Cid v. South Dakota Dept. of Social Services, 20846
| Decision Date | 01 June 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 20846,20846 |
| Citation | 1999 SD 108,598 N.W.2d 887 |
| Parties | Carlos CID and Medarda Cid, Appellants, v. SOUTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Appellee. . Considered on Briefs |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Roberto A. Lange of Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for appellants.
Mark Barnett, Attorney General, Anthony M. Sanchez, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for appellee.
¶1 In this appeal, we affirm the decision of the Department of Social Services (DSS), which terminated certain welfare benefits to a legal resident alien, and hold that the denial of such benefits does not violate a provision of the South Dakota Constitution, which prevents a distinction between resident aliens and citizens in reference to property.
¶2 Carlos Cid, who is of Chilean ancestry, has worked in the United States since 1979 and is a naturalized United States citizen. In 1994, he married Medarda Lagang, a Filipino, who at the time of the marriage had a son, Kevin. The marriage was performed in Puerto Rico where Medarda and Kevin continued to reside until they entered the United States in December 1996. They are recognized as legal resident aliens with social security status.
¶3 In 1997, shortly after he suffered a heart attack which required him to undergo corrective heart surgery, Cid applied for certain welfare benefits for himself and his family. 1 DSS regulations in place at the time permitted the entire family to receive certain benefits. 2 However, the passage of the Welfare Reform Act in 1996 3 prompted DSS to promulgate new rules. The new rules were implemented in September 1997 and included changes in the regulations regarding the eligibility of resident aliens for certain welfare benefits.
¶4 In October 1997 DSS notified Cid that the change of regulations would affect the family's receipt of welfare benefits. The notice stated as follows:
Effective November 1, 1997, Medarda L. Cid and Kevin Lagang will no longer be eligible for TANF, medicaid, and food stamps as they do not meet eligibility requirements for aliens. 67:10:01:07 and 67:10:01:08.
¶5 Cid challenged the termination and DSS reversed the denial of certain welfare benefits to Kevin. However, it determined that the termination of Medarda's benefits was proper. Cid and Medarda (Cids) appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the DSS decision.
¶6 From that decision Cids appeal, raising the following issues:
1. Whether the termination and denial of certain welfare benefits by DSS to Medarda Cid due to her status as a resident alien violate Article VI, § 14 of the South Dakota Constitution.
2. Whether the termination and denial of certain welfare benefits to Medarda Cid due to her status as a resident alien violate equal protection principles under the United States and South Dakota Constitutions.
3. Whether the reliance of DSS on conformity with federal law in revising state regulations and in terminating welfare benefits to Medarda Cid justifies or excuses the violation of Article IV, § 14 of the South Dakota Constitution.
¶7 1. The termination and denial of certain welfare benefits to Medarda Cid due to her status as a resident alien did not violate Article VI, § 14 of the South Dakota Constitution.
¶8 This appeal presents us with our first opportunity to interpret Article VI, § 14 of the South Dakota Constitution. It provides:
No distinction shall ever be made by law between resident aliens and citizens, in reference to the possession, enjoyment or descent of property.
¶9 Cids argue that DSS violated this provision when it denied Medarda certain welfare benefits. They claim that she possessed a property interest in such benefits; therefore, a distinction in law was made based upon her status as a resident alien. We disagree.
¶10 When determining the meaning of a constitutional provision, we must "give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it." Poppen v. Walker, 520 N.W.2d 238, 242 (S.D.1994) (citing Schomer v. Scott, 65 S.D. 353, 358, 274 N.W. 556, 559 (1937); State v. Jorgenson, 81 S.D. 447, 455-56, 136 N.W.2d 870, 875 (1965)). This Court "has the right to construe a constitutional provision in accordance with what it perceives to be its plain meaning." Id. (citing State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425, 428 (S.D.1984)). If the words and language of the provision are unambiguous, "the language in the constitution must be applied as it reads." In re Janklow, 530 N.W.2d 367, 370 (S.D.1995) (citing Levasseur v. Wheeldon, 79 S.D. 442, 112 N.W.2d 894 (1962)). However, "[i]f the meaning of a term is unclear, the Court may look to the intent of the drafting body." Poppen, 520 N.W.2d at 242 (citing Cummings v. Mickelson, 495 N.W.2d 493, 499 (S.D.1993)).
¶11 In determining whether Article VI, § 14 is ambiguous, as it relates to this litigation, we must ascertain whether the term "property" is susceptible to more than one meaning. See Poppen, 520 N.W.2d at 242. Clearly, such is the case. "Property" has been defined as "a quality or trait belonging and ... peculiar to an individual or thing." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 916 (1979). It has also been defined as "something owned or possessed" and as "something to which a person has a legal title." Id. In addition, the definition includes "that which belongs exclusively to one" and "everything which is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal." Black's Law Dictionary 1216 (6th Ed.1990).
¶12 Further, this Court has previously interpreted the term "property" in Article XI of the South Dakota Constitution by examining the framers' intent. See National Surety Co. v. Starkey, 41 S.D. 356, 360-61, 170 N.W. 582, 583 (1919) ( Article XI, § 7 of the South Dakota Constitution); Ewert v. Taylor, 38 S.D. 124, 158, 160 N.W. 797, 808 (1916) (). We found "property" to mean "the thing of which there may be ownership as distinguished from the right to possess and use the thing." Ewert, 38 S.D. at 141, 160 N.W. at 801. We concluded that such definition included "everything of value, tangible or intangible, capable of being the subject of individual right or ownership." Nat'l Surety, 41 S.D. at 360, 170 N.W. at 583. However, we also recognized that the definition had limitations and could not be all encompassing. See id. at 364-65, 170 N.W. at 585 (). We find such limitation exists here.
¶13 With the definition so limited and the obvious ambiguity of the term, it is clear that we cannot "apply the language as it reads." See Janklow, 530 N.W.2d at 370 (citation omitted). We must then look to the intent of the drafting body to determine the provision's meaning. See Poppen, 520 N.W.2d at 242 (citation omitted).
¶14 We recognize that the language of Article VI, § 14 has remained constant since its adoption, 4 and the provision has never been amended. 5 Therefore, when examining the constitutional framers' intent, we cannot accept that, in a provision that predates statehood, the intended meaning of "property" included certain benefits from welfare programs that were enacted nearly one-half century later. 6 To expand the framers' language and use of the term to include an interest in welfare benefits would simply be too great a stretch to make, and we refuse to expand the term's definition in such a way. Thus, we conclude that the denial and termination of certain welfare benefits to Medarda Cid did not violate Article VI, § 14 of the South Dakota Constitution.
¶15 2. The termination and denial of certain welfare benefits to Medarda Cid due to her status as a resident alien did not violate equal protection principles under either the United States or South Dakota Constitutions.
¶16 Cids point to South Dakota Administrative Rule 67:10:01:08 and the Welfare Reform Act as violative of the equal protection clause. The rule provides that "[a] qualified alien is ineligible for assistance under this article for five years unless the alien meets the requirements contained in Pub.L. 104-193, 402(b)(2) (110 Stat. 2264) (August 22, 1996)." 7 Cids claim that, because the rule denies benefits to certain resident aliens like Medarda, while allowing other resident aliens to obtain benefits, it violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and South Dakota Constitutions. 8 We disagree.
¶17 Cids claim that classifications based upon nationality and alienage are inherently suspect; therefore, they are subject to strict scrutiny analysis. They rely on Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971), to support their claim. In Graham, the United States Supreme Court reviewed two state statutes to determine whether such statutes violated the equal protection clause: (1) an Arizona statute that required citizenship or a residency period of fifteen years as a prerequisite to receiving certain benefits; and (2) a Pennsylvania statute that extended benefits only to United States citizens. Id. at 367-68, 91 S.Ct. at 1849-50, 29 L.Ed.2d at 539. The statutes were inconsistent with national policy and law and placed additional burdens upon those subject to their provisions. 9 Id. at 376-77, 91 S.Ct. at 1854, 29 L.Ed.2d at 544. The Supreme Court has long recognized that states are prohibited from adding to, or taking from, "conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States or the several states." Id. at 378, 91 S.Ct. at 1855, 29 L.Ed.2d at 545 (quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419, 68 S.Ct. 1138, 1142, 92...
To continue reading
Request your trial