Ciak v. State
| Decision Date | 07 June 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. S04A0343.,S04A0343. |
| Citation | 597 S.E.2d 392,278 Ga. 27 |
| Parties | CIAK v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Barry Staples, Hix H. Green III, Marietta, for appellant.
Barry E. Morgan, Solicitor-General, Thomas J. Campbell, Assistant Solicitor-General, Marietta, for appellee.
A police officer stopped Ciak solely because he suspected the windows of the Georgia-registered car she was driving violated OCGA § 40-8-73.1. Smelling alcohol, the officer commenced a DUI investigation, ultimately arresting Ciak for DUI. She was not charged at that time with a violation of OCGA § 40-8-73.1 because a test at the arrest site showed the windows were not tinted beyond the 32 percent limit, but was eventually charged by accusation with that offense. Ciak filed a motion to suppress all evidence derived from the traffic stop, contending OCGA § 40-8-73.1 is facially unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection. The trial court denied the motion, holding that Ciak failed to prove she was similarly situated to others who are treated differently and that the statute is rationally related to the purpose of officer safety. This Court granted Ciak's application for interlocutory review and requested the parties to address the constitutionality of OCGA § 40-8-73.1.
1. Ciak contends the statute denies equal protection of the law because it applies only to residents of Georgia. The trial court rejected that argument on two bases, first that Ciak was not situated similarly to a class being treated differently, and second that the legislature had legitimately applied piecemeal remedies to achieve the statute's purpose of promoting the safety of law enforcement personnel. We disagree with both holdings.
The trial court's order identifies the class of persons affected by the statute as drivers of all vehicles on Georgia roads, but the class to be considered here is actually somewhat smaller. The class of persons affected by the statute comprises the drivers of all motor vehicles which are registered in Georgia and have tinted windows. Within that class, the statute distinguishes between residents of this state and non-residents.1 It is that distinction which Ciak contends denies her equal protection of the law. Her argument is supported by the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 23, 105 S.Ct. 2465, 86 L.Ed.2d 11 (1985): "A State may not treat those within its borders unequally solely on the basis of their different residences...."
When, as here, neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right is affected by the challenged statute, an equal protection challenge is assessed under the "rational relationship" test, under which a legislative classification will not be found to deny equal protection if the classification bears a direct relation to the purpose of the legislation. Love v. State, 271 Ga. 398(2,3), 517 S.E.2d 53 (1999). As several other jurisdictions have noted, the purpose of laws restricting the degree to which vehicle windows may be tinted is to enhance the safety of law enforcement officers approaching vehicles they have stopped. See, e.g., Tucker v. United States, 708 A.2d 645, 648 (D.C.App.,1998); People v. Pitts, 222 Mich.App. 260, 274, 564 N.W.2d 93 (1997); People v. Strawn, 210 Ill.App.3d 783, 788, 155 Ill.Dec. 269, 569 N.E.2d 269 (1991). It being self-evident that non-residents can be as dangerous to police officers as residents, we perceive no rational connection between the residence of the driver of a vehicle and the goal of improving law enforcement officer safety during traffic stops. Thus, the distinction drawn by the statute violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws because it distinguishes between similarly situated persons, drivers of cars registered in Georgia, on a basis which bears no reasonable relation to the purpose of the statute.
The trial court applied to the statute the holding in Farley v. State, 272 Ga. 432, 434, 531 S.E.2d 100 (2000), that" `[a] legislature may address a problem "one step at a time," or even "select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others." [Cits.]'" However, we were presented in Farley with a situation in which there were two different types of vehicles with different safety records, making it reasonable for the legislature to start with one or to choose a remedy only pertaining to the class of vehicles producing more injuries. This case presents no such dichotomy and the situation governed by the statute at issue here offers no "choice of evils" decision for legislative action. Thus, the difference in treatment of residents and non-residents by OCGA § 40-8-73.1 cannot be justified by the principles stated in Farley. The trial court erred in ruling the statute is constitutional.
2. The unconstitutionality of the statute does not, however, require the grant of the motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the traffic stop. In Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court posed the question This principle was applied in State v. Smith, 652 N.W.2d 546 (Minn.App.2002), where the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's judgment suppressing evidence seized pursuant to an arrest stemming from a traffic stop based on a tinted-window statute which the trial court had declared unconstitutional. The appellate court, assuming the correctness of the ruling on the statute's constitutionality, nonetheless reversed the suppression, quoting DeFillippo, supra, 443 U.S. at 38, 99 S.Ct. 2627:
Police are charged to enforce laws until and unless they are declared unconstitutional. The enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers concerning its constitutionality — with the possible...
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