Churchill v. Holt

• Decision Date: 06 April 1881
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: William W. Churchill & others v. Reuben L. Holt & others

131 Mass. 67

William W. Churchill & others v. Reuben L. Holt & others

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

April 6, 1881

Suffolk. Tort to recover the amount of a judgment paid by the plaintiffs, in an action brought by Julia Meston against them for personal injuries occasioned by falling into an open and unguarded hatchway on the plaintiffs' premises, alleged in this action to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants' servant. After the former decision, reported 127 Mass. 165, the case was tried in this court, before Lord J.; the jury returned a verdict for the defendants; and the plaintiffs alleged exceptions, which appear in the opinion.

Exceptions overruled.

J. O Teele, (C. R. Train with him,) for the plaintiffs.

A. A. Ranney, for the defendants.

Morton, J. Colt & Field, JJ., absent.

OPINION

Morton, J.

This case came before us at the former hearing upon an offer of proof made by the plaintiffs; and it was held that the case should have been submitted to the jury, because the evidence offered tended to show that, on the day of the accident, the plaintiffs left the hatchway in a safe condition, and the servant of the defendants negligently removed the cover, and thus made it dangerous, without the knowledge of the plaintiffs. It was adjudged that, if such were the facts, the parties were not joint tortfeasors, in pari delicto and the plaintiffs could maintain an action for indemnity. Churchill v. Holt, 127 Mass. 165. At the second trial, the facts were disputed. The principal question was whether the parties were joint tortfeasors, within the rule of law which precludes those who are in pari delicto from recovering of each other indemnity or contribution. The evidence was conflicting. The bill of exceptions states that "the presiding justice gave instructions intended to cover all the points raised by either party, to which no exception was taken except as follows: The jury were instructed that if the plaintiffs left the hatchway in a condition that was reasonably safe, and the defendants' servant removed the covering in the performance of the defendants' business, so that the injury to Mrs. Meston was caused by that means, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover; but that if the hatchway as left by the plaintiffs was in an unsafe condition, so that an injury to Mrs. Meston was liable to happen in consequence of it, and the defendants' servant, in the course of the business of the defendants, so interfered with the hatchway as to cause it to be more dangerous, and Mrs. Meston was injured in the way thus made more...