MORGAN HILL CONCERNED PARENTS ASSOC., CONCERNED PARENTS ASSOC., Plaintiffs, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

MORGAN HILL CONCERNED PARENTS ASSOC.,

CONCERNED PARENTS ASSOC., Plaintiffs,

v.CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

No. 2:11-cv-3471-KJM-AC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DATED: March 29, 2013

ORDER

The court heard argument on defendant California Department of Education's ("CDE's") motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for a more definite statement on July 27, 2012. (ECF 13.) Rony Sagy appeared for plaintiffs; Paul Lacy appeared for defendant. For the following reasons, the court DENIES defendant's motion to dismiss and motion for a more definite statement.

I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND

The federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") establishes a comprehensive regulatory framework to improve the schooling of disabled individuals. 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et. seq. IDEA's framework and California's associated laws have been described helpfully as follows:

IDEA is Spending Clause legislation. Virginia Office of Prot. & Advocacy v. Virginia, Dept. of Educ., 262 F. Supp. 2d 648, 658 (E.D. Va. 2003). 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(1) directs the Secretary of Education to make grants to States "to assist them to provide special education and related services to children with disabilities in accordance to this subchapter." As a federal spending program, IDEA operates "much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman ("PennhurstI"), 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). "Consequently, under the IDEA a state is eligible for financial assistance only if it first 'demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Secretary" that, among other things, "children with disabilities and their parents are afforded the procedural safeguards required by section 1415.'" Virginia Office of Prot., 262 F. Supp. 2d 648, 658-659 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(6)(A)).

IDEA and its regulations 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1, et seq., provide procedural and substantive standards to educate students with disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(d). IDEA requires a state, to receive federal financial assistance, to effectuate a policy to assure disabled children a free appropriate public education ("FAPE"). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). A FAPE requires special education and related services at public expense, under public supervision, and with no charge to the student or parents. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(9) and (29).

IDEA requires a participating state to submit to the U.S. Department of Education a plan of policies, procedures and program descriptions. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a). California participates in IDEA, adopted a federally-approved state plan, and enacted statutes and regulations to comply with federal requirements. See Cal. Ed. Code, §§ 56000, et seq.; Cal. Code Regs., Tit. 5, §§ 3000, et seq. Each disabled student's instruction is based on an Individualized Education Program ("IEP"), pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). Parents are entitled to file a complaint with CDE concerning matters of identification, evaluation or educational placement of a child or FAPE provision. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6); Cal. Code Regs., Tit. 5, §§ 4600, et seq.

Under California's plan, the "district, special education local plan area, or county office of education" of the child's residence is responsible to identify disabled children, to assess suspected disability, to determine educational placements and related services through an IEP, and to provide needed education and related services. Cal. Educ. Code, §§ 56300, 56302, 56340, 56344(b).

[. . ]

As to a proposal or refusal to initiate or change the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a child, or the provision of a FAPE, parents may request an administrative "due process hearing" before an independent and impartial hearing officer to challenge the result. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f); Cal. Ed. Code, §§ 56501, et seq.; 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.506, 300.507, 300.508. CDE is required to enter intoan interagency agreement with another state agency or contract with a nonprofit organization to provide the independent and impartial process. Cal. Ed. Code, § 56504.5. Pursuant to an interagency agreement, the Office of Administrative Hearings conducts the due process hearings and renders final administrative decisions. Cal. Ed. Code, § 56505(h). A party subject to an unfavorable final administrative decision may seek de novo review by a court of competent jurisdiction. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A); Cal. Ed. Code, § 56505(k).

S.A. v. Tulare Cnty. Office of Ed., No. CV F 08-1215 LJO GSA, 2009 WL 30298, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2009).

In addition to due process hearings, parents and students have recourse to state complaint resolution procedures ("CRP"). 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151-300.153. Under the CRP, parents and students may file a complaint with the state educational agency ("SEA") when a local education agency ("LEA") is not following special education laws or procedures or has not implemented what is already specifically written into a student's IEP. While appeals to district courts from a CRP determination are not provided for in the federal CRP regulations, courts in this Circuit have entertained them. See, e.g., Christopher S. v. Stanislaus Cnty. Office of Educ., 384 F.3d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 2004); S.A., 2009 WL 30298, at *8.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Association and Concerned Parents Association ("plaintiffs") are unincorporated associations composed of parents of children with disabilities. (First Amended Complaint ("FAC") ¶ 4.) The purpose of these associations is to protect the legal rights of disabled children. (Id.) Defendant CDE is an SEA that oversees the local school districts throughout California. (FAC ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on April 23, 2012, alleging defendant has not ensured FAPE by not complying with its monitoring, investigating, and enforcement obligations under the IDEA. (FAC ¶ 37.)

On June 13, 2012, defendant filed the present motion to dismiss both for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, or in the alternative for a more definite statement. (ECF 13.) Plaintiffs opposed the motion on June 29, 2012 (ECF 14), and defendant replied July 6, 2012 (ECF 15). The court heard oral argument on the motion on August 6, 2012. (Hearing Tr., ECF 20.)

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, until proven otherwise, cases lie outside the jurisdiction of the court. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377-78 (1994). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be challenged by either party or raised sua sponte by the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3); see also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-84 (1999). A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be either facial or factual. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). In a facial attack, the complaint is challenged as failing to establish federal jurisdiction, even assuming all the allegations are true and construing the complaint in the light most favorable to a plaintiff. See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).

By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger provides evidence that an alleged fact is false, or a necessary jurisdictional fact is absent, resulting in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. In these circumstances, the allegations are not presumed to be true and "the district court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction." McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). "Once the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a factual motion by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction." Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1040 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).

Jurisdictional dismissal is "exceptional" and warranted only "'where the alleged claim under the constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction or where such claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.'" Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)). The Ninth Circuit has held that "[j]urisdictional finding of genuinely disputed facts is inappropriate when 'the jurisdictional issue and substantive issues are so intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits of anaction.'" Sun Valley Gasoline, Inc. v. Ernst Enters., Inc., 711 F.2d 138, 139 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983)). "Normally, the question of jurisdiction and the merits of an action will be considered intertwined where . . . a statute provides the basis for both the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court and the plaintiff's substantive claim for relief." Id. (quotation omitted). Where a jurisdictional attack is mounted against a claim that implicates statutory interpretation, the court should refrain from dismissing where an interpretation is available that supports jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) ("[T]he district court has jurisdiction if 'the right of the petitioners to recover under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United States are given one construction and will be defeated if they are given another.'" (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 685 (1946)); Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Leasehold & Easement in the Cloverly Subterranean Geological Formation,...