Chupp v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc.
| Citation | 990 N.E.2d 993 |
| Decision Date | 22 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 41A04–1302–SC–48.,41A04–1302–SC–48. |
| Parties | Daniel J. CHUPP, Appellant–Plaintiff, v. WYNDHAM VACATION OWNERSHIP, INC., Appellee–Defendant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the Johnson Superior Court; The Honorable Richard L. Tandy, Magistrate; Cause No. 41D01–1209–SC–2771.
Daniel J. Chupp, Franklin, IN, Appellant pro se.
James L. Petersen, Brian J. Paul, Christina L. Fugate, Erin A. Webley, Ice Miller LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Attorneys for Appellee.
Daniel Chupp, pro se, appeals the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss filed by Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc. (“WVO”), as well as from the court's denial of Chupp's motion to reconsider. Chupp raises three issues which we consolidate and restate as whether the court erred in dismissing Chupp's notice of small claim on the basis that it did not have personal jurisdiction over WVO. WVO also requests appellate attorney fees pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 66(E). We affirm and deny WVO's request for attorney fees.
On November 9, 2009, Chupp, who is a resident of Franklin, Indiana, and a representative of WVO, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located in Orlando, Florida, entered into a “Discovery VIP” membership agreement entitling Chupp to certain travel and accommodation benefits. 1 Appellee's Appendix at 14–15.2 The agreement was signed in Las Vegas, Nevada. Id . at 14. Chupp also signed a “Statement of Understanding” which stated that “I understand that I am able to use my points for accommodations at select Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc. (Wyndham) locations or for a Wyndham Vacation Resorts and cruise combination package, as listed in the current Discovery Vacations by Wyndham Member's Directory.” Id. at 16.
On September 4, 2012, Chupp filed a notice of small claim (the “Claim”) against WVO in the Magistrate Division of the Johnson County Court. The Claim noted that WVO's address was located in Orlando, Florida. Chupp noted the following on the Claim form in the field asking the plaintiff to state the nature of the claim: Id . at 9. On October 5, 2012, WVO moved to dismiss the Claim for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to properly file the notice of claim, specifically noting that it “has no contacts with Indiana that would subject it to personal jurisdiction .” Id. at 11. On October 9, 2012, Chupp filed an objection to WVO's motion, noting that he “googled Wyndham near Franklin Indiana and 27 properties came up with one in Greenwood Indiana which is in Johnson County.” Id. at 24. On October 25, 2012, WVO filed a reply which stated that Chupp Id. at 27. On October 29, 2012, Chupp filed a response to WVO's reply. On November 13, 2012, Chupp filed a request for admissions pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 36.
On January 8, 2013, the court held a hearing on the parties' motions. At the outset of the hearing, Chupp, pro se, indicated to the court that he was on vacation in Las Vegas when a representative of WVO approached him on the street and asked if Chupp would listen to a ninety-minute presentation to “try to sell you one of those timeshare things,” and, following the presentation, he signed the membership agreement. Transcript at 7. WVO, by counsel, argued that and that Id. at 13–14. On January 10, 2013, the court entered its order of dismissal without prejudice. Chupp filed a motion to reconsider dismissal on January 15, 2013, stating in part:
The fact that [WVO] does not own or operate the location in Johnson County Indiana is immaterial to the this [sic] case. This case is a general contractor and sub-contractor dispute. When party 1 and party 2 enters into a contract (written or verbal). [sic] That contract is still in effect when party 2 sub-contracts with party 3 to actually perform party 2 contractual obligations to party 1. Party 1 does not have to be party to or even be aware of the contract between party 2 and party 3. When party 3 fails to start or complete the obligation party 2 has to party 1 this is a breech [sic] of the original contract between party1 [sic] and party 2. Party 1 being [Chupp] and party 2 being [WVO] and party 3 being Wyndham Hotel Group.
Appellee's Appendix at 43. Chupp also noted that Defendant's Exhibit 1, an affidavit of Susan Martinez who is a paralegal for WVO, stated that WVO “does not own or operate or maintain any of the hotel properties,” and “[b]y this statement [WVO] is acknowledging the fact that there is a sub-contract with the Wyndham Hotel Group.” Id. at 44. On January 22, 2013, the court denied Chupp's motion to reconsider.
The issue is whether the court erred in dismissing Chupp's notice of small claim on the basis that it did not have personal jurisdiction over WVO. Before addressing the arguments of the parties, however, we note that although Chupp is proceeding pro se, such litigants are held to the same standard as trained counsel and are required to follow procedural rules. Evans v. State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. This court will not “indulge in any benevolent presumptions on [his] behalf, or waive any rule for the orderly and proper conduct of [his] appeal.” Ankeny v. Governor of State of Indiana, 916 N .E.2d 678, 689 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (citation omitted), reh'g denied, trans. denied.
Personal jurisdiction is a question of law. LinkAmerica Corp. v. Albert, 857 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Ind.2006). “Therefore, our review is de novo, and we do not defer to the trial court's legal conclusion as to whether personal jurisdiction exists.” Sebring v. Air Equip. and Eng'g, Inc., 988 N.E.2d 272, 274 (Ind.Ct.App.2013) (citing LinkAmerica, 857 N.E.2d at 965). However, to the extent that the issue of personal jurisdiction turns on disputed facts, the trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Id. Also, to the extent we review the court's denial of Chupp's motion to reconsider, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. Buford v. Flori Roberts, Inc., 663 N.E.2d 1159, 1160 (Ind.Ct.App.1996).
Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A) serves as Indiana's long-arm jurisdiction provision. Sebring, 988 N.E.2d at 274. This provision extends to the limits of the United States Constitution; therefore, analysis of personal jurisdiction is reduced “to the issue of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the Federal Due Process Clause.” Id. at 274–275 (quoting LinkAmerica, 857 N.E.2d at 967).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that before a state may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must have “certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ “ Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940)). If the defendant's contacts with the state are so “continuous and systematic” that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into the courts of that state for any matter, then the defendant is subject to general jurisdiction, even in causes of action unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the forum state. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984).
If the defendant's contacts with the forum state are not “continuous and systematic,” specific jurisdiction may be asserted if the controversy is related to or arises out of the defendant's contacts with the forum state. Id. at 414 & n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 1868. Specific jurisdiction requires that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state so that the defendant reasonably anticipates being haled into court there. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474–75, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). A single contact with the forum state may be sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over a defendant, if it creates a “substantial connection” with the forum state and the suit is related to that connection. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U .S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). But a defendant cannot be haled into a jurisdiction “solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or of the unilateral activity of another party or a third person.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417, 104 S.Ct. 1868;Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984); World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)).
Id. (quoting LinkAmerica, 857 N.E.2d at 967).3
Initially, we observe that WVO asserts that Chupp's argument should be waived for failure to present a cogent argument, and in this regard we are inclined to agree. Specifically, WVO argues that Chupp's brief “is substantially noncompliant with the appellate rules,” noting that it “introduces new information that is outside the record and irrelevant to the jurisdictional question before this court,” that his statement of the case fails to reference the record or...
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