Chu v. State, 87-1901

• Decision Date: 09 March 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-1901,87-1901
• Parties: 13 Fla. L. Weekly 663 Marcie CHU, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 330

521 So.2d 330

13 Fla. L. Weekly 663

Marcie CHU, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 87-1901.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Fourth District.

March 9, 1988.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Ellen Morris, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Amy L. Diem, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

DELL, Judge.

The state charged appellant with driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1985). The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress the results of a blood alcohol test. Thereafter, appellant withdrew her previous plea of not guilty, entered a plea of no contest and reserved her right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. In an amended order denying appellant's motion to suppress, the trial court certified the following question as one of great public importance:

DOES SECTION 316.1932(1)(c), FLORIDA STATUTES (1986) PROHIBIT A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER FROM REQUESTING THE ADMINISTRATION OF A BLOOD TEST IF A DEFENDANT DOES NOT APPEAR AT A HOSPITAL, CLINIC OR OTHER MEDICAL FACILITY AS A RESULT OF HIS INVOLVEMENT AS A DRIVER IN A MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT AND IF A BREATH TEST IS NOT IMPRACTICAL OR IMPOSSIBLE?

We accept jurisdiction of the certified question pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(4)(B) and 9.160. We answer this question with a qualified no and we affirm the trial court's order denying appellant's motion to suppress.

The trial court's amended order contains a summary of the facts leading to this appeal:

On March 13, 1987, the Defendant was involved in a one-car traffic accident on I-95 in which her car overturned. Emergency medical personnel were the first people to arrive on the scene to give aid to the Defendant. The Defendant was however not injured. Shortly after the emergency medical personnel arrived on the scene, Florida Highway Patrol Trooper Kozma arrived. Trooper Kozma made contact with the emergency medical personnel and then he approached the Defendant who was sitting on the back of the emergency vehicle. The Defendant cooperated completely with Trooper Kozma. During the course of the investigation, and through conversation with the Defendant, the Defendant had a strong odor of alcoholic beverage on her breath and at times, the Defendant appeared to lack coherency. Based on this appearance as well as the odor of alcohol on her breath and the accident, Trooper Kozma requested her to submit to a blood test at the scene. The Defendant's implied consent was read to her and Trooper Kozma also obtained a written consent from the Defendant for the blood test. Trooper Kozma testified that the reason that he opted for a blood test instead of a breathalyzer test was for the fact that the paramedics were already there and he thought that it would be the most accurate and quickest way to test the Defendant. There was also no question that the Defendant was not going to be transported to the hospital as there were no injuries. After receiving the results of the blood test on March 21, 1987, the Defendant was issued a summons for driving under the influence of alcohol.

Appellant contends that notwithstanding her consent to submit to a blood alcohol test, the trial court erred when it failed to suppress the results of the test because the requirements of section 316.1932(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1986) had not been met. The state agrees that the record would not support a blood test taken pursuant to the implied consent provisions of section 316.1932(1)(c). However, the state contends that section 316.1932(1)(c) does not preclude the admission of blood alcohol test results where the driver has given actual consent to the blood test. The state further argues that the statutory requirements of section 316.1932(1)(c) apply only to cases where the driver's consent will be implied as a matter of law.

The general rules concerning statutory construction are outlined in Barruzza v. Suddath Van Lines, Inc., 474 So.2d 861, 864 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985):

The starting point in statutory analysis is, of course, the language of the statute. Where the language used by the legislature makes clear the legislative intent, it is incumbent upon the courts to give effect to that intent. ... Thus, in those instances "where the language of a statute clearly limits the application to a particular class of cases, leaving no room for doubts as to the meaning of the legislature, the statute may not be enlarged or expanded to cover cases not falling within its provisions." (citations omitted).

The plain language of the implied consent statute shows that when the circumstances described in sections 316.1932(1)(c) and 316.1933(1) are not present, the legislature provided for the use of a breath test to determine the alcoholic content of the operator's blood and for a urine test to determine the presence of chemical substances:

Any person who accepts the privilege extended by the laws of this state of operating a motor vehicle within this state shall, by so operating such vehicle, be deemed to have given his consent to submit to an approved chemical test of his breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of...