Church v. City of Medina, Civil File No. 11-275 (MJD/FLN)

• Decision Date: 25 June 2012
• Docket Number: Civil File No. 11-275 (MJD/FLN)
• Parties: WOODRIDGE CHURCH, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MEDINA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

WOODRIDGE CHURCH, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF MEDINA, Defendant.

Civil File No. 11-275 (MJD/FLN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Dated: June 25, 2012

MEMORANDUM OF LAW & ORDER

Charles R. Shreffler, Jr., Shreffler Law, PLLC, and Joel L. Oster, Alliance Defense Fund, Counsel for Plaintiff.

George C. Hoff, Kimberly B. Kozar, and David M. Quealy, Hoff, Barry & Kozar, P.A., Counsel for Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendant City of Medina's Motion to Partially Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. [Docket No. 13] The Court heard oral argument on February 10, 2012.

Defendant seeks to dismiss Counts One, Two, Five, and Eight in their entirety because the claims are not ripe; dismiss Counts Six and Seven, to the extent they are based on the moratorium, because the claims are moot; anddismiss the as-applied portions of Counts Three and Four because the claims are not ripe. The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant's motion. Because Plaintiff has not obtained any decision, let alone a final decision, from Defendant regarding Plaintiff's expansion plans, the as-applied claims based on Defendant's creation of a new zoning district are not ripe. Because Plaintiff has pled claims for damages based on the moratorium, the moratorium claims are not moot.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff Woodridge Church ("Church") is located on approximately 27.6 acres of land in Defendant the City of Medina, Minnesota ("City"). (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 12.) When the Church purchased the land, the property was zoned Rural Residential ("RR"), which permitted church use as a conditional right. (Id. ¶13.)

The Church broke ground for the construction of a sanctuary in 1996, ultimately holding its first service in the building in January of 1997. (Id. ¶ 19.) Since this time, the Church has continued to grow, facilitating a need to expand the existing building. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.)

In the spring of 2008, the Church "initiated conversation with City staff, informing them of the Church's intent to expand their current facility by adding approximately 19,000 square feet (split over 2 levels) to their existing space of approximately 28,000 square feet[,]" resulting in a total square footage of 47,000 square feet. (Id. ¶ 27.) After working with City officials, architects, and builders, the Church reduced its initial expansion plans, seeking 14,000 additional square feet for a total building size of 42,000 square feet. (Id. ¶ 29.)

The Church submitted a permit application to the City Planning Department on November 10, 2008. (Hoff Aff., Ex. 2.) In January of 2009, the Church submitted plans to the City Council for its proposed construction. (Compl. ¶ 30.) The Complaint alleges that the City refused to approve the Church's plans. (Id. ¶ 32.)

In February of 2009, the City placed a one-year moratorium on the construction of all church buildings within the City. (Compl. ¶ 33.) The Church's application was the only church construction application pending before the City Council at that time. (Id. ¶ 35.) During the period of the moratorium, the City created a new zoning district called the "Rural Public/SemiPublic" ("RPS"). (Id. ¶ 37.) The Church, City Hall, and an additional church were included in this newly zoned district. (Id.)

The City Planning Commission recommended a maximum building size in the RPS district of 45,000 total square feet, with a 35,000 square foot cap on a building's footprint. (Compl. ¶ 39.) In May or June of 2009, the City Council, rejecting this suggestion, implemented a maximum square footage of 40,000 square feet and lifted the city-wide moratorium. (Id. ¶¶ 40, 43.)

The City's Planning Commission was scheduled to consider the Church's application for a conditional use permit and interim use permit at its meeting on August 11, 2009. (Hoff Aff., Ex. 2.) The Church withdrew its permit application for the proposed expansion on August 10, 2009. (Id.)

B. Procedural History

On February 3, 2011, the Church filed a complaint against the City of Medina in this Court. The Church's Complaint alleges: Count One, Violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"); Count Two, Violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment; Count Three, Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; Count Four, Violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment; CountFive, Violation of the Right to Peaceable Assembly under the First Amendment; Count Six, Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; Count Seven, Violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment; and Count Eight, Violation of the Right of Conscience secured under Article 1, Section 16 of the Minnesota Constitution.

Defendant has now filed a Motion to Partially Dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1265 (8th Cir. 2006).

In order to properly dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the complaint must be successfully challenged on its face or on the factual truthfulness of its averments. In a facial challenge to jurisdiction, all of the factual allegations concerning jurisdiction are presumed to be true and the motion is successful if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction.

Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). "In a factual attack, the court considers matters outside the pleadings, and the non-movingparty does not have the benefit of 12(b)(6) safeguards." Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Should the court determine at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Here, Defendant asserts a facial challenge to jurisdiction. However, Defendant has submitted two exhibits - an August 10, 2009, email and August 10, 2009 letter, evidencing the Church's withdrawal of its permit application -and asks that the Court consider them as public records. The Church does not object to the characterization of these documents as public records. Nor does the Church dispute that it withdrew its permit application the day before the hearing before the City's Planning Commission. The Complaint does not assert that the Church completed a permit application. In deciding a 12(b)(1) facial motion to dismiss, the Court considers the pleadings, "some public records, materials that do not contradict the complaint, or materials that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings." Noble Sys. Corp. v. Alorica Cent., LLC, 543 F.3d 978, 982 (8th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (addressing 12(b)(6) and 12(c) motions)); Mattes v. ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 697 (8th Cir. 2003) ("A motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) which is limited to a facial attack on thepleadings is subject to the same standard as a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6).") (citation omitted). Therefore, the Court may consider Defendant's exhibits when analyzing this facial challenge.

B. Ripeness

"The ripeness doctrine flows both from the Article III 'cases' and 'controversies' limitations and also from prudential considerations for refusing to exercise jurisdiction." Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 234 F.3d 1032, 1037 (8th Cir. 2000). The doctrine's "basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements." Id. (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)). A two-prong test has been delineated to determine the ripeness of a particular case: an evaluation of both (1) "the fitness of the issues for a judicial decision," and (2) "the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 234 F.3d at 1038 (citations omitted). "The issue of ripeness . . . is one of subject matter jurisdiction." Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp. v. S.D., 362 F.3d 512, 520 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

Defendant asserts that Counts One, Two, Five, and Eight, in their entirety, and Counts Three and Four in part, fail because the Church's as-applied statutory and constitutional challenges are not ripe. (Counts Six and Seven contain challenges to the moratorium, which the City concedes are not unripe. The City's argument regarding whether Counts Six and Seven are moot is addressed in Section III(C).)

1. Williamson Ripeness Standard

The Supreme Court set forth the ripeness requirement for challenging local land use decisions in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). In Williamson, the Supreme Court held that "a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue." Id. at 186. The Supreme Court further held that, when there was no evidence that the applicant had applied for a variance and the government entity had the power to grant variances, its takings claim was not ripe. Id. at 193-94. "[W]hether it is analyzed as a deprivation of property without due process under the FourteenthAmendment, or as a taking under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment," the applicant's claim was premature because there would be no final decision regarding how the local government's regulations would be applied to the property until the applicant applied for a variance. Id. at 200.

A final decision from the governmental entity is "a final, definitive position as to how [the plaintiff] could...