Ciampi v. Zuczek

• Decision Date: 12 February 2009
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 07-256 S.
• Citation: 598 F.Supp.2d 257
• Parties: David M. CIAMPI, Plaintiff, v. Etsuko Motoki ZUCZEK, in her capacity as Finance Director of the Town of Westerly, Paul Cornia, in his capacity as Superintendent of Water of the Town of Westerly, and Paul Charadio in his capacity as Superintendent of Public Works of the Town of Westerly, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

Page 257

598 F.Supp.2d 257

David M. CIAMPI, Plaintiff, v. Etsuko Motoki ZUCZEK, in her capacity as Finance Director of the Town of Westerly, Paul Cornia, in his capacity as Superintendent of Water of the Town of Westerly, and Paul Charadio in his capacity as Superintendent of Public Works of the Town of Westerly, Defendants.

C.A. No. 07-256 S.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

February 12, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Elizabeth M. Noonan, Adam M. Ramos, Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C., Providence, RI, for Plaintiff.

John J. Cloherty, III, Pierce, Davis & Perritano, LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM E. SMITH, District Judge.

In this action, the Plaintiff, David Ciampi, seeks to hold the Town of Westerly liable for the presence of a rain water drainage ditch on his property and for installing and maintaining an underground waterline across another portion of his property.

The Town has moved for summary judgment arguing it has acquired a prescriptive easement over the drainage ditch and disclaiming any ownership responsibility for the waterline. Because material issues of fact are still in dispute surrounding the creation of the drainage ditch, summary judgment on this issue is denied. There are no material facts in dispute, however, with respect to Plaintiffs claims relating to the waterline, procedural and substantive due process, and indemnity. Thus, the Town's motion on these counts is granted.

I. Background

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff pled a total of six counts: eminent domain (Count I);¹ violations of procedural and substantive due process, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts II & III); and state law claims for trespass, unjust enrichment and indemnification (Counts IV-VI). This action was originally commenced in Rhode Island Superior Court. After Plaintiff amended his complaint almost one year later, Defendants successfully removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

Plaintiff's property is located at 486 Atlantic Avenue, Westerly, Rhode Island. The parcel is approximately a quarter acre in size and is sandwiched between Block Island Sound and Winnapaug Pond. During periods of heavy rain, Atlantic Avenue, the main road running east to west directly in front of the property, floods and becomes impassible. To alleviate the potential for flooding, the Town has constructed drainage ditches or swaleways that are designed to channel water off Atlantic Avenue in the direction of Winnapaug Pond.

Plaintiff first visited the unimproved property in August of 2000. Shortly thereafter, he entered into a written purchase and sale agreement with the owner, the Caroline G. Turco Family Trust² and began obtaining the necessary permits required to build a house on the property.

During an inspection by his engineer, Plaintiff discovered one of the Town's unrecorded drainage ditches obscured underneath the property's dense vegetation. The ditch traversed northeast from the western edge of the property to the northern property boundary.³ It is undisputed that the Town created this ditch long before Plaintiff took title to the land. There is, however, a great deal of dispute as to exactly when it was created.⁴

Despite the presence of the ditch, Plaintiff moved forward with the closing, took title to the property on December 18, 2003, and began construction of a summer/vacation house. While building a fence, contractors discovered an unrecorded subterranean waterline running north to south through the property. No easements for subterranean waterlines are recorded on the property.

Further investigation revealed that the two-inch waterline connected two of the Plaintiff's neighbors to the Town watermain on Atlantic Avenue. Town records indicate the waterline was installed sometime in 1959. While the records do not reveal who installed the waterline, it is the Town's long-standing practice to only run waterlines up to the border of private property. From there it is the responsibility of each property owner to extend the line to his or her home. The Town vehemently denies that it had anything to do with the installation of the waterline on Plaintiff's property and maintains that it is not responsible for it.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 959 (1st Cir.1997).

An issue of fact is "genuine" if it "may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party," id. at 960, and an issue of fact is "material" "only when it possesses the capacity, if determined as the nonmovant wishes, to alter the outcome of the lawsuit under the applicable legal tenets." Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 253 (1st Cir.1996).

Initially, the moving party must show "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). If established, the nonmoving party must present facts that demonstrate a genuine trialworthy issue remains. Cadle, 116 F.3d at 960. This burden can be satisfied by presenting "enough competent evidence to enable a finding favorable to the nonmoving party." Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116 (1st Cir.1993).

A nonmoving party must beware that "establishing a genuine issue of material fact requires more than effusive rhetoric and optimistic surmise." Cadle, 116 F.3d at 960. "If the evidence [adduced in opposition to the motion] is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). It is never sufficient to offer "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Id. (quoting Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990)).

III. Analysis

A. Waterline Claims

Plaintiffs claims for trespass and unjust enrichment, as set forth in Counts IV and V of the amended complaint, are premised on the presence of both the drainage ditch and the waterline. Since the waterline and the ditch were created independently the Court will consider them separately. For the reasons explained below, summary judgment is only appropriate on the waterline aspects of Counts IV and V.

To sustain an action for trespass in Rhode Island, a plaintiff must show that a defendant entered his property. Ferreira v. Strack, 652 A.2d 965, 969 (R.I. 1995); Berberian v. Avery, 99 R.I. 77, 205 A.2d 579, 581-82 (1964) (citing Mosby v. Goff, 21 R.I. 494, 44 A. 930 (1899)). The only objective evidence Plaintiff offers to support his claim that the Town entered onto his property and installed the waterline is the fact that the waterline connects to a shutoff valve before it splits off to connect two of Plaintiffs neighbors, and that the pipe is two-inches in diameter as opposed to one-inch. Plaintiff contends that a two-inch pipe is more consistent with a municipal application as opposed to a private use, but concedes he has no knowledge as to whether two-inch pipe was the standard in 1959, let alone who installed the line.⁵

The Town, on the other hand, produced evidence that its long and established practice is not to install pipes on private property unless the person requesting service is the land owner, or has an easement. Further, pipes on private property are ordinarily the responsibility of the land owner, and the Town is only responsible for water service lines that run from the water main to the border of private property. Plaintiff attempts to rebut this evidence with the fact that at least once in the Town's history a waterline was run improperly across a landowner's property. However, nothing in the record suggests that is what happened in this case and to infer otherwise is to engage in rank speculation.

Thus, because Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence to suggest there is a genuine issue as to whether the Town installed the waterline on Plaintiff's property, summary judgment in favor of the Defendants is appropriate.

Plaintiffs claim for unjust enrichment based on the presence of the waterline must meet the same fate as the trespass claim. To recover for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must prove (1) that a benefit was conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff, (2) that the defendant has an appreciation for such benefit, and (3) that the defendant accepted the benefit in such a way that it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for it. Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Carbone, 898 A.2d 87, 99 (R.I.2006); see also Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 673 (R.I.1997). However, "[s]imply conferring a benefit ... is not sufficient to establish a claim for unjust enrichment. `The most significant requirement ... is that the enrichment to the defendant be unjust.'" R & B Elec. Co. v. Amco Const. Co., 471 A.2d 1351, 1356 (R.I.1984) (quoting Paschall's, Inc. v. Dozier, 219 Tenn. 45, 407 S.W.2d 150, 155 (1966)).

In this case, there is no evidence to suggest the Town wrongfully accepted a benefit. This case stands in stark contrast to those cases where a defendant blatantly and wrongfully enriches himself at the expense of a plaintiff. See e.g. Narragansett, 898 A.2d at 99 (liability under theory of unjust enrichment held proper where defendants illegally had bypassed the electric company's billing meter). Even though Town water passes through the pipe and the Town derives...