Hahn v. Musante

• Decision Date: 15 December 1943
• Citation: 130 Conn. 441,35 A.2d 201
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: HAHN v. MUSANTE, BERMAN & STEINBERG & CO., Inc.

130 Conn. 441

35 A.2d 201

HAHN

v.MUSANTE, BERMAN & STEINBERG & CO., Inc.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 15, 1943.

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Comley, Judge.

Action by Ella Hahn against Musante, Berman & Steinberg & Company, Inc., for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant and tried to the jury. Verdict and judgment for defendant, and appeal by plaintiff.

Error, and case remanded, with directions.

David Goldstein, of Bridgeport, and Leo Nevas, of Westport (John F. Holian, of Bridgeport, on the brief), for appellant.

John Keogh, Jr., of So. Norwalk, and Frank J. Culhane, of Danbury (John Keogh, of So. Norwalk, on the brief), for appellee.

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS, and DICKENSON, JJ.

MALTBIE, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff brought this action to recover for injuries suffered when she fell just inside the entrance to a building leased by the defendant to the state of Connecticut for use as a public office in administering unemployment compensation. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant, and from the court's denial of a motion to set that verdict aside the plaintiff has appealed. The question then is, Was there evidence before the jury upon which they could reasonably find facts furnishing a basis for holding the defendant liable?

The jury could have found these facts: On June 9, 1939, the state entered into a written lease of the building for a period of two years from July 1, 1939, at a monthly rental of $100. The lease contained an agreement that the defendant, before that day, would make certain repairs and alterations in accordance with plans and specifications submitted by the state, and this was done. It also contained a covenant that the state would not ‘assign this lease, nor underlet a part or the whole of said leased premises, nor make alterations in said leased premises, nor use the same for any purpose but that hereinbefore authorized, without written permission from’ the defendant, with a further provision that if the state violated this covenant the lease would thereupon terminate. It also contained a provision giving the state an option to entend the lease for a further period of two years or any part thereof on the same terms and conditions, provided notice was given thirty days before the termination of the tenancy; but there was no evidence that such a notice was given. On August 22, 1941, a further written lease of the premises for a period of two years from July 1, 1941, was executed. This lease contained the same provisions as the first one except that it omitted the agreement by the defendant to make repairs and alterations.

During the occupancy of the building by the state, a large number of persons were continually visiting the office in connection with unemployment compensation. The building had two entrances. At first the door within which the plaintiff fell was used as an exit, but from a time a few months before the accident it was used principally for entrance to the building. The threshold of this door was higher than the level of the floor of the office. Some time before the accident the defendant had sent a carpenter to the premises who constructed just inside the door a platform about four feet square, with its top five or six inches above the floor of the office and with railings along the sides at right angles to the door but with the side opposite the door left open for use in stepping from the platform to the floor. Thereafter several people stumbled in stepping down, although a sign giving warning of the step had been posted. A representative of the defendant was informed of this; the assistant manager of the office suggested to him that the entrance be changed so as to eliminate the need of stepping down after entering the building; and another member of the office staff suggested the substitution of a ramp for the platform. The defendant sent a carpenter to the premises who changed the railings of the platform so that there was one across the side opposite the door but none on the right of the entrance, and persons entering the building would cross the platform and step down on that side. People continued, however, to stumble in stepping down to the floor. The attention of the defendant's representative was called to this fact two or three weeks before the accident occurred, and he said he would remedy conditions. Some time after July 1, 1941, the defendant caused a ramp to be built in place of the platform. On that day the plaintiff had occasion to visit the office in connection with a claim for unemployment compensation. She entered the door, turned to the right, took two or three steps and, stepping off the edge of the platform, fell to the floor. The defendant concedes in its brief that the entrance to the room was adequately lighted.

In Webel v. Yale University, 125 Conn. 515, 7 A.2d 215, 123 A. L. R. 863, note, 870, the plaintiff fell on premises leased by the defendant for a beauty shop by reason of the fact that the floor of a room which she was leaving was some seven inches higher than that of the room which she was entering, and we adopted and applied the doctrine that, where a landowner leases premises for a purpose which involves the fact that people will come into them as the invitees of the tenant, there are conditions upon the premises which are likely to cause injury to such persons and the landowner knows or should know that the tenant cannot reasonably be expected to remedy these conditions or guard against danger from them, the landlord may be liable for injuries suffered by reason of them. The trial court, in directing the verdict, held that the doctrine there advanced did not apply in this...