Church v. State, 20693
| Decision Date | 15 August 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 20693,20693 |
| Citation | 928 S.W.2d 385 |
| Parties | Michael CHURCH, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent-Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Ellen H. Flottman, Asst. Public Defender, Columbia, for movant-appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, David R. Truman, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, for respondent-respondent.
Michael Church (Movant) pleaded guilty to the Class D felony of attempted stealing pursuant to § 570.030, RSMo 1994. He was sentenced to five years in the Missouri Department of Corrections. From this plea and sentence, Movant filed his Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied his motion.
Movant appeals the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion. He claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel in that counsel led Movant to believe that he would receive drug treatment if he pled guilty. Movant also contends that counsel misinformed him that the state of Oklahoma could not file a detainer against him on his escape charge from that state. 1
Review of a postconviction motion is limited to a determination of whether the motion court clearly erred. Wilhite v. State, 845 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Mo.App.1992). The motion court's findings of facts and conclusions of law are presumed correct, State v. Rice, 887 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Mo.App.1994), and will be deemed clearly erroneous only if a full review of the record leaves this Court with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. Wilhite, 845 S.W.2d at 594.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel defendant must show that counsel failed to provide reasonably effective assistance and that defendant was thereby prejudiced. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Absent a showing to the contrary, counsel is presumed to have provided effective assistance. Wilhite, 845 S.W.2d at 594-95. Movant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel was ineffective. Id. at 594. "[O]nce a guilty plea is entered, the adequacy of representation becomes immaterial except to the extent that the ineffectiveness of counsel bears on the issue of the voluntary nature and understanding of the plea." State v. Rahberger, 747 S.W.2d 724, 725 (Mo.App.1988); see also Hagan v. State, 836 S.W.2d 459, 463 (Mo. banc 1992). When a movant claims his plea was involuntary because he was misled by counsel, the test is whether movant's belief was reasonable. Torrence v. State, 861 S.W.2d 149, 150 (Mo.App.1993). In order to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis, movant must demonstrate that, but for the errors of counsel, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hagan, 836 S.W.2d at 464.
Movant was first charged with the Class C felony of stealing more than $150 by deceit. During the plea hearing, it was discovered that insufficient facts existed to support this charge and the charge was amended to the Class D felony of attempted stealing. Movant then accepted the state's offer of a plea bargain. Pursuant to the plea bargain, the state agreed to recommend a five-year sentence and to dismiss three other charges pending against Movant. After questioning Movant at length about the plea, the motion court accepted Movant's guilty plea.
Movant then filed his Rule 24.035 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and an evidentiary hearing was held. The only evidence submitted by Movant in support of the allegations contained in the motion was his own deposition. 2 Movant contends his attorney led him to believe that as part of the plea agreement, he was going to receive drug treatment while he was in the Department of Corrections. Additionally, Movant contends that counsel advised him that he would be immune from a fugitive warrant issued by the state of Oklahoma as long as he remained in Missouri. Since entering the Department of Corrections he has received no drug treatment and has had a detainer lodged against him by the state of Oklahoma.
Testifying at the postconviction relief hearing on behalf of the state was Jake Skouby, an attorney that had represented Movant prior to his attorney at the guilty plea hearing. 3
We first address Movant's allegation that his attorney informed him he would receive drug treatment as part of the plea bargain. Movant asserts that he was willing to accept a seven-year sentence in order to receive the cocaine treatment program. However, the following exchange took place at the hearing:
Movant: Yes, sir.
The transcript clearly indicates that Movant understood that there was not an option available to the motion court that would place Movant in prison for a seven-year period. Additionally, there followed a discussion about what was contained in the plea agreement and Movant gave no indication that he was expecting anything other than what was contained in the Memorandum of Plea Bargain.
....
The transcript reveals that Movant indicated that the conditions contained...
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McClellan v. State, 21860
...court's order and judgment is not clearly erroneous and the judgment of the motion court denying relief is affirmed. Church v. State, 928 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Mo.App.1996); Bauer, 949 S.W.2d at 250. The judgment is MONTGOMERY, C.J., and PARRISH, P.J., concur. 1 Movant, a prior and persistent of......
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Briley v. State
...Id. "In a proceeding for postconviction relief, credibility of the witnesses is for the motion court's determination." Church v. State, 928 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Mo.App.1996). "It is within the discretion of the motion court to believe or disbelieve Movant's testimony." Id. The motion court foun......