Churchill v. Star Enterprises

• Decision Date: 22 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 98-1751.,CIV. A. 98-1751.
• Parties: Mary CHURCHILL v. STAR ENTERPRISES a/k/a Star Staff Inc., et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

3 F.Supp.2d 625

Mary CHURCHILL v. STAR ENTERPRISES a/k/a Star Staff Inc., et al.

No. CIV. A. 98-1751.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

June 22, 1998.

Thomas M. Holland, Law Offices of Thomas More Holland, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

Gayle A. Stein, Ballard, Spahr, Andrews and Ingersoll, Philadelphia, PA, Irving L. Hurwitz, Carpenter Bennett & Morrissey, Newark, NJ, Jed M. Milstein, Ballard Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, Philadelphia, PA, for Star Enterprises.

Irving L. Hurwitz, Carpenter Bennett & Morrissey, Newark, NJ, for Joseph Jantorno, David Smith.

MEMORANDUM

BARTLE, District Judge.

This is an action under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., with pendent state law claims. Presently before the court is the motion of defendants to dismiss the complaint and for sanctions. Defendants contend that the action is barred by res judicata, that is, by claim preclusion.

Defendants present their motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, any motion under Rule 12(b) must be brought prior to the filing of a responsive pleading. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). Defendants filed and served their answer approximately one month before the instant motion to dismiss. For this reason we will treat the motion as one requesting judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c).

In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the well pleaded facts of the complaint will be taken as true. In addition, we may consider matters of public record, and authentic documents upon which the complaint is based if attached to the complaint or as an exhibit to the motion. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1391 (3d Cir.1994); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1042, 114 S.Ct. 687, 126 L.Ed.2d 655 (1994).

According to the complaint, filed on April 2, 1998, plaintiff Mary Churchill was a station manager for defendant Star Enterprises, also known as Star Staff Incorporated ("Star"). Individual defendants Joseph Jantorno and David Smith worked as her regional manager and manager, respectively. In June, 1996, plaintiff was diagnosed with oral cancer and underwent three surgeries. From August through October of 1996, plaintiff received radiation treatment, as a result of which she suffered various side effects including fatigue. Plaintiff "requested reasonable accommodation by continually notifying her supervisor, Defendant David Smith [of] her need for staffing assistance in order to modify her work schedule so that she could work less hours." Compl. ¶ 26. Her final request occurred on January 29, 1997, when she left a voice mail message on defendant Smith's answering machine again requesting assistance for staffing her store. This request, as well as all prior requests, went unanswered. Defendant Smith advised defendant Jantorno of plaintiff's requests for assistance. Defendant Jantorno then scheduled an "untimely evaluation" for plaintiff and asked defendant Smith to perform such evaluation. Compl. ¶ 39. Defendants terminated plaintiff on February 7, 1997 "in an effort to avoid the obligation of providing Plaintiff a reasonable accommodation" and for "pretextual reasons." Compl. ¶¶ 31, 41.

Plaintiff claims that her discharge violated the ADA, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 43, §§ 951 et seq. and the New Jersey Family Leave Act ("NJFLA"), N.J.Stat.Ann. §§ 34:11B-1 et seq. She seeks reinstatement, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and counsel fees. Defendants argue, on the other hand, that the instant action is barred by claim preclusion because plaintiff could have raised these ADA, PHRA, and NJFLA claims in a prior lawsuit based on these same facts.

On May 20, 1997, over ten months prior to filing the present action ("Churchill II"), plaintiff instituted a lawsuit in this court, entitled Churchill v. Star Enterprises, 3 F.Supp.2d 622 ("Churchill I"), against these same defendants asserting a violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. The complaint in Churchill I contended that plaintiff, employed as a station manager for Star since July of 1991, was diagnosed and treated for oral cancer. After three surgeries, due to which she missed two and a half weeks of work, she commenced radiation treatment. On January 29, 1997 plaintiff put defendants on notice that she qualified for FMLA leave due to her "serious medical need." Compl. ¶ 20. However, defendants discharged her on February 6, 1997 "for exercising her rights under the FMLA." Compl. ¶ 23. Plaintiff sought equitable relief of reinstatement and restoration of health benefits, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. She also demanded liquidated damages pursuant to the FMLA, as well as attorneys' fees, expert fees, and costs.

After a Rule 16 status conference on September 11, 1997 in Churchill I, this court entered a scheduling order with a December 31, 1997 discovery deadline. It placed the case in the court's February, 1998 trial pool. At trial, which commenced before the undersigned on February 11, the jury found that the defendants terminated plaintiff in violation of the FMLA and awarded damages of $8,609.02. The court then added statutory interest. Finding that the violation of the FMLA had not been made in good faith, we doubled this award as liquidated damages. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii). We entered judgment on February 13, 1997 in favor of plaintiff and against all three defendants, Star, Joseph Jantorno, and David Smith for $18,337.22, jointly and severally. We also ordered defendant Star to reinstate plaintiff to a position equivalent to the one she held as of February 5, 1997, with equivalent wages and benefits. Subsequently, we awarded plaintiff counsel fees and costs. See Churchill v. Star Enter., No. CIV. A. 97-3527, 1998 WL 254080 (E.D.Pa. Apr.17, 1998). As noted above, it was not until April 2, 1998, almost two months after the jury verdict in Churchill I, that plaintiff filed Churchill II.

The primary purpose of claim preclusion is to prohibit piecemeal adjudication of claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. Board of Trustees of Trucking Employees of N.J. Welfare Fund, Inc. Pension Fund v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 504 (3d Cir.1992). The Court of Appeals has defined claim preclusion as

giv[ing] dispositive effect to a prior judgment if a particular issue, although not litigated, could have been raised in the earlier proceeding. Claim preclusion requires: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving; (2) the same parties or their privities; and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.

Id. The first two elements are obviously met here. Churchill I resulted in final judgment after trial in favor of the same plaintiff and against the same defendants named in Churchill II.

In order to determine whether claim preclusion bars the present action, we must decide whether Churchill II is based upon the "same cause of action" as Churchill I. This third element, however, does not mean that plaintiff must espouse the same legal theory in both lawsuits for claim preclusion to apply. Rather, "[w]hether two lawsuits are based on the identical cause of action `turn[s] on the essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir.1984)). The Court of Appeals has enumerated various factors we must consider. See Athlone, 746 F.2d at 984. The "focal points of our analysis are whether the acts complained of were the same, whether the material facts alleged in each suit were the same and whether the witnesses and documentation required to prove such allegations were the same." Id.

We conclude that Churchill I and Churchill II involve the same cause of action because the underlying events in both cases are the same.¹ A review of the complaints in both actions reveals that they allege essentially the same facts. Indeed, many paragraphs in the two pleadings are identical. Compare Churchill I ¶¶ 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 11-13, 16-19, 24 with Churchill II ¶¶ 4, 7-9, 14-16, 18-21, 23, 33, and 43. Only five factual paragraphs in Churchill II were not set forth in Churchill I. See Churchill II ¶¶ 22, 25, 38-40. Those paragraphs omitted from the Churchill I complaint simply reference facts relevant to plaintiff's termination, which were the subject of testimony at the Churchill I trial. Both cases challenge the defendants' response to plaintiff's request for leave/accommodation and plaintiff's subsequent termination. The complaints differ in only one major respect. Churchill I contends that defendants violated the FMLA when they dismissed plaintiff,² while Churchill II states that defendants violated the ADA, the PHRA, and the NJFLA.

Not only are the acts complained of here the same, but the witnesses and documents to be produced at trial would be the same. At the trial of Churchill I, the witnesses included the plaintiff, her doctors, employees of defendant with knowledge of plaintiff's illness, and employees of defendant with involvement in plaintiff's termination, including the named individual defendants, as well as Deborah Cox and Walter Schreiber.³ To prove plaintiff's claim of termination due to disability discrimination, the witnesses would necessarily include these same persons. Simply because the legal theories in the two actions are different is immaterial for purposes of claim preclusion.

Plaintiff argues that Churchill II is not barred because the court could not have had subject matter jurisdiction over the ADA and PHRA claims at the time of Churchill I. During the pendency of Churchill I, plaintiff maintains that she could not have included her ADA and PHRA claims because she had not yet received her right to sue letter or otherwise completed...