Cincinnati v. Ohio Council 8, Am. Fedn. of State, Cty. & Mun. Emp., AFL-CIO

• Decision Date: 09 February 1994
• Docket Number: No. C-920542,AFL-CIO,C-920542
• Citation: 638 N.E.2d 94,93 Ohio App.3d 162
• Parties: City of CINCINNATI, Appellant, v. OHIO COUNCIL 8, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES,, et al., Appellees. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 162

93 Ohio App.3d 162

638 N.E.2d 94

City of CINCINNATI, Appellant, v. OHIO COUNCIL 8, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, et al., Appellees. ^*

No. C-920542.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, First District, Hamilton County.

Decided Feb. 9, 1994.

Fay D. DuPuis, City Sol. and Mark C. Vollman, Cincinnati, for appellant.

Ronald Janetzke and Robert D. Lenhard, Washington, DC, for appellees, Ohio Council 8, American Federation of State, County and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO, and Local Unions 190, 223, 240, 250, 1543, and 3119.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal derives from the trial court's granting of summary judgment for the defendants-appellees, Ohio Council 8 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, and its affiliated local unions ("the union"), in a declaratory judgment action brought by plaintiff-appellant, the city of Cincinnati.

In 1983, the city filed this action seeking a declaration that provisions of the union's collective-bargaining agreements with the city violated Section 4, Article V of the city's charter, proscribing contributions to any political candidate by persons in the city's administrative service. Terms of the bargaining agreements called for the city to deduct portions of each union employee's pay so that the deductions could be contributed to the union's political action committee, PEOPLE. PEOPLE used the funds to support individual partisan political candidates.

Following protracted litigation, in 1991 the Ohio Supreme Court remanded this cause to the court below for determination of substantive issues necessary for the resolution of the city's claim. The issues now pertinent to this appeal are whether in 1981, and in following years, PEOPLE made contributions to state and local political races in Ohio, and whether the city can constitutionally restrict its employees from making voluntary contributions to a union political action committee that does not fund state or local candidates in Ohio, but does fund other non-local races. Cincinnati v. Ohio Council 8, Am. Fedn. of State, Cty. & Mun. Emp., AFL-CIO (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 658, 672, 576 N.E.2d 745, 757.

This action was resolved by the trial court on cross-motions for summary judgment. We have in the past questioned the wisdom of resolving actions for declaratory judgment by summary judgment. In the case on review, however, the parties' stipulation of all the facts before the trial court would seem to answer that concern. The parties' election to address the issues by cross-motions for summary judgment demonstrates that neither side believed that a genuine issue of material fact was in dispute and that the court was free to review the evidentiary fundament and render a decision as a matter of law.

In a document entitled "Final Judgment Entry," the trial court resolved the substantive issues on remand, declared the rights of the parties and entered summary judgment for the union. The court determined that PEOPLE did not make contributions to candidates for city, county or state office in Ohio. Id. at 3. It also held the charter provision barring collection of voluntary political contributions to be unconstitutional. Id. at 6. In two assignments of error, the city contests the trial court's entry of summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In its first assignment of error, the city contends that "the stipulated evidence precludes the trial court's finding that PEOPLE did not make contributions to local political candidates. Such finding is clearly erroneous and against the manifest weight of the evidence." Appellant's Brief at 8. The city essentially argues that when it weighed the stipulated evidence, the trial court incorrectly inferred from the evidence that contributions by PEOPLE to federal congressional races did not qualify as "local" elections even if the congressional district at issue included portions of Cincinnati or Ohio.

The function of summary judgment is to determine from the affidavits and other evidentiary materials if triable factual issues exist. Only after construing the facts most strongly in favor of the party opposing the motion, as required by Civ.R. 56(C), can the trial court enter summary judgment if it appears that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion adverse to the...