Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp. v. Brown
| Decision Date | 23 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:13-cv-1232 |
| Parties | CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS REALTY CORP., Plaintiff, v. RONALD BROWN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of Magistrate Judge Terrence P. Kemp's Report & Recommendation (ECF No. 15) and Defendants Ronald Brown and Tanya Brown's ("the Browns") objections thereto (ECF No. 17). For the reasons that follow, the Court OVERRULES the objections, ADOPTS the R & R, and REMANDS this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
On December 2, 2008, Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp filed this mortgage foreclosure action in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Ohio, as Case No. 08-CVE-12-1598. On December 11, 2013, the Browns removed the case to this Court and subsequently filed an amended notice of removal. The substitute plaintiff in the underlying action, Florida Coastal Partners, LLC ("Plaintiff or Florida Coastal"), filed a motion to remand this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 13.)
In its motion, Florida Coastal states that this is the second attempt by the Browns to remove this case. (ECF No. 13 at 1.) On February 23, 2010, the Browns first attempted to remove Case No. 08-CVE-12-1598 to this Court. See Case No. 2:10-cv-165. On March 15, 2010,United States District Judge James L. Graham issued an order remanding this case to the Court of Common Pleas based upon his finding that this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. (Ex. A, ECF No. 13.); see also Case No. 2:10-cv-165.
In the instant action, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand. (ECF No. 13.) The Browns opposed the motion. (ECF No. 14.) Magistrate Judge Kemp issued a Report and Recommendation in which he recommended that the Court grant Plaintiff's motion. (ECF No. 15.) The Magistrate Judge found that there was no basis for federal removal jurisdiction. (Id.)
In their opposition to Plaintiff's motion to remand, the Browns argued that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction because they filed a separate lawsuit that involves a federal question. (ECF No. 14 at 2.) Specifically the Browns filed a lawsuit against Plaintiff alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, fraud, and quiet title. See Case No. 13-cv-1225. The Browns maintained that because their separate action is a related case, they could remove this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18, which permits jointer of claims. (ECF No. 14 at 2.) Magistrate Judge Kemp found that the relationship between the two cases does not create federal court jurisdiction because jurisdiction is not present upon the face of the pleadings in this case. (ECF No. 15 at 3.) Magistrate Judge Kemp explained that ' ' (ECF No. 15 at 4.)
The Browns also argued that federal question jurisdiction exists because the state court deprived them of their constitutional right to a jury trial. (ECF No. 14 at 2.) The Magistrate Judge disposed of this argument, indicating that the Browns can make their constitutional argument on appeal to a state court. (ECF No. 15 at 4.) The Magistrate Judge noted further, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this Court from hearing the constitutional claim. (ECF No. 15 at 4.) That doctrine, named after the decisions in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 461 U.S. 462 (1983), stands for the proposition that "the lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers challenging state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced." Raymond v. Moyer, 501 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Magistrate Judge determined that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied because the Browns were, in essence, attempting to appeal a decision of the state court. (ECF No. 15 at 4.)
A district court must review de novo those portions of a magistrate judge's report to which a specific objection has been made, and may accept, reject, or modify any of the magistrate judge's findings or recommendations. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "The objections must be clear enough to enable the district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious." Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995). "'[O]bjections disput[ing] the correctness of the magistrate'srecommendation but fail[ing] to specify the findings . . . believed [to be] in error' are too general." Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Miller, 50 F.3d at 380).
"Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). The removal statute provides in relevant part:
[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
On a motion for remand, the question is whether the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Federal courts strictly construe removal jurisdiction. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (). "Accordingly, a federal court must resolve any doubt of its removal jurisdiction in favor of state court jurisdiction." Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Eddie, 3:13-CV-63, 2013 WL 1867023 (S.D. Ohio May 2, 2013) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941)).
The defendant carries the burden of showing that removal is proper and that the federal court has original jurisdiction to hear the case. See Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 540 (1939); Her Majesty the Queen v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 339 (6th Cir. 1989).
In the present case, the Browns Objection to the Magistrate Judge's Report is not the model of clarity. (ECF No. 17.) While the Objection has five different sections in which theBrowns make numerous arguments as to why the Court has jurisdiction, it fails to pinpoint those portions of the Magistrate Judge's report the Browns want this court to specially consider. The Court discerns only one issue the Browns raise that is dispositive and contentious. The Browns object to the determination that no federal question jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the well-pleaded complaint rule because the Complaint on its face did not raise any claims under federal law. (ECF No. 17 at 2.) Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, "federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Strong v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 78 F.3d 256, 259 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 392. "[T]he vast majority of cases brought under the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts are those in which federal law creates the cause of action." Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 478 U.S. at 808. The Browns argue that federal question jurisdiction exists under three exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule: the artful pleadings doctrine, the complete preemption doctrine, and the substantial federal question doctrine1. (ECF No. 17.)
Before addressing this objection, the Court notes that Judge Graham, not the Magistrate Judge, already determined that no federal question jurisdiction existed under the well-pleaded complaint rule when the Browns first tried to remove this case. Judge Graham pointed out that this action, on its face, did not "raise any claims that arise under federal law." Case No. 2:10-cv0165 at 2. Judge Graham noted that the availability of a "federal defense does not alter the well-pleaded complaint rule," under which a "complaint states a federal question only when 'a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States [is] an element, and anessential one, of plaintiff's cause of action.'" Id. at 2 (quoting Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936)). Judge Graham also noted that this Court, in James v. Guaranteed Rate, Inc., 2009 WL 928285, *4 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 6, 2009), "specifically held that the existence of federal law defenses to a mortgage foreclosure action brought under state law does not make the case removable." Id. at 3. In his Report, the Magistrate merely summarized Judge Graham's previous ruling. (ECF No. 15 at 2.) Magistrate Judge Kemp's Report did not address this issue. Instead, he addressed whether the Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and whether the Court had jurisdiction over the Browns' constitutional claim. (ECF No. 15 at 3-5.)
The Browns' objection therefore goes to an issue already...
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