Ciardelli v. Rindal

• Decision Date: 20 August 1998
• Docket Number: No. C6-97-173,C6-97-173
• Citation: 582 N.W.2d 910
• Parties: Brigitte CIARDELLI, Respondent, v. Donald Bradley RINDAL, D.D.S., et al., petitioners, Appellants.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 910

582 N.W.2d 910

Brigitte CIARDELLI, Respondent, v. Donald Bradley RINDAL, D.D.S., et al., petitioners, Appellants.

No. C6-97-173.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 20, 1998.

Syllabus by the Court

On the particular facts of this case, a dentist's reauthorization of a prescription constituted neither a "single act" nor the continuation of "treatment" for purposes of the statute of limitations governing a patient's medical malpractice claim. In granting summary judgment for the defendants, the district court properly held that the patient's claim was not commenced timely.

Reversed.

Gregory P. Bulinski, Charles E. Lundberg, Bassford, Lockhart, Truesdell & Briggs, P.A., Minneapolis, for Appellants.

Timothy P. McCarthy, Jeffrey D. Bores, Chestnut & Brooks, P.A., Minneapolis, for Respondent.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

TOMLJANOVICH, Justice.

Respondent Brigitte Ciardelli sued the appellants, Dr. Donald Rindal and HealthPartners (then Group Health Inc.), for dental malpractice in December 1995, alleging that Rindal failed to recommend surgery to correct and/or halt the progress of Ciardelli's temporomandibular joint dysfunction (TMJD). The main issue before us is whether a doctor's authorization of a prescription refill constitutes a part of "continuing treatment" for purposes of the statute of limitations governing medical malpractice claims. On the particular facts of this case, we conclude that it does not.

Ciardelli first consulted Rindal, a dentist in HealthPartners' Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Clinic, on May 20, 1986. Ciardelli suffered from pain, clicking, and locking in her jaw. Rindal diagnosed temporomandibular joint dysfunction (TMJD)--specifically, "right, [possibly] late stage internal derangement with locking." Over the next seven and one-half years, Rindal administered a conservative course of treatment, prescribing medications, physical therapy, and several orthotic devices for Ciardelli's condition. He ordered imaging studies in March 1992 and an MRI in September 1992.

In April 1992, Rindal prescribed physical therapy and Motrin to alleviate Ciardelli's increasing pain. From April 1992 to May 1993, Ciardelli had the Motrin prescription filled five times; each bottle contained 90 800-milligram tablets. When Ciardelli last visited Rindal, on December 29, 1992, she told him she had been taking the Motrin only when necessary to control her pain. Rindal recommended that Ciardelli continue taking the medication as needed and continue physical therapy. According to the treatment plan, a surgical consultation would have been the next step if these measures did not alleviate Ciardelli's symptoms. Rindal asked Ciardelli to return for an examination in six to eight weeks; however, she did not return.

On December 8, 1993, when Ciardelli sought another refill of the Motrin prescription, the pharmacy contacted Rindal for authorization. Rindal did not speak with Ciardelli; he simply authorized another prescription for one fill and one refill of the Motrin.

Ciardelli commenced this malpractice action on December 4, 1995, by effecting personal service of process on Rindal and HealthPartners. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01. This was nearly three years after her last appointment with Rindal but just under two years from the date he authorized the last prescription for Motrin.

Ciardelli's main expert witness, Dr. Thomas Keane, would testify that Rindal deviated from the accepted standard of care by: (1) failing to "obtain TMJ imaging studies as soon as possible following the clinical presentation of symptoms consistent with TMJD"; (2) not recommending surgical intervention in 1986 or 1987, when Keane surmises Ciardelli's condition was at Stage II or III; and (3) not consulting with, or referring Ciardelli to, a TMJD specialist qualified to manage her care. Keane avers that because of Rindal's inaction, Ciardelli has sustained severe, permanent injury to her temporomandibular joints, has had to undergo surgery, and likely will experience continued degeneration.

In granting Rindal's motion for summary judgment, the district court held that Rindal's treatment of Ciardelli terminated as of her last visit to his office. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, holding that treatment did not terminate until Rindal authorized the last prescription. See Ciardelli v. Rindal, 565 N.W.2d 465, 468 (Minn.App.1997). We granted Rindal's petition for further review to decide whether Ciardelli's action is time-barred.

On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, this court reviews the record to determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the district court erred in applying the law. See Offerdahl v. University of Minn Hosps. & Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn.1988). The court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted. See id. "Where there are disputed questions of material fact as to whether a plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitations, these questions are to be decided by a jury." Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn.1982).

I.

Under Minnesota law, medical malpractice claims must be commenced within two years of the accrual of the cause of action. See Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1) (1996) (amended 1997). "Alleged negligence coupled with the alleged resulting damage is the gravamen in deciding the date when the cause of action accrues." Offerdahl, 426 N.W.2d at 429. Ordinarily, this means that "[t]he cause of action accrues when the physician's treatment for the particular condition ceases." Grondahl, 318 N.W.2d at 243. However, when the allegedly negligent conduct is comprised of a single act, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time the plaintiff sustains damage from that act, absent fraudulent concealment. See Offerdahl, 426 N.W.2d at 428-29.

Rindal argues that the "single act exception" bars Ciardelli's malpractice claim. A discrete act of negligence by a medical professional falls within the single act exception when "it was complete at [a] precise time [and] no continued course of treatment could either cure or relieve it." Swang v. Hauser, 288 Minn. 306, 309, 180 N.W.2d 187, 190 (1970). For example, we held that the statute of limitations began to run on the date a plaintiff sustained damage from an intrauterine device (IUD), the risks of which she claimed were not disclosed to her by the defendant doctor when the IUD was inserted. See Offerdahl, 426 N.W.2d at 429. Specifically, the plaintiff "sustained damage * * * when she was hospitalized for [pelvic inflammatory disease] and the * * * IUD was removed." Id.; see also Murray v. Fox, 300 Minn. 373, 376, 220 N.W.2d 356, 358 (1974).

Rindal observes that Ciardelli's expert, Keane, would testify that surgery should have been performed in 1986 or 1987. Hence, Rindal argues, his failure to obtain imaging studies promptly, recommend surgery, and refer Ciardelli to a specialist was a single, irreversible act that occurred in 1986 or, at the latest, 1987. The court of appeals rejected this contention, see Ciardelli, 565 N.W.2d at 467, as do we.

When read in the light most favorable to Ciardelli, the complaint asserts a pattern of negligence spanning the entire period of her treatment with Rindal. Thus, "it is most difficult to determine the precise time" of the negligence. Swang, 288 Minn. at 309, 180 N.W.2d at 189. While Keane might testify that surgery should have been performed in 1986 or 1987, when he surmises Ciardelli's TMJD was at Stage II or Stage III, it does not necessarily follow that surgery at Stage IV would have been fruitless in preventing at least some of the permanent damage that Ciardelli claims to have suffered. Because it is not clear when "the alleged resulting damage" occurred, Offerdahl, 426 N.W.2d at 429, the single act exception does not apply.

II.

Ciardelli maintains--and the court of appeals agreed--that the course of treatment continued up until December 1993, when Rindal authorized a renewal of the Motrin prescription. See Ciardelli, 565 N.W.2d at 468. We have stated that "[t]he statute of limitations will be extended when a doctor's negligence is part of a continuing course of treatment, such as when a doctor consistently fails to properly treat a fracture." Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn.1993). There are "three factors to be considered in determining when treatment ceases: (1) whether there is a relationship between physician and patient with regard to the illness; (2) whether the physician is attending and examining the patient; and (3) whether there is something more to be done." Grondahl, 318 N.W.2d at 243 (citing Schmit v. Esser, 183 Minn. 354, 358-59, 236 N.W. 622, 625 (1931)).

In Grondahl, we decided that summary judgment for the defendant was improper where the plaintiff asserted that she had consulted the doctor by telephone after her last office appointment with him. See Grondahl, 318 N.W.2d at 244. ¹ The plaintiff commenced suit more than two years after the last office visit but within two years of her last telephone call to the doctor. Id. at 242. Under those circumstances, the court determined, a jury applying the three-factor test "might reasonably conclude" that the doctor did not cease treating the plaintiff until the date of their last telephone conversation, which took place less than two years before the plaintiff filed suit. Id. at 244; see also Noland v. Freeman, 344 N.W.2d 419, 420 (Minn.1984) (holding that summary judgment was improper where the parties disputed whether the plaintiff's last office visit related to the allegedly negligent surgery).

We do not think a jury reasonably could conclude that Rindal's treatment of Ciardelli's TMJD continued until he reauthorized the Motrin prescription. There cannot be a "relationship between physician and patient" when the physician cannot "attend[ ] and examin[e] the...