Cindy E., In re
| Decision Date | 31 July 1978 |
| Citation | 147 Cal.Rptr. 812,83 Cal.App.3d 393 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In re CINDY E., a person coming under the Juvenile Court Law. PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CINDY E., Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 19526. |
Cindy E., a minor, appeals from orders of the juvenile court declaring her to be a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and committing her to the Youth Guidance Center for 45 days.
On June 14, 1977, the District Attorney of Orange County filed a petition in juvenile court requesting that appellant be declared a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. 1 The petition alleges that on June 12, 1977, appellant willfully and unlawfully took a sweatshirt and wallet containing $145.82 from Jenny H. in violation of Penal Code section 487, subdivision 2 (grand theft).
On July 20, 1977, the district attorney filed another petition making the same request. This petition alleges that on April 16, 1977, appellant willfully and unlawfully bought and received two gold coins that had been stolen, knowing them to be stolen, and concealed and withheld the coins from the owner in violation of Penal Code section 496 (receiving stolen property).
Appellant was 13 years old at the time of both incidents.
A jurisdictional hearing was held on September 13, 1977. The allegations of both petitions were found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, and appellant was declared to be a person described in section 602 () and thus within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. A dispositional hearing was set for October 14, 1977. On that date, appellant, one parent, and her attorney appeared in court only to learn that the matter was set on the calendar for October 19, 1977. At the October 19 hearing, the court declared appellant to be a ward of the court, committed her to the Youth Guidance Center for 45 days, and ordered her to make restitution. Appellant appeals from both the September 13 and October 19 orders.
Appellant contends that the orders of the juvenile court must be reversed because (1) there was no showing that appellant knew the wrongfulness of her acts as required by Penal Code section 26, subdivision One, (2) a photographic identification of appellant was impermissibly suggestive denying her due process of law, (3) the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate wardship due to the passage of time, and (4) there was no express finding that continued custody of appellant by her parents would be detrimental.
A child under the age of 14 must appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct in order to become a ward of the juvenile court under section 602. Penal Code section 26, subdivision One, provides that children under the age of 14 are incapable of committing crimes "in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness."
Appellant contends that the People failed to show that she knew the wrongfulness of her acts, arguing that the law requires the People to prove this fact "beyond a reasonable doubt." Apparently the requisite measure of proof for this matter has not yet been clearly articulated by the courts. Penal Code section 26, subdivision One, speaks in terms of "clear proof"; the cases interpreting that section, while emphasizing that the law requires knowledge of wrongfulness to be clearly demonstrated, have generally merely reiterated the language of the statute without elucidation. 2 (See, e. g., In re R., supra, 1 Cal.3d 855, 83 Cal.Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127; In re Harold M. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 380, 144 Cal.Rptr. 744; In re Tanya L. (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 725, 143 Cal.Rptr. 31; In re Michael B. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 443, 118 Cal.Rptr. 685; In re T. R. S. (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 178, 81 Cal.Rptr. 574; People v. Williams (1936) 12 Cal.App.2d 207, 55 P.2d 223.)
It is unnecessary for us to decide this issue for, even assuming that knowledge of wrongfulness should be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, we must uphold the juvenile court's action. Although the court did not separately state the measure of proof applied to this issue, the record reveals that the court found the allegations in the petitions, which included allegations that appellant had the requisite criminal intent, to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Penal Code section 26, subdivision One, establishes a rebuttable presumption that a child under 14 years of age is incapable of entertaining criminal intent. (See, In re R., supra, 1 Cal.3d 855, 83 Cal.Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127; see generally, Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed. 1969) pp. 836-841.) The factual issue posed by this presumption was specifically brought to the court's attention by the arguments of counsel at the jurisdictional hearing. It is difficult to conceive how the court could be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant actually had criminal intent, if the court was not also equally convinced that appellant had the capacity to have such intent.
The record contains sufficient evidence to support the implied finding that appellant appreciated the wrongfulness of her acts. Appellant was 13 years old at the time she committed the acts alleged in the petitions. A child's age is a basic and important consideration (see, In re R., supra, 1 Cal.3d 855, 83 Cal.Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127), and, as recognized by the common law, it is only reasonable to expect that generally the older a child gets and the closer she approaches the age of 14, the more likely it is that she appreciates the wrongfulness of her acts. 3 (See, In re Harold M., supra, 78 Cal.App.3d 380, 387, 144 Cal.Rptr. 744.)
Regarding the petition alleging that appellant stole a sweatshirt and wallet containing money, the evidence shows that on June 12, 1977, Jenny H. and three other girls, ranging in age from 7 to 10, were leaving a grocery store where, on an errand for Jenny's mother, they had just purchased some items. Jenny had a sweatshirt tied around her waist, and in the pocket of the sweatshirt was her mother's wallet containing about $145. Appellant approached the four girls from the rear on her bicycle, startling them, and said, "Your brother owes me money." The four girls gave varying reasons why that could not be so. Appellant then asked the girls their names and where they lived, and the girls answered. Then, saying "That looks like my sister's sweatshirt that got ripped off," appellant grabbed Jenny's sweatshirt. After a brief tugging match, appellant won the sweatshirt and quickly rode away on her bicycle.
Appellant's expressed displeasure about her sister's sweatshirt being "ripped off" indicates an understanding that ripping off someone's property, as she did to Jenny's sweatshirt, wrongs the rightful owner. Moreover, upon wresting the sweatshirt from Jenny and the other girls, appellant sped away. The conduct and statements of a child during and after the commission of the criminal acts may evidence an awareness of the wrongfulness of the acts (see In re R., supra, 1 Cal.3d 855, 867, 83 Cal.Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127; In re Harold M., supra, 78 Cal.App.3d 380, 388-389, 144 Cal.Rptr. 744; In re Tanya L., supra, 76 Cal.App.3d 725, 729-730, 143 Cal.Rptr. 31), and appellant's flight does just that.
Regarding the petition alleging that appellant received stolen property, i. e., two gold coins, the evidence shows that in March of 1977, 12-year-old Cynthia J. showed appellant her father's coin collection, which was kept in a box in a bedroom closet. Cynthia also told appellant that she and her family would be gone for the Easter vacation. After returning from the vacation, Mr. J. discovered that two gold coins were missing from his collection. Approximately one or two weeks after Easter, appellant sold two gold coins, identical to those stolen from Mr. J., to two employees of a local liquor store, telling them that the coins had been willed to her by her grandfather. Cynthia telephoned appellant, and said that she knew, and a lot of other people knew, that appellant had taken the coins, and asked where they were. Appellant replied that she had sold them to the two liquor store employees. In a later conversation, appellant told Cynthia that while she had sold the coins, she was not the one who originally took them.
Appellant's fabrication of a story to legitimate her possession of the coins to the two store employees indicates an awareness that she had obtained the coins wrongfully. Her attempt to shift some of the blame to others and minimize her own involvement also suggests that she knew that what had happened was wrong.
Appellant complains that using evidence of facts that constitute an element of the crime or of acts performed during the commission of the crime to show knowledge of wrongfulness is "bootstrapping." She suggests that the "clear proof" requirement of Penal Code section 26, subdivision One, imposes an additional burden on the People that cannot be met merely by presenting evidence of the events that gave rise to the petitions. This is said to be the only logical interpretation; since "clear proof" does not relate to the measure of proof (that being "beyond a reasonable doubt" according to appellant), it must define the type or quality of evidence required. Appellant finds support for her argument in the statement in In re R., supra, 1 Cal.3d 855, at page 864, 83 Cal.Rptr. 671, at page 678, 464 P.2d 127, at page 134, that "(a) juvenile court must...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Lewis
... ... is a basic and important consideration [citation], and, as recognized by the common law, it is only reasonable to expect that generally the older a child gets and the closer [he] approaches the age of 14, the more likely it is that [he] appreciates the wrongfulness of [his] acts." ( In re Cindy E. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 393, 399, 147 Cal. Rptr. 812 .) ... Defendant argued both at trial and on appeal that the juvenile file did not disclose the juvenile court's finding that defendant knew the wrongfulness of his conduct pursuant to section 26. Assuming that the juvenile ... ...
- Lewis v. Davis
-
In re James B.
...at p. 298, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 148; see also In re Marven C. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 482, 486-487, 39 Cal. Rptr.2d 354; In re Cindy E. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 393, 398-399, 147 Cal.Rptr. 812.) The trier of fact, not the appellate court, must be convinced of the minor's guilt, and if the circumstances......
- People v. J.E. (In re J.E.)