Citizens' Bank of Georgetown v. Jones

• Decision Date: 07 December 1923
• Docket Number: 18178.
• Parties: CITIZENS' BANK OF GEORGETOWN et al. v. JONES.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

220 P. 787

127 Wash. 294

CITIZENS' BANK OF GEORGETOWN et al. v. JONES.

No. 18178.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 7, 1923

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; J. Truax, Judge.

Action by the Citizens' Bank of Georgetown and others against Isabella Jones. From a dismissal of the action, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed and remanded, with instructions.

Tennant & Twitchell, of Seattle, for appellants.

H. E Foster, of Seattle, for respondent.

MACKINTOSH J.

The findings of fact show that:

I. The respondent executed this instrument:

'$5,000.00.

Seattle, Wash.

'On or before 3 years after date without grace I promise to pay to the order of G. W. Gregory _____ dollars in gold coin of the United States of America, of the present standard value, with interest thereon in like gold coin at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum from maturity until paid, for value received. Interest to be paid semiannually, and if not so paid, the whole sum of both principal and interest to become immediately due and collectable at the option of the holder of this note. And in case suit or action is instituted to collect this note or any portion thereof, I promise and agree to pay in addition to the costs and disbursements provided by statute, a reasonable sum of dollars in like gold coin for attorney's fees in said suit or action.

'Due April 3, 1922, at 6528 30th NE.

'[Signed] Isabella Jones.'

The findings further show that:

'II. On the back or reverse side of said document appeared a writing purporting to be an indorsement by G. W Gregory to the Citizens' State Bank of Georgetown.

'III. Counsel for plaintiffs called defendant Isabella Jones to the witness stand with the evident intent and purpose of proving by the defendant that her signature was appended to the document as maker thereof, whereupon defendant's attorney announced that defendant would admit having signed the document in question.'

The court's conclusions of law were:

'I. That the figures '$5,000.00' appearing in the margin of said document do not constitute any part of the instrument itself but is merely a memorandum.

'II. That said instrument is not negotiable, pursuant to section 3392 of Remington's Compiled Statutes of Washington, in that it does not contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money.

'III. That plaintiff cannot be deemed a holder in due course pursuant to section 3443 of Remington's Compiled Statutes of Washington because said instrument is not complete and regular upon its face, and for the further reason that upon an examination of the instrument it cannot be said that any person taking the same' had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it.

'IV. That the instrument in question is not a promissory note in any sum and is not negotiable, and plaintiff cannot be a holder thereof in due course for value.

'V. That said action should be dismissed, defendant to recover costs.'

We have to consider whether the findings of fact support the judgment following the above conclusions of law. The question is whether the instrument before us is negotiable, complete, and regular upon its face.

Section 3392 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, as far as material here, reads:

'An instrument to be negotiable must conform to the following requirements: * * * (2) Must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money.'

Section 3443 of the same act is:

'A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions: (1) That it is complete and regular upon its face. * * *'

This appears to be the first time that this question has ever been presented to this court, but we find that it has been before courts of various states and that the decisions are not harmonious.

The quoted portions of sections 3392 and 3442 above are but restatements of the law merchant, and the decisions of other courts under the law merchant are therefore as persuasive as those decided under the uniform negotiable instruments act.

The courts of California, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts Maine, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont, in the following opinions: Strickland v. Holbrooke, 75 Cal. 268, 17 P. 204; Corgan v. Frew, 39 Ill. 31, 89 Am. Dec. 286; Witty v. Michigan Mutual Life Ins. Co., 123 Ind. 411, 24 N.E. 141, 8 L. R. A. 365, 18 Am. St. Rep. 327; Sweetzer v. French, 13 Metc. (Mass.) 262; Coolbroth v. Purinton, 29 Me. 469; McCoy v. Gilmore, 7 Ohio, 268, pt. 1; Williamson v. Smith, 1 Cold. (Tenn.) 1, 78 Am. Dec. 478; Weaver's Adm. v. Paul, 4 Pa. Dist. R. 492; Petty v. Fleishel, 31 Tex. 169, 98 Am. Dec. 524; and Kimball v. Costa, 76 Vt. 289, 56 A. 1009, 104 Am. St. Rep. 937, 1 Ann. Cas. 610--have held that such instruments as the one here are negotiable, complete, and regular. While the courts of Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Rhode Island, and Virginia, in the following cases: Prim & Kimball v. Hammel, 134 Ala. 652, 32 So. 1006, 92 Am. St. Rep. 52; Norwich Bank v. Hyde, 13 Conn. 279; Vinson v. Palmer, 45 Fla. 630, 34 So. 276; Hollen v. Davis, 59 Iowa, 444, 13 N.W. 413, 44 Am. Rep. 688; Smith v. Smith, 1 R. I. 398, 53 Am. Dec. 652; and Chestnut v. Chestnut, 104 Va. 539, 52 S.E. 348, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 879, 7 Ann. Cas. 802--have held directly to the contrary.

The reason for the holding in the first line of authorities is as well expressed by the Supreme Court of Indiana, in Witty v Michigan...