Christy v. Cranberry Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Inc.

Decision Date16 August 2004
Citation856 A.2d 43,579 Pa. 404
PartiesClyde E. CHRISTY, Administrator of the Estate of Anne K. Christy, and Clyde E. Christy, Individually, Appellees v. CRANBERRY VOLUNTEER AMBULANCE CORPS, INC. and Louis Liberto, Appellants.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Mary Elizabeth Dixon, Philadelphia, for Cranberry Volunteer Ambulance et al.

Michael A. Murphy, Philip A. Ignelzi, Pittsburgh, for Clyde E. Christy.

BEFORE: CAPPY, C.J., CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN and BAER, JJ.

OPINION

Justice NEWMAN.

In this case, we are asked to determine whether a volunteer ambulance company is entitled to the benefit of local government immunity pursuant to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act) when furnishing the same emergency medical services that an immune volunteer fire company provides. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the Order of the Commonwealth Court and remand the matter for the parties to introduce evidence regarding whether the ambulance company is a "local agency," pursuant to our analysis in Sphere Drake Insurance Company v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 566 Pa. 541, 782 A.2d 510 (2001).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellee Clyde E. Christy (Christy), the president of Cranberry Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Inc. (Cranberry Ambulance), a Pennsylvania non-profit corporation,1 attended the company's annual picnic on August 28, 1994, at Knob Hill Community Park in Marshall Township, Allegheny County. Many of the Cranberry Ambulance employees attended the picnic, although some of them, including Louis Liberto (Liberto), a paid staff paramedic with Cranberry Ambulance, remained on duty back at the station. During the picnic, Christy began to experience symptoms of a heart attack. Sallie Bailey (Bailey), a friend of Christy's who was also an attendee and a volunteer paramedic with Cranberry Ambulance, assisted Christy and telephoned the station to summon an ambulance. Bailey waited with Christy and rendered assistance. Liberto and Julie Wilson (Wilson), a volunteer emergency medical technician (EMT), responded to the call and arrived at the scene to render aid. Christy was moved by stretcher to the ambulance and then transported to North Hills Passavant Hospital (Hospital). Wilson drove the ambulance, and Liberto rode in the back to care for Christy. Bailey rode along in the back of the ambulance to continue to care for Christy, despite Liberto's protests that her presence was unnecessary.2

En route, Liberto administered oxygen to Christy and assessed his condition. Bailey argued with Liberto and wanted to administer nitroglycerine (NTG).3 Liberto contacted the Hospital medic command for instructions. The Hospital physician ordered Liberto to administer the NTG, which Liberto did not do.4 Because he feared further confrontation with Bailey, Liberto told her that he did not receive any orders. Liberto maintained Christy on basic life support during the thirty-minute ride to the Hospital and never administered the NTG. Christy's experts testified that Christy suffered a "very large myocardial infarction," causing a permanent loss of one-third of his heart function. (RR at 282a). Medical evidence suggested that NTG would have relieved his chest pain and reduced the severity of his heart attack. Christy, who was thirty-seven years old at the time of his heart attack, survived. Medical testimony established that at the time of the incident, Christy had the arteries of a seventy-year old man, that there was a history of cardiac disease in his family, including his father's death from cardiac disease at age thirty, and that Christy had smoked two packs of cigarettes a day since he was a teenager. (RR at 1119a).

Christy filed an action for damages against Liberto and Cranberry Ambulance (collectively, Appellants) on July 25, 1996, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court), claiming that: (1) Liberto was grossly negligent in refusing to administer the NTG; and (2) Cranberry Ambulance was vicariously liable for the negligent conduct of Bailey and/or Liberto in the ambulance. Christy's wife, Anne K. Christy, also brought a claim against Appellants for loss of consortium.5 Cranberry Ambulance asserted that Christy's claims were barred by the liability provisions of the Emergency Medical Services Act (EMSA),6 as set forth at 35 P.S. § 6931(j)(2), which provides:

j. Liability.
(2) No first responder, emergency medical technician or EMT-paramedic or health professional who in good faith attempts to render or facilitate emergency medical care authorized by this act shall be liable for civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions, unless guilty of gross or willful negligence. This provision shall apply to students enrolled in approved courses of instruction and supervised pursuant to rules and regulations.

35 P.S. § 6931(j)(2).

At the conclusion of the first trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellants and against Christy on all claims. Christy filed a Motion for Post-Trial Relief, seeking a new trial because of alleged prejudicial statements made by Liberto and Cranberry Ambulance's former counsel. The trial court granted the Motion, vacating the verdict and ordering a new trial. In an Order dated January 12, 2000, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the Order of the trial court.7 We denied a subsequent request for allocatur.

When the matter was retried in September of 2001, the trial court instructed the jury that as a matter of law Bailey acted as an agent of Cranberry Ambulance and that the company was vicariously liable for her actions if the jury found her conduct constituted gross negligence. The court instructed the jury to state separately whether Liberto was grossly negligent and whether Cranberry Ambulance, acting through its agents Liberto and/or Bailey, was grossly negligent. The jury answered "yes" to both questions. Christy then requested a charge on punitive damages, which the trial court refused. The jury found against Appellants and in favor of Christy in the amount of $200,000.00, and against Appellants and in favor of Christy, as administrator of the estate of his wife, in the amount of $50,000.00. The trial court subsequently molded the verdict to include delay damages and entered judgment on the molded verdict.

Christy appealed the denial of punitive damages to the Commonwealth Court; Liberto and Cranberry Ambulance cross-appealed, arguing that they were immune from liability as a local agency under the Tort Claims Act.8 Citing to its earlier decision in Scrima v. Swissvale Area Emergency Service, 143 Pa.Cmwlth. 500, 599 A.2d 301 (1991), the Commonwealth Court found that Cranberry Ambulance was not immune from liability as a local agency under the Tort Claims Act because immunity of a volunteer ambulance company is governed not by that Act but by the EMSA. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court affirmed that portion of the trial court Order that found that Cranberry Ambulance did not have immunity. Cranberry Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Inc. v. Christy, Pa.Cmwlth., No. 1357 C.D. 2002, 822 A.2d 893 (2003) (unpublished memorandum).

On November 12, 2003, we granted allocatur to consider whether the Commonwealth Court erred by: (1) holding that Cranberry Ambulance is not immune under the Tort Claims Act when it performs the exact same emergency medical services as an immune volunteer fire company; and (2) not remanding the matter to the trial court, following the post-verdict decision of our Court in Sphere Drake. Christy v. Cranberry Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Inc., 575 Pa. 704, 837 A.2d 1179 (2003).

DISCUSSION
Tort Claims Act Immunity

We must decide whether Cranberry Ambulance is immune under the Tort Claims Act as a question of law; therefore, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. Board of Revision of Taxes, 574 Pa. 707, 833 A.2d 710 (2003) (citing Buffalo Twp. v. Jones, 571 Pa. 637, 813 A.2d 659, 664 n. 4 (2002)). The question we address is purely legal, and our review does not encompass the merits of the underlying negligence action.

Pursuant to the Tort Claims Act, "no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person." 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541. "Local agency" is defined as "[a] government unit other than the Commonwealth government." 42 Pa.C.S. § 8501. A "government unit" is defined as "any government agency," which includes "any political subdivision, municipal authority and other local authority, or any officer or agency of any such political subdivision or local authority." 42 Pa.C.S. § 102. We noted in Sphere Drake that the definitional section in Chapter 85 of the Judicial Code does not define "local authority," but that the Statutory Construction Act describes it as "a municipal authority or any other body corporate and politic created by one or more political subdivisions pursuant to statute." Sphere Drake, 782 A.2d at 513 (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1991).

Equally as important as the definition of "local agency" status is "[t]he overall purpose of the Tort Claims Act ... [which] is to limit governmental exposure to tort liability for its acts." Sphere Drake, 782 A.2d at 515. See, e.g., Lory v. City of Philadelphia, 544 Pa. 38, 674 A.2d 673, 675-76 (1996),

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 870, 117 S.Ct. 184, 136 L.Ed.2d 123 (1996). See also Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 512 Pa. 129, 516 A.2d 306, 311 (1986) (plurality opinion) (preservation of the public treasury as against the possibility of unusually large recoveries in tort cases, is, self-evidently, an important governmental interest).

Volunteer fire companies are local agencies for purposes of the Tort Claims Act. Regester v. Longwood Ambulance Co., Inc., 751 A.2d 694 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000), aff'd sub nom. Regester v. County of Chester, 568 Pa. 410, 797...

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