CHRISTUS HEALTH SOUTHEAST TEX. v. Broussard

Decision Date25 February 2010
Docket NumberNo. 09-09-00083-CV.,09-09-00083-CV.
Citation306 SW 3d 934
PartiesCHRISTUS HEALTH SOUTHEAST TEXAS d/b/a Christus St. Mary Hospital and Dubuis Health System, Inc. d/b/a Dubuis Hospital of Port Arthur, Appellants, v. Preston BROUSSARD, Individually and a/n/f of Dorothy Broussard as well a/n/f of Cody Broussard, Appellees.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals
306 S.W.3d 934

CHRISTUS HEALTH SOUTHEAST TEXAS d/b/a Christus St. Mary Hospital and Dubuis Health System, Inc. d/b/a Dubuis Hospital of Port Arthur, Appellants,
v.
Preston BROUSSARD, Individually and a/n/f of Dorothy Broussard as well a/n/f of Cody Broussard, Appellees.

No. 09-09-00083-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Beaumont.

Submitted on October 29, 2009.

Decided February 25, 2010.


306 SW 3d 935

Erin E. Lunceford, Sprott, Rigby, Newsome, Robbins, Lunceford & Bell, P.C., Houston, for appellants.

David W. Ghisalbert, John C. Osborne, Law Office of John C. Osborne, P.L.L.C., Houston, for appellees.

Before GAULTNEY, KREGER, and HORTON, JJ.

OPINION

DAVID GAULTNEY, Justice.

Christus Health Southeast Texas, d/b/a Christus St. Mary Hospital, and Dubuis Health System, Inc., d/b/a Dubuis Hospital of Port Arthur, challenge the trial court's order denying their second motion to dismiss healthcare liability claims. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 74.351(l) (Vernon Supp. 2009). Because at this stage of the lawsuit the motion would require the trial court to look beyond the four corners of the expert report to determine fact issues, the challenge raised in this interlocutory appeal does not support a reversal of the trial court's order. We affirm the order denying the motion.

BACKGROUND

In their original petition, plaintiffs allege that while Dorothy Broussard was awaiting discharge from a long-term care facility under the control of Dubuis "and/or" St. Mary, she suffered a "cardiac incident," dislodged her breathing tube, and sustained a hypoxic brain injury that resulted in her death. Plaintiffs claim Dubuis and St. Mary failed to safely monitor and restrain her.

Plaintiffs served appellants with a copy of an expert report of Dr. Jon D. Peters, a board-certified neurologist. Dubuis and St. Mary filed motions to dismiss the healthcare liability claim. Dubuis and St. Mary objected to Peters's report and challenged the expert's qualifications to render an opinion on the standard of care. St. Mary and Dubuis also argued the expert's report was deficient because Peters "used vague and conclusory statements to discuss the standards of care, and the alleged breaches of those standards of care."

In a prior opinion, this Court held that the trial court erred in overruling the objections

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to the expert report because the report and curriculum vitae did not show sufficient expertise to render "administrative decisions" criticized in the report. See Christus Health Se. Tex. v. Broussard, 267 S.W.3d 531, 536 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2008, no pet.). We remanded the case for the trial court to consider whether to grant an extension of time to cure the deficiencies. See id. at 536-37.

The trial court granted appellees a thirty-day extension of time to cure the deficiencies. After plaintiffs served an amended report on the defendants, St. Mary and Dubuis filed objections and a second motion to dismiss. The trial court denied appellants' motion. St. Mary and Dubuis then filed this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision regarding the adequacy of an expert report under an abuse of discretion standard. Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Tex.2001). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Bowie Mem'l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex.2002).

A plaintiff asserting a healthcare liability claim must provide each defendant physician and healthcare provider with an expert report no later than the 120th day after filing suit. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009). The statute defines "expert report" as

a written report by an expert that provides a fair summary of the expert's opinions as of the date of the report regarding applicable standards of care, the manner in which the care rendered by the physician or health care provider failed to meet the standards, and the causal relationship between that failure and the injury, harm, or damages claimed.

Id. § 74.351(r)(6) (Vernon Supp. 2009). When a plaintiff furnishes the report within the time permitted, the defendant may file a motion challenging the report. Id. § 74.351(l).

The statute provides that the trial court "shall grant a motion challenging the adequacy of an expert report only if it appears to the court, after hearing, that the report does not represent an objective good faith effort to comply with the definition of an expert report in Subsection (r)(6)." Id. When determining whether the report represents a good-faith effort to comply with the statutory requirements, the trial court's inquiry is limited to the four corners of the report. Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52; Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878. To constitute a good-faith effort, the report "must discuss the standard of care, breach, and causation with sufficient specificity to inform the defendant of the conduct the plaintiff has called into question and to provide a basis for the trial court to conclude that the claims have merit." Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 875.

THE SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS: "FALSE FACTS"

In one issue, appellants contend the trial court abused its discretion in denying their second motion to dismiss because the amended expert report does not meet the statutory requirements of section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Appellants argue on appeal that the amended report does not distinguish between the standard of care, breach, and causation applicable to each of the two appellants, and that the amended report relies on false facts. Appellees respond that appellants may not raise on appeal objections not made in the trial court. Appellees argue that appellants'

306 SW 3d 937

challenge to the sufficiency of the amended report in the trial court focused on the expert's...

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