Raymond v. Moyer

• Decision Date: 21 August 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-4081.,06-4081.
• Parties: Douglas J. RAYMOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas J. MOYER, Chief Justice; Alice Robie Resnick, Justice; Paul E. Pfeifer, Justice; Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Justice; Maureen O'Connor, Justice; Terrence O'Donnell, Justice; Judith Ann Lanzinger, Justice; Robert R. Cupp, Justice, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

501 F.3d 548

Douglas J. RAYMOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas J. MOYER, Chief Justice; Alice Robie Resnick, Justice; Paul E. Pfeifer, Justice; Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Justice; Maureen O'Connor, Justice; Terrence O'Donnell, Justice; Judith Ann Lanzinger, Justice; Robert R. Cupp, Justice, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 06-4081.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: July 26, 2007.

Decided and Filed: August 21, 2007.

ARGUED: Stephen W. Gard, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Damian W. Sikora, Ohio Attorney General's Office, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Stephen W. Gard, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Britt K. Strottman, Ohio Attorney General's Office, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees.

Before: KEITH, MOORE, and COLE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Douglas J. Raymond ("Raymond") appeals from the district court's judgment dismissing his claims filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Raymond filed suit against the seven then-members of the Ohio Supreme Court — Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer, Justice Alice Robie Resnick,¹ Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Justice Maureen O'Connor, Justice Terrence O'Donnell, and Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger (collectively, "the defendants") — alleging that their decision denying him admission to practice law in Ohio without examination violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First Amendment, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to judicial immunity on all of Raymond's claims and dismissed his suit. Because the lower federal courts lack jurisdiction over Raymond's claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, we DISMISS the case for lack of jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

According to his complaint, Douglas J. Raymond is a medical malpractice attorney admitted to practice law in Colorado, Michigan, and Missouri. As part of his practice, Raymond has appeared pro hac vice in Ohio state courts forty-three times. Raymond alleges that he "frequently has represented individuals who have been victimized by the wrongful and illegal actions of individuals, corporations and organizations which wield great economic and political power in the State of Ohio and elsewhere," Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 11 (Compl. at ¶ 33), and "frequently has spoken out on matters of great public concern in the State of Ohio and elsewhere regarding the wrongful and illegal actions of economically and politically powerful interests in the State of Ohio and elsewhere," J.A. at 11 (Compl. at ¶ 34).

On October 1, 2004, Raymond applied for admission to practice law in Ohio without examination. Raymond alleges that he was qualified for admission and submitted all the necessary paperwork, but that on May 25, 2005, he was informed that the Ohio Supreme Court had denied his application for admission without examination. Raymond allegedly received no reason for the denial of his application. On September 13, 2005, Raymond filed "a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration of his application to be admitted to [the] bar of the State of Ohio without examination," J.A. at 14 (Compl. at ¶ 48), but on November 8, 2005, he again was informed that his application was denied, and he again was given no reason.

On December 27, 2005, Raymond filed a complaint in the federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming the seven members of the Ohio Supreme Court as defendants in both their individual and official capacities. Raymond alleged that the denial of his application for admission without examination violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First Amendment, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. He requested a declaration that the denial of his application was unconstitutional and an injunction requiring the defendants to grant his application. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and on June 22, 2006, the district court granted the defendants' motion, 2006 WL 1735368, concluding that they were entitled to judicial immunity. Raymond timely appealed. After the parties submitted their briefs on appeal, we requested and received supplemental briefing from both parties addressing whether we lack jurisdiction over this case because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

II. ANALYSIS

Although neither party raised the issue of jurisdiction on appeal, "we are under an independent obligation to police our own jurisdiction." SEC v. Basic Energy & Affiliated Res., Inc., 273 F.3d 657, 665 (6th Cir.2001). Because "[t]he Supreme Court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from final state-court judgments," Abbott v. Michigan, 474 F.3d 324, 328 (6th Cir.2007), the lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction "over cases brought by `state-court losers' challenging `state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced'" under what has come to be known as "the Rooker-Feldman doctrine," Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 1199, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005)). We have emphasized the narrow scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine:

The doctrine applies only when a plaintiff complains of injury from the state court judgment itself. If the source of the injury is the state court decision, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would prevent the district court from asserting jurisdiction. If there is some other source of injury, such as a third party's actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent claim.

Abbott, 474 F.3d at 328 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Notably, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine "does not prohibit federal district courts from exercising jurisdiction where the plaintiff's claim is merely a general challenge to the constitutionality of the state law applied in the state action, rather than a challenge to the law's application in a particular state case." Hood v. Keller, 341 F.3d 593, 597 (6th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A. As-Applied Challenge

Raymond's complaint alleges only injuries arising from the decision denying him admission to practice law in Ohio. Raymond argues that the decision denying him admission to practice law violated his rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First Amendment, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and he is explicitly seeking a declaration that the decision was in error and an injunction barring the defendants from "continuing to refuse to grant [his] application" for admission to practice law, J.A. at 19 (Compl. at Prayer for Relief ¶ B) — that is, an injunction requiring that the decision be reversed. If the decision denying Raymond admission to practice law was a state-court judgment for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, then this case falls squarely within the class of cases over which the lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction: "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517. The dispositive question regarding the jurisdictional issue, then, is whether the decision denying Raymond admission to practice law in Ohio was a state-court judgment for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The Supreme Court analyzed a similar question in one of the cases that gave the Rooker-Feldman doctrine its name, District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). At issue in Feldman were the requests of two applicants, Marc Feldman and Edward J. Hickey, Jr., to be allowed to sit for the District of Columbia bar examination despite the fact that they had not graduated from a law school approved by the American Bar Association, as required by Rule 46 I(b)(3) of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.² Feldman, 460 U.S. at 465-66, 470-72, 103 S.Ct. 1303. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals issued per curiam orders denying Feldman's and Hickey's petitions to waive the requirements of Rule 46 I(b)(3), and, in separate actions, Feldman and Hickey filed suit in the federal district court challenging the denial of their waiver petitions. Id. at 468-69, 472-73, 103 S.Ct. 1303. The Supreme Court explained one of the key issues before the Court:

The District of Columbia Circuit properly acknowledged that the United States District Court is without authority to review final determinations of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in judicial proceedings. Review of such determinations can be obtained only in this Court. A crucial question in this case, therefore, is whether the proceedings before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals were judicial in nature.

Id. at 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (internal citations omitted). Examining the nature and effect of the decisions denying Feldman and Hickey permission to sit for the District of Columbia bar examination, the Supreme Court concluded that those decisions were judicial in nature:³

The proceedings were not legislative, ministerial, or administrative. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals did not "loo[k] to the future and change[e] existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power." Nor did it engage in rulemaking or specify "the requirements of eligibility or the course of study for applicants for admission to the bar. . . ." Nor did the District of Columbia Court of Appeals simply engage in ministerial action. Instead, the proceedings before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals involved a "judicial inquiry" in which the court was called upon...