Cia. Minera, Etc., Ramos v. Bartlesville Zinc Co.

• Decision Date: 24 June 1925
• Docket Number: (No. 3225.)<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL&gt
• Parties: CIA. MINERA YGNACIO RODRIGUEZ RAMOS, S. A., v. BARTLESVILLE ZINC CO. et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 388

275 S.W. 388

CIA. MINERA YGNACIO RODRIGUEZ RAMOS, S. A., v. BARTLESVILLE ZINC CO. et al.

(No. 3225.)^*

Supreme Court of Texas.

June 24, 1925.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Eighth Supreme Judicial District.

Suit by Cia. Minera Ygnacio Rodriguez Ramos, S. A., against the Bartlesville Zinc Company and others. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed in the Court of Civil Appeals (202 S. W. 1048), and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed and cause remanded.

Waters Davis, J. M. Goggin, and Dee W. Harrington, all of El Paso, for plaintiff in error.

R. C. Walshe and U. S. Goen, both of El Paso (Edw. F. Harris, of Houston, of counsel), for defendants in error.

PIERSON, J.

For a statement of the case the following is quoted from the opinion of the honorable Court of Civil Appeals:

"The Compania Minera Ygnacio Rodriguez Ramos, S. A., brought this suit against the Bartlesville Zinc Company, American Metals Company, Limited, the Compania Minera de Penoles, S. A., and Compania de Minerales de Metales et al., for damages for the conversion of 48 cars of ore, alleging that same was taken from plaintiff in the Republic of Mexico by unknown parties, and shipped to El Paso, where it was unlawfully appropriated by defendants. The defense is that it was seized and confiscated by Francisco Villa as a military necessity, sold to parties in Mexico, from whom it was by defendant. American Metals Company, purchased in good faith. The plaintiff in reply denied that the ore was taken or confiscated by any act of a sovereign state, so as to constitute it booty of a conquering army, or was taken to be used in the course of military operations, or under circumstances where danger was immediate and impending, or necessity urgent for the maintaining of the army, or the necessities of war. The cause was submitted to a jury on special issues, and upon the verdict judgment was rendered for plaintiff for $75,902.14, from which this appeal.

"The jury found that a civil war existed in Mexico during the time the ore sued for was taken, and that armies of soldiers led by Francisco Villa were opposed by the armies of Venustiano Carranza; that the cars of ore sued for were not taken by any force or government in possession and control of the territory where plaintiff's mine was, or by any agent of such force or government, acting by authority of such government or force. Nor was it taken by Francisco Villa, or any of his agents or officers acting by his authority or direction; nor was the proceeds thereof intended for the benefit of the faction dominated by Villa.

"The appellant (Bartlesville Zinc Company et al.) contends that the uncontradicted evidence shows that the ore was taken under confiscation by the officers and agents of the Villa government for the use of the army. The evidence is uncontradicted that the ores were purchased from Hipolito Villa; that he was the financial agent of Gen. Villa; but we find no positive statement that these ores were taken for the use of the army. There are circumstances tending to show that they were taken for his own private use, as well as circumstances indicating that they were taken by him as the representative of Gen. Villa for the army. For this reason we conclude that this is properly a question for the jury to determine."

The Court of Civil Appeals, after reversing the judgment of the trial court on account of the admission of certain testimony, entered its ruling upon a vital issue in the case as follows:

"The jury made the finding that a state of war existed in Mexico at the time the ore was taken, and that Francisco Villa was at the head of a contending faction, so it became a material inquiry whether or not the ores were confiscated and sold by his (Villa's) officers or agents as such, for the reason that under the settled law of the United States, a sale by such would convey title; so it became important that the minds of the jury be free from bias or prejudice, on account of any collateral matters in evidence, and we cannot say that such testimony did not have an improper effect upon their minds."

The Court of Civil Appeals thus held that a seizure of private property by the Villa faction in Mexico and "a sale by such would convey title." The correctness of this ruling is the issue raised by plaintiff in error in its application for writ of error. It is admitted that the title to the ore was in plaintiff in error, and still is, unless the property was seized by Villa or his agents and the seizure and sale were the acts of a government, whose acts as such government are entitled to be respected by a foreign government.

Defendant in error's title is not based upon the right of property, but that the seizure of the property was the act of a government in Mexico, and that the courts of one nation will not undertake to review or revise the governmental acts of another as between it and its citizens. This principle is cheerfully subscribed to, and, whether rightful or wrongful, if the taking of the ore by Villa or his agents was the act of such a government whose acts are entitled to respect as such, the possession of the property in the hands of the purchaser would not be reviewed or disturbed by the courts of the United States. But we cannot give to the Villa faction or government such recognition. Under the well-settled principles of international law, the Villa government in Mexico, although for a considerable period of time it controlled all of northern Mexico by paramount force, did not establish its legal right to rule, its acts were unlawful and are not entitled to the dignity of acts of government that the courts of a foreign nation should or can respect.

It is argued by defendant in error that the Villa government exercised governmental power and was absolute over large areas of the Republic of Mexico; that, by certain acts the government of the United States recognized it as a de facto government. Belligerent rights may have been conceded to the Villa faction, and it may be conceded that his organization exercised powers of government over a very large area of Mexico. Yet that adds little to its pretensions of legality. If it had been successful, its legality would have been established, and its acts would be entitled to the respect due to another government.

The recognition of the Villa faction in Mexico, as belligerents, could not be referred to as any sort of recognition of it as a government, certainly not a de jure government, and certainly not a recognition of the legality of its acts against the de jure government of Mexico, nor of the validity of its decrees and acts respecting private property. The acts of Villa in seizing private property or by sale attempting to divest title to it in itself being an act against the de jure government of Mexico, and one violative of rights of property, it does not appear that the courts of this country are under any duty whatever to respect and give effect to such wrongful acts.

The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 185, 186, 24 L. Ed. 716, describes certain kinds of de facto governments, analyzes their relative powers, and defines the recognition that should be given to the respective acts, as follows:

"One of them is such as exists after it has expelled the regularly constituted authorities from the seats of power and the public offices, and established its own functionaries in their places, so as to represent in fact the sovereignty of the nation. Such was the government of England under the commonwealth established upon the execution of the king and the overthrow of the loyalists. As far as other nations are concerned, such a government is treated as in most respects possessing rightful authority; its contracts and treaties are usually enforced; its acquisitions are retained; its legislation is in general recognized; and the rights acquired under it are, with few exceptions, respected after the restoration of the authorities which were expelled. All that counsel say of de facto governments is justly said of a government of this kind. But the Confederate government was not of this kind. It never represented the nation, it never expelled the public authorities from the country, it never entered into any treaties, nor was it ever recognized as that of an independent power. It collected an immense military force, and temporarily expelled the authorities of the United States from the territory over which it exercised an usurped dominion; but in that expulsion the United States never acquiesced; on the contrary, they immediately resorted to similar force to regain possession of that territory and re-establish their authority, and they continued to use such force until they succeeded. It would be useless to comment upon the striking contrast between a government of this nature, which, with all its military strength, never had undisputed possession of power for a single day, and a government like that of the commonwealth of England under Parliament or Cromwell.

"The other kind of de facto governments, to which the doctrines cited relate, is such as exists where a portion of the inhabitants of a country have separated themselves from the parent state, and established an independent government. The validity of its acts, both against the parent state and its citizens or subjects, depends entirely upon its ultimate success. If it fail to establish itself permanently, all such acts perish with it. If it succeed, and become recognized, its acts from the commencement of its existence are upheld as those of an independent nation. Such was the case of the state governments under the old confederation on their separation from the British crown. Having made good their declaration of independence, every thing they did from that date was as valid as if their independence had been at once acknowledged. Confiscations, therefore, of enemy's property made by them were sustained as if made by an...