Christy v. Achievers of Louisiana, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:10-CV-01040 |
| Parties | SHONA CHRISTY PLAINTIFF v. ACHIEVERS OF LOUISIANA, INC. DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas |
Before the Court are Defendant Achievers of Louisiana, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 25) and Plaintiff Shona Christy's Counter Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 28). Plaintiff has responded (ECF No. 28),1 and Defendant has replied. (ECF No. 32). Defendant has also responded to Plaintiff's counter motion. (ECF Nos. 32 & 40). The motions are ripe for the Court's consideration. For the following reasons, the motions will be granted in part and denied in part.
Storms damaged the Plaintiff's A-frame house in February 2008. Plaintiff filed and settled a claim with State Farm Insurance, and, in April 2008, chose the Defendant to make the covered repairs. The parties' contract required the Defendant to replace the damaged metal roof system, replace the damaged siding, replace the damaged windows, and replace the damaged fascia. In mid-August 2008, more rain caused water damage to the Plaintiff's house. The Defendant completed its repair job shortly after that, on August 27, 2008. In September 2009, Plaintiff's house again experienced steady rains. Plaintiff discovered leaks in the house, andDefendant came out again to make further repairs. Those repairs, however, were not enough to stop the leaks. Plaintiff claims that her house is now severely damaged, and that Defendant is to blame.
The subject of greatest controversy in this case is the replacement siding material. Plaintiff wanted to replace the damaged metal-shake siding with an identical product. That product was unavailable, first because the Defendant could not locate it, and then because of financial constraints. At Defendant's office, Plaintiff saw a sample of Nailite, a vinyl shake that, like her original shake siding, looks like wood shakes. Plaintiff further researched the Nailite product, and eventually the parties agreed to use it. Who is ultimately responsible for the decision to use the Nailite is in considerable dispute. Plaintiff contends that, either because it was not designed for the use to which the parties put it, or because the Defendant wrongly installed it, or both, the use of Nailite bears much of the blame for her damages.
Plaintiff filed suit in Ashley County, Arkansas Circuit Court on May 5, 2010. The Defendant removed to this Court on June 3, 2010, relying on diversity jurisdiction. The Defendant is now before the Court requesting summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims.
The standard of review for summary judgment is well established. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that when a party moves for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Krenik v. Cnty. of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has issued the following guidelines for trial courts to determine whether this standard has been satisfied:
The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is a need for trial—whether, in other words, there are genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). See also Agristor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1987); Niagara of Wisconsin Paper Corp. v. Paper Indus. Union-Mgmt. Pension Fund, 800 F.2d 742, 746 (8th Cir. 1986). A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party. Id. at 252.
The Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The nonmoving party must then demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik, 47 F.3d at 957. A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
Plaintiff's amended complaint (ECF No. 9) makes a breach-of-contract claim.2 (ECF Nos. 14 & 15). Under the breach-of-contract umbrella, Plaintiff makes claims for breach of the warranties of sound workmanship, habitability, merchantability, and fitness for a particular purpose. Upon consideration, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment onPlaintiff's habitability and merchantability claims. The Court also finds, however, that there are too many disputed material facts to grant summary judgment on Plaintiff's workmanship and fitness claims.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant owed her a warranty of habitability on her repair. In Arkansas, "there is an implied warranty of...habitability in the sale of a new home by a seller who is also the builder." Curry v. Thornsberry, 354 Ark. 631, 642, 128 S.W.3d 438, 443 (Ark. 2003). This case concerns the repair of an existing home—not the sale of a new one. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's warranty-of-habitability claim.
Plaintiff also argues that Defendant owed her a warranty of merchantability on the Nailite shakes. The warranty of merchantability applies to goods that are not suited for their ordinary purpose. Lee v. Martin, 74 Ark. App. 193, 199, 45 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001). Plaintiff argues that Defendant used the Nailite as a roofing material, and admits in her amended complaint that the "material used by the defendant was not warranted as roofing material." (ECF No. 6, at 2). Because the material was, by Plaintiff's admission, not used for its ordinary purpose, the warranty of merchantability does not apply. See Flippo v. Mode O'Day Frock Shops of Hollywood, 248 Ark. 1, 3, 449 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Ark. 1970) (). Defendant is thus entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's warranty-of-merchantability claim.
The contract in this case guaranteed that the work would be done "in a workmanlike manner in accordance with standard practices." (ECF. No. 25-5). Moreover, in Arkansas, "[t]he general rule is that a contractor or builder impliedly warrants that the work he undertakes will be done in a good and workmanlike manner...." Carroll-Boone Water Dist. v. M & P Equip. Co., 280 Ark. 560, 575, 661 S.W.2d 345, 353 (Ark. 1983). However, "where a contact contains an express warranty on the subject of an asserted implied warranty, the former is exclusive and there is no implied warranty on that subject." Bullington v. Palangio, 345 Ark. 320, 327, 45 S.W.3d 834, 838 (Ark. 2001) (citing Carter v. Quick, 263 Ark. 202, 563 S.W.2d 461 (Ark. 1978)) (internal citation omitted). Because the Plaintiff is relying on both an express and an implied warranty of workmanlike conduct, the express warranty becomes exclusive.
To do a job in a workmanlike manner is to "do the work as a skilled workman should do it." Fitzgerald v. La Porte, 64 Ark. 34, 40 S.W. 261, 261 (Ark. 1897). The question here is whether Defendant's work "was done in a manner generally considered skillful by those capable of correctly judging such work...." Id. at 262. A contractor "must use reasonable judgment," and his use of "customary methods is a matter to be considered, but that standard does not necessarily meet the test of ordinary care." Dixon v. Ledbetter, 262 Ark. 758, 760, 561 S.W.2d 294, 295 (Ark. 1978). A contractor is held to the standard of a reasonable person and a reasonable contractor, but when the standards diverge, he is held to the stricter of the two. Ark. Mod. Jury Instr. Civ. 1203 cmt. "The issue of completion of repair work in a satisfactory manner [is] clearly one of fact...." United Bilt Homes, Inc. v. Sampson, 310 Ark. 47, 50, 832 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Ark. 1992).
Plaintiff has provided the Court with enough evidence to survive summary judgment on this claim. Through her expert, Mike Worth, Plaintiff has shown evidence that Defendant's work fell short of the industry custom governing her repairs. Worth started installing metal roofs as a subcontractor in 1980, and before that he installed vinyl siding. (ECF No. 28-4, at 1). In his deposition, Worth testified to several sub-standard features of Defendant's Nailite installation:
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