Cilibrasi v. Reiter

• Decision Date: 11 April 1951
• Citation: 103 Cal.App.2d 397,229 P.2d 394
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: CILIBRASI v. REITER et al. Civ. 18326.

Page 394

229 P.2d 394

103 Cal.App.2d 397

CILIBRASI v. REITER et al.

Civ. 18326.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

April 11, 1951.

Theodore A. Epstein, Burbank, for appellant.

Moss, Lyon & Dunn and Gerold C. Dunn, all of Los Angeles, Henry F. Walker, Los Angeles, of counsel, for respondents.

MOORE, Presiding Justice.

Appellant while she was an employee of a tenant of respondents sued the latter for injuries received while using the rest room of the landlords. The answer included a special plea that for $1000 paid to the plaintiff she had compromised her claim and executed a full release of the defendants from all liability. Such plea having been established to the satisfaction of the trial court, Code Civ.Proc. sec. 597, judgment was entered against appellant, denying recovery.

On this appeal it is contended that by virtue of SECTION 3859 OF THE LABOR CODE¹ such release is void by reason of the fact that it was executed without the written consent of appellant's employer; that solely by virtue of the subrogation provisions of the Labor Code an employee is limited to one recovery and the employer may recover his damages where the employee was injured by the negligence of the third party. After she had settled her claim against respondents, appellant filed against her employer before the Industrial Accident Commission and an award was made against him and his insurance carrier. The employer received credit for the $1000 paid by respondents.

May plaintiff now sue respondents on the identical claim for which they paid her $1000 and took her total release? She can not do so for two good reasons, namely, (1) she did not rescind her contract of release and (2) the statute which she asserts to be determinative of the nullity of the release is violative of constitutional provisions if interpreted as urged by appellant.

It is a familiar principle of adjective law that in the absence of the rescission of a contract of settlement of a claim for personal injuries accomplished according to law, and of a restoration of the consideration paid for the release of the claim the release of the tort feasor is a valid contract and prevents recovery on the disputed claim. Garcia v. California Truck Co., 183 Cal. 767, 769, 192 P. 708; State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Thackery, 132 Cal.App. 10, 14, 22 P.2d 250. Compromises of claims are often made on the basis of buying peace and prove no more than that a dispute existed. Rich v. Edison Electric Company, 18 Cal.App. 354, 358, 123 P. 230; 15 C.J.S., Compromise and Settlement, § 22, page 737. But there is no principle known to the law whereby a claimant who has been dealt with fairly may ignore her solemn covenants once made with her antagonists and recover again for the same injuries. Wherever such second recovery has been allowed it was upset on appeal. Appellant's claim was extinguished by her contract of settlement as completely as if she had accepted the money in payment of a judgment for her injuries. To allow her recovery in this action would be contrary to both law and good morals. It would place a premium upon the dishonest practice of the employee who effects a settlement of his claim against a party other than his employer and then obtains an award from the Industrial Accident Commission, to be followed by a court action against the same third party on the identical account. San Bernardino County v. Industrial Accident Commission, 217 Cal. 618, 626, 20 P.2d 673.

The law favors settlement of legal controversies. Armstrong v. Sacramento Valley R. Co., 179 Cal. 648, 650, 178 P. 516. If appellant was dissatisfied with her contract of settlement, and if she had been the victim of fraud or other overreaching by respondents, the courts were open for the enforcement of a rescission and to obtain such recovery as the law would warrant. But it was not void by virtue of section 3859, Labor Code. To hold that the language of that statute means that such a settlement of a claim as was made by appellant is void would be to construe the statute contrary to the legislative intent. When a statute is susceptible of two constructions, it is the duty of a court to give it such interpretation as will avoid confusion and absurdity and to adopt that which is consistent with sound reason and good morals. State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Thackery, supra. By giving a rational interpretation to the section as a part of a far-reaching enactment designed not to deprive citizens of traditional rights vouchsafed by the federal and state constitutions but to enlarge the rights of industrial workers, the statute cannot be so interpreted as to render void a release contract executed by a workman in favor of the asserted tort feasor.

The Section is Void as Construed by Appellant.

The statutes relating to workmens' compensation derive their validity from section 21, Article XX of the constitution. That section directs the legislature to enact legislation which would create the employer's liability to make 'adequate provisions for the comfort, health and safety and general welfare of any and all workmen and those dependent upon them for support to the extent of relieving from the consequences of any injury or death incurred or sustained by workmen in the course of their employment,' etc., regardless of the cause of the death or injury. Nothing in section 21 or in the act adopted pursuant thereto was intended to place restrictions upon an employed workman's enforcement of his claims against another who is not his employer. Section 21 was essential to the validity of the contemplated act. Without that section the Employer's Liability Act would have been invalidated by the doctrine of freedom of contract which is ingrained in all organic laws. Such act was adopted as the expression of this state's policy for preserving the manpower of the toiling masses and to minimize the losses resulting to them in industry. Insofar as any section of the Labor Code attempts to coerce an industrial employee or his dependent to deast from making contracts with others who...