Cieszynski v. Franklin Corp.

• Decision Date: 20 February 1964
• Docket Number: No. 135903,135903
• Citation: 25 Conn.Supp. 342,203 A.2d 676
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Gene M. CIESZYNSKI v. FRANKLIN CORPORATION et al.

Page 676

203 A.2d 676

25 Conn.Supp. 342

Gene M. CIESZYNSKI v. FRANKLIN CORPORATION et al.

No. 135903.

Superior Court of Connecticut, Hartford County.

Feb. 20, 1964.

Lexton, Januszewski & McQuillan, New Britain, for plaintiff.

Regnier, Moller & Taylor, Hartford, for all defendants.

HOUSE, Judge.

This complaint is in two counts, the first directed against Smith-Holden, Inc., alleged to be the lessee of the premises at 325 Murphy Road, Hartford, and the second against Franklin Corporation, alleged to be the lessor of the said premises. In brief, it is alleged that the lessee held a reception on the leased premises which the plaintiff attended as a business guest, and that 'while walking from the defendant's business establishment to her parked vehicle,' she fell and sustained injuries on a raised asphalt curbing.

The first count, directed against the lessee, makes no allegations whatsoever as to the place where the plaintiff fell except that it was 'while walking from the defendant's business establishment to her parked vehicle.' There is no allegation that the fall occurred upon the leased premises or on premises in any way whatsoever owned, controlled or leased by the lessee defendant.

The second count, directed against the lessor, does allege that the defendant Franklin Corporation was the owner of the premises known as 325 Murphy Road, which it leased to Smith-Holden, Inc., and that the plaintiff 'while on said premises as a business-invitee' was caused to fall. Here there is an allegation that the lessor corporation against whom the second count is directed owned the premises on which the plaintiff fell, although there is no allegation that the defendant lessor retained any control whatsoever over the leased premises.

The defendant lessee corporation has demurred to the first count, which is directed solely against that corporation, in so far as the allegations of negligence in paragraphs 4(b), 4(c) and 4(e) are concerned. Paragraph 4(b) alleges, in substance, that the lessee defendant failed to provide adequate parking facilities for the business-invitees 'and/or' an attendant to direct traffic for the party guests. Paragraph 4(c) alleges that although the defendant lessee knew or should have known that the street parking facilities were inadequate for the number of guests it had invited, it failed to provide signs indicating parking facilities in the rear. Paragraph 4(e) alleges, that knowing that the guests would use a parking area adjoining the leased premises, the defendant lessee nevertheless failed to provide any lighting facilities for its own premises or the adjoining premises. To each of these separate paragraphs the defendant lessee has demurred because none of them sets out any duty in law owed by this defendant to the plaintiff.

The defendant lessor corporation also demurs to the second count because there is no allegation of control on the part of the lessor corporation, nor is there 'any valid standard of care * * * [by] the owner of totally demises premises' as claimed in paragraph 1 of the first count, nor are there duties 'as set forth in paragraph 3 of said count' which are required of an owner in the position of this defendant.

Of course, a demurrer admits the allegations of the complaint for the purpose of testing that pleading as a matter of law, and the allegations must be given the same favorable construction that a trier would give them in admitting evidence. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. General Electric Co., 148 Conn 693, 697, 174 A.2d 298; Arsenault v. General Electric Co., 147 Conn. 130, 132, 157 A.2d 918.

'Negligence occurs where one under a duty to exercise a certain degree of care to avoid injury to others fails to do so.' Dean v. Hershowitz, 119 Conn. 398, 407, 177 A. 262, 266. The burden is upon the plaintiff to allege and prove a breach of a duty by the defendant in order to establish a basis for recovery. Attardo v. Ambriscoe, 147 Conn. 708, 711, 166 A.2d 458. One of the basic principles inherent in our procedure is that 'in any action the complainant is required to set forth facts upon the basis of which, if true, he may be able to establish in law a right to relief, for, unless that is done, the pleading is demurrable, City of Waterbury v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 86 Conn. 180 , * * *.' Zamatha v. Harak, 134 Conn. 480, 483, 58 A.2d 704, 706.

The respective duties of landlords and tenants to third persons who come onto demised premises have been many times defined in recent cases, starting with the decision in Webel v. Yale University, 125 Conn. 515, 7 A.2d 215, 123 A.L.R. 863; see Torre v. DeRenzo, 143 Conn. 302, 122 A.2d 25; Hahn v. Musante, Berman & Steinberg & Co., 130 Conn. 441, 35 A.2d 201; Corrigan v. Antupit, 131 Conn. 71, 37 A.2d 697; see also Wright, Conn.Law of Torts § 54; 2 Stevenson, Negligence in the Atlantic States § 494. These all clearly demonstrate that a necessary condition precedent to the...