Christopher v. Adam's Mark Hotels

• Decision Date: 05 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-2842,97-2842
• Citation: 137 F.3d 1069
• Parties: 7 A.D. Cases 1537, 12 NDLR P 60 Cheryl D. CHRISTOPHER, Appellant, v. ADAM'S MARK HOTELS, a division of HBE Corporation, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1069

137 F.3d 1069

7 A.D. Cases 1537, 12 NDLR P 60

Cheryl D. CHRISTOPHER, Appellant, v. ADAM'S MARK HOTELS, a division of HBE Corporation, Appellee.

No. 97-2842.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 13, 1998.

Decided March 5, 1998.

David William White, Overland Park, KS, argued (Shellie L. James, on the brief), for Appellant.

Steven Stanford Griswold, Kansas City, MO, argued, for Appellee.

Before BOWMAN, MORRIS S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and JONES, ¹ District Judge.

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Cheryl Christopher sued Adam's Mark Hotels seeking damages for employment discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102-12213 (1994 & Supp. I 1995), and for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress under Missouri state law. Adam's Mark moved for summary judgment, and the District Court ² granted the motion. Christopher now appeals. We find no error and affirm the judgment.

I.

We must view the record in the light most favorable to Christopher, the nonmoving party, and give her the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Miller v. National Cas. Co., 61 F.3d 627, 628 (8th Cir.1995). Christopher applied for a sales secretary position at Adam's Mark in Kansas City, Missouri on May 10, 1995. She submitted a resume and employment application indicating that she possessed a Master's Degree in Computer Science, that she was highly skilled and experienced in the use of WordPerfect (the word processing program utilized at Adam's Mark), and that she had taught WordPerfect at the college level. Christopher was interviewed the same day she applied but did not identify herself as an individual with a disability at the time. She was hired that day for the position.

Christopher reported for work the next day, May 11, 1995. Christopher took part in Adam's Mark's orientation program, at which she was asked to complete several forms. One was a Supplemental Information Form, which contained questions about medical condition and history. In response, Christopher wrote that she had experienced a bipolar breakdown and that she had been hospitalized for bipolar dysfunction. The supplemental form was placed in Christopher's personnel file in accordance with company procedures.

After orientation, Christopher reported to the sales department where she began on-the-job training with Lisa Lambertson, the sales secretary Christopher was to replace. The training was to consist of Lambertson working side-by-side with Christopher. On this first day in the sales office, Christopher admitted to Lambertson that she was not familiar with the WordPerfect function keys. When asked to execute a merge and set up a banner using WordPerfect, Christopher indicated she did not know how to perform these tasks. Christopher struggled with locating and opening documents, saving documents, and closing documents. At one point during Christopher's training, Ann Windsor, Christopher's immediate supervisor, pulled up a blank form for Christopher to work on. Christopher told Windsor that the form was difficult to use and that one of her first priorities would be to change the office system. Christopher admitted in her deposition that she acted combatively during her brief employment at Adam's Mark. Prior to her termination, however, no one told Christopher that she was having performance problems.

Just a few days after Christopher's employment began, Windsor recommended that Christopher be terminated. Sometime after Christopher's orientation but before her termination, Windsor reviewed Christopher's personnel file. Based upon Windsor's recommendation, Don Russell, Director of Human Resources, agreed that Christopher should be terminated. It was Russell's practice to review employees' files prior to terminating them. On May 17, 1995, Russell terminated Christopher.

II.

We review de novo a decision to grant summary judgment. See Hase v. Missouri Div. of Employment Sec., 972 F.2d 893, 895 (8th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 906, 113 S.Ct. 2332, 124 L.Ed.2d 244 (1993). Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant establishes "that there are no material facts in [genuine] dispute and that, as a matter of law, the movant is entitled to judgment." Oldham v. West, 47 F.3d 985, 988 (8th Cir.1995). We proceed with caution when deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate in employment discrimination cases because intent is usually a central issue. See Gill v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-6, Festus, Mo., 32 F.3d 376, 378 (8th Cir.1994). This cautionary approach, however, "cannot and should not be construed to exempt" from summary judgment employment discrimination cases involving intent. Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 959 (8th Cir.1995). If there is no genuine issue about the employer's discriminatory intent, to the extent intent is material, then summary judgment may be appropriate.

The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating "against a qualified individual with a disability because of [that] disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A qualified individual with a disability is a person "with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position." Id. § 12111(8).

To establish a claim of intentional discrimination under the ADA, we employ the burden-shifting scheme set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-Am., Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1318 (8th Cir.1996). First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct at 1824. To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff "must show that she is disabled within the meaning of the Act; [that] she is qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation; and [that] she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability." Webb v. Mercy Hosp., 102 F.3d 958, 959-60 (8th Cir.1996). After a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. Then, in order to prevail, the plaintiff must show that the employer's stated reason was in fact pretextual. See id. at 804, 93 S.Ct. at 1825. This requires proof that the employer's articulated reason for the adverse employment action was false and that discrimination was the real reason. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2751, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Christopher, and for purposes of this appeal, we do not quarrel with the District Court's conclusion that she established a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA. As to the first element, whether Christopher is "disabled," the parties argue whether her bipolar disorder meets the definition under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining disability). We have in the past, however, assumed without deciding that bipolar disorder constitutes a disability sufficient to make out a prima facie case. See Birchem v. Knights of Columbus, 116 F.3d 310, 313-14 (8th Cir.1997). As to the second and third elements, whether Christopher was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job and whether Christopher...